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Why do some individuals endorse public policies aimed at reducing income 
inequality while others oppose them? Why is there widespread support for such policies 
in certain countries, but not in others? This dissertation advances scholarship toward a 
general theory of support for redistribution by analyzing variation in redistributive 
attitudes within and across two developing democracies, Argentina and Peru. Support for 
redistribution is higher in the former country. 
It examines existing theories based on interests and group identity, explanations 
whose predictions have been almost exclusively evaluated in the context of advanced 
industrial democracies. It also introduces and assesses a belief-based explanation that 
focuses on inequality frames, simplified mental models of the issue of inequality 
comprised of individuals’ beliefs about the causes of economic outcomes, about the 
extent to which society provides equal opportunities, and about the nature of wealth 
 ix 
accumulation. This dissertation argues that these theories are complementary and 
identifies the contextual factors that condition the extent to which the considerations 
emphasized by these accounts inform redistributive attitudes. Interests and group identity 
are salient in contexts where individuals have access to material and informational 
resources that make them more cognizant of their position along economic and ethnic 
cleavages. In contrast, inequality frames inform redistributive attitudes regardless of 
context because of their inside-the-head nature. This study shows that the relative 
dominance of redistributive beliefs in Argentina and self-reliance beliefs in Peru help 
explain why support for redistribution is higher in the former country. 
Finally, this dissertation develops a politico-historical explanation for why and 
how these frames became relatively dominant. This account argues that individuals’ 
inequality frames are relatively stable during times of normal politics, but malleable 
during certain critical political junctures brought about by major events like mass 
political incorporation or economic crises. During such times, individuals are particularly 
receptive to elite cues and messages that are transmitted not only via rhetoric but also via 
public policies. Redistributive beliefs become dominant wherever political actors whose 
discourse features elements consistent with the redistributive frame are able to implement 
successful comprehensive social policies. The self-reliance frame becomes dominant in 
countries where this combination of rhetoric and policies does not take place during a 
critical juncture. 
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Redistribution is one of the central activities carried out by states. By extracting 
income and wealth from some and transferring them to others, states can significantly 
alter their citizens’ life chances. Accordingly, redistribution tends to be a contentious 
issue that lies at the heart of many theories seeking to account for political phenomena.  
In some of the regime transitions and democratic consolidation literature, for 
example, distributional conflicts between worse-off and well-off individuals drive cycles 
of democratization, radical politics, repression, and democratic breakdown (e.g., 
Acemoglu and Robinson 2005; Boix 2003). Theories of welfare state development are 
built on the premise that certain groups of society demand redistribution while others 
oppose it, and welfare states develop as a consequence of the relative power of these 
coalitions (e.g., Stephens 1979; Iversen 2005). Finally, theories of voting behavior and 
partisanship consider citizens’ views over the issue of redistribution to be a fundamental 
political cleavage (e.g., Kitschelt and Rehm 2004). 
But, why do some individuals endorse public policies aimed at reducing income 
inequality, alleviating poverty, and transferring resources to vulnerable populations while 
others oppose them? And, why is there widespread support for such policies in certain 
countries, but not in others? In short, what explains variation in redistributive attitudes 
across individuals and countries? To date, existing scholarship does not provide a 
comprehensive answer to these important questions. 
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There are two main existing theories that seek to answer these questions: accounts 
that focus on interests and those that focus on group identity. Interest-based theories posit 
that redistributive attitudes reflect individuals’ interests, which are in turn determined by 
the distribution of the costs and benefits of redistributive policies across the population. 
Thus, individuals whose position in the economic structure makes them likely winners 
from redistribution should be more supportive of it than those who are likely losers (e.g., 
Iversen 2005; Meltzer and Richard 1981). 
Theories based on group identity emphasize ethnic or racial divisions. One strand 
within this paradigm argues that attitudes reflect a sense of shared interests between 
individuals who identify with a particular ethnic or racial group. Thus, those who identify 
with groups that benefit from redistribution should be more supportive of it than those 
who do not identify with these groups (e.g., Alesina and Glaeser 2004, 148-154; Alesina 
and Guiliano 2009). Another strand focuses on individuals’ tendency to categorize others 
into groups and discriminate against outgroup members as well as on deeply held 
symbolic attitudes. Accordingly, individuals who hold negative or prejudiced attitudes 
toward ethnic or racial groups that disproportionately benefit form redistribution should 
be less supportive of it than those who do not hold such attitudes (e.g., Gilens 1995; 
Gilens 1996). 
The vast majority of the evidence supporting the expectations suggested by 
interest- and group identity-based accounts comes from studies of redistributive attitudes 
in advanced industrial democracies—in fact, several expectations from these theories 
have been assessed only with data from these countries. Moreover, scholars have 
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generally found unqualified support for their theoretical expectations—a fact likely due, 
at least in part, to the similarities in the economic, political, and social contexts where 
they test them. This has resulted in a body of scholarship that can be best characterized as 
a list of factors that have been found to explain individual-level variation in redistributive 
attitudes within advanced industrial democracies. Some of the factors emphasized by 
interest-based theories are current income, unemployment risk, and social class. Theories 
based on group identity emphasize ethnic identification and prejudice. 
Scholarship on redistributive attitudes is underdeveloped on many fronts. First, as 
a result of the geographical limitation of existing research, little is known about how well 
existing theories travel to explain redistributive attitudes in developing democracies. 
There is a particular dearth of evidence when it comes to theories emphasizing group 
identity. Second, from a theoretical standpoint, this body of scholarship is in urgent need 
of efforts at theoretical synthesizing—of attempts to integrate current knowledge into a 
general explanation of redistributive attitudes that can account not only for individual-
level variation, but also for divergence in these attitudes across countries. In addition, 
such a theory would need to incorporate a third type of explanation that focuses on the 
role of subjective beliefs; to date, such an account has been completely overlooked by 
comparative politics literature seeking to understand support for redistribution. 
This dissertation seeks to improve the current understanding of attitudes about 
redistribution by analyzing variation in such attitudes within and across two developing 
democracies, Argentina and Peru. In addition to examining existing theories focused on 
interests and group identity, this study introduces and assesses a belief-based explanation 
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that focuses on inequality frames, simplified mental models of the issue of inequality that 
inform individuals’ opinions about redistribution. Rather than advancing this type of 
explanation to the detriment of the other two, this dissertation argues that these theories 
are complementary. 
In turn, this study identifies the contextual factors that condition the extent to 
which interest-based and group identity-based accounts are useful in explaining 
individual-level variation in redistributive attitudes. This dissertation also moves 
scholarship forward by explicitly examining the extent to which individual-level factors 
can explain why support for redistribution is higher in Argentina than in Peru. Finally, the 
dissertation advances a politico-historical explanation to shed light on the origins of 
inequality frames, an area that is currently under-theorized within the literature. 
Main Argument 
This dissertation demonstrates the explanatory power of a belief-based theory of 
redistributive attitudes. By focusing on individuals’ social beliefs, this theory stands in 
contrast to those that emphasize interests and group identity and thus focus on 
individuals’ objective position with regard to structural cleavages. According to this 
belief-based theory, “conceptual frames” about the issue of inequality fundamentally 
inform individuals’ opinions about redistributive public policies. Conceptual frames are 
simplified mental models of reality that help people navigate complex issues (Lakoff 
2006). Frames are collections of cognitions that allow individuals to make sense of new 
information and form opinions, similar to other types of organized prior knowledge. 
Inequality frames, in particular, contain information about the causes of economic 
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outcomes and poverty that inform individuals’ judgments about the fairness of the 
distributive status quo and about the moral worthiness of helping those in need. 
This dissertation identifies two ideal-type inequality frames: the redistributive 
frame and the self-reliance frame. According to the first frame, society does not give 
people a fair chance at getting ahead and forces over which individuals have no control, 
like luck and birth, determine economic standing. Moreover, society is rigid, with very 
low social mobility, and wealth is relatively finite, making economic advancement 
resemble a zero-sum game. In contrast, according to the self-reliance frame, society lives 
up to the ideal of equality of opportunity, giving everyone who is willing to try hard 
enough a fair chance to get ahead. These alternative conceptions about the causes of 
economic disparities lead to opposing policy positions. 
According to the redistributive frame, social conditions cause inequality and are 
to blame for poverty. Thus, individuals who hold beliefs that are in line with this frame 
should support policies that transfer income or wealth from well-off individuals to worse-
off individuals. In turn, according to the self-reliance frame, individuals themselves, their 
own traits and behaviors, are responsible for inequality and poverty. As a result, 
individuals whose views are in line with this frame should oppose these policies. 
This belief-based theory of redistributive attitudes complements, rather than 
competes against, accounts emphasizing interests and group identity. Indeed, each of 
these accounts identifies a number of considerations that might combine to inform 
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redistributive attitudes.1 In turn, this dissertation identifies the contextual factors that 
make particular considerations more or less salient in shaping support for redistribution. 
Considerations derived from structural cleavages inform support only in contexts where 
individuals have access to material and informational resources that make them more 
cognizant of their position along these cleavages. While this is often the case in advanced 
industrial democracies, it is not in Argentina and Peru. And this is likely the case in other 
developing countries. 
To analyze the causes of cross-national variation in support for redistribution, this 
dissertation departs from the premise that such variation is the product of differences at 
the individual level. Indeed, a given polity does not hold attitudes; rather the level of 
support for redistribution in a given country is a reflection of the opinions of the 
individuals within that polity. There are three potential individual-level differences that 
can help explain cross-national divergence in redistributive attitudes. 
The first type is differences in the distribution of a given consideration among the 
population between countries. Consider the following example. As argued above, 
individuals who hold beliefs in line with the redistributive frame should support 
redistribution, while those whose views are closer to the self-reliance frame should 
oppose it. Aggregate-level divergence in support for redistribution between two societies 
can arise from differences in the proportion of the population that holds each of these 
beliefs. In other words, divergence could arise because the population of one country 
                                                
1 Considerations are factors or reasons that might lead an individual to decide his opinion on any given 
political issue (Zaller 1992, 40). 
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consists of more individuals who hold beliefs in line with the redistributive frame, while 
the population of the other country consists of more individuals who hold beliefs in line 
with the self-reliance frame. Differences in other considerations could explain aggregate-
level divergence in the same way. This dissertation refers to these types of differences as 
“compositional differences.” 
The second type of individual-level differences is differences in the extent to 
which a given consideration informs support for redistribution across countries—i.e., 
differences in the effect of a given consideration on support. Continuing with the example 
above, consider two countries with divergent levels of support for redistribution but with 
populations equally split between the two inequality frames. It could be that holding 
beliefs in line with a given inequality frame leads individuals to support or oppose 
redistribution more adamantly in one country than in the other. In other words, the effect 
of these beliefs on support could be greater in magnitude in one country. In this case, 
divergences in support for redistribution across the two countries do not arise from 
compositional differences, as the distribution of beliefs among the countries’ populations 
is the same. Instead they arise from what this dissertation refers to as “salience 
differences.” 
The third and final type of individual-level differences is what this dissertation 
refers to as “population-wide differences.” These are those differences in aggregate levels 
of support that compositional and salience differences cannot explain. To illustrate this 
type of difference imagine that inequality frames are equally distributed across the 
populations of two countries and that the effects of these inequality frames on support for 
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redistribution are equal across both countries. Yet, the level of support observed among 
individuals is higher in one country than in the other. This would imply that, as a whole, 
individuals within the first country are more supportive of redistribution than individuals 
in the other country, regardless of their individual-level characteristics. 
This dissertation finds that a combination of compositional and salience 
differences in inequality frames can help explain why support for redistribution varies 
across Argentina and Peru. In turn, it develops an explanation for why and how one of the 
two frames becomes relatively dominant in a given country. This political theory of the 
origins of mass inequality frames draws on the critical juncture framework (Collier and 
Collier 2002) to understand the historical evolution of these frames. It argues that 
individuals’ inequality frames are relatively stable during times of normal politics, but 
malleable during certain periods, like times of mass political incorporation or the 
aftermath of economic crises. 
During such times, individuals are particularly receptive to elite cues and 
messages that are provided not only through rhetoric but also through public policies. The 
redistributive frame becomes dominant wherever political actors whose discourse 
features elements consistent with this frame are able to implement relatively successful 
comprehensive social policies. The self-reliance frame becomes dominant in countries 
where this combination of rhetoric and policies during a critical juncture does not take 
place. By analyzing the origins of mass inequality frames, this dissertation helps explain 
present cross-national divergences in support for redistribution. 
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Research Design 
The research question guiding this study is: what accounts for divergence in 
support for redistribution between Argentina and Peru? In the process of answering this 
question, this dissertation achieves the following goals. First, it evaluates the extent to 
which considerations derived from interest and group identity are useful to explain 
individual-level variation in support for redistribution in these two countries. By doing 
so, it examines the generalizability of these theories outside advanced industrial 
democracies, with an eye toward identifying the contextual factors that condition the 
explanatory power of these theories. Second, it develops a belief-based theory that 
focuses on inequality frames and assesses the extent to which this theory can account for 
within-country variation in redistributive attitudes. 
Third, this dissertation analyzes whether compositional and salience differences in 
the considerations emphasized by these three theories can explain variation across the 
two countries. It finds that differences in inequality frames can account for part of this 
variation, but that differences in other types of considerations cannot. Finally, this study 
develops and examines a politico-historical theory of the origins of inequality frames. 
This theory explains how inequality frames become dominant in a given country. 
To do this, this dissertation relies on a multi-method empirical strategy. First, 
expectations regarding considerations derived from interests, group identity, and social 
beliefs are examined by estimating models in which support for redistribution is a linear 
function of these various considerations as well as control covariates. These regression 
analyses evaluate the extent to which each of these considerations informs support for 
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redistribution. The data used to estimate these models come from the World Values 
Survey (WVS) and the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). 
The politico-historical theory of the origins of inequality frames is evaluated 
using comparative historical case studies. These case studies analyze the political 
development of Argentina and Peru since the early twentieth century. Using process 
tracing (George and Bennett 2005), this analysis identifies critical junctures and the 
causes of inequality frame dominance. This method is also used to rule out alternative 
explanations. These case studies rely primarily on secondary sources. Wherever possible, 
historical public opinion data on social beliefs and attitudes toward redistribution—from 
both primary and secondary sources—are also incorporated in the analyses. 
Latin America constitutes an important context in which to analyze redistributive 
attitudes. Given the region’s stark and chronic levels of inequality (Milanovic 2002; de 
Ferranti, Perry, Ferreira, and Walton 2004, 53-57), the issues of inequality and 
redistribution have played an important role in political development. In particular, 
distributional conflicts fueled by inequality have helped to give rise to cycles of 
democracy and dictatorship (Diamond, Hartlyn, Linz, and Lipset 1999; Sheahan 1987; 
Smith 2005). More recently, the enactment of market reforms in the region was followed 
by a period of popular support for these reforms, during which issues of redistribution 
were sidelined. However, the recent revival of left political alternatives in the region has 
brought the issue of redistribution back to the forefront of the political arena (Cleary 
2006; Stokes 2009). 
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Argentina and Peru are interesting countries within Latin America for examining 
redistributive attitudes for at least a couple of reasons. First, the two countries have 
divergent levels of support for redistribution. Support is relatively high in Argentina and 
relatively low in Peru. Within the region, these two countries might be considered 
representative of other countries with similar levels of support for redistribution. As 
shown in Chapter 3, Argentina and Peru are “typical cases” (Gerring 2006, 88-89) when 
it comes to the relationship between support for redistribution and provision of 
redistributive policies in Latin America. 
Second, the divergence in redistributive attitudes across the two countries, with 
Argentines being more supportive of redistribution than Peruvian, is particularly puzzling 
given these countries’ levels of poverty and certain aspects of their political development. 
Given that poverty is much more widespread in Peru than in Argentina, one would expect 
Peruvians to be more concerned about inequality and more supportive of redistribution 
than Argentines, but this is not the case. Additionally, until fairly recently, Argentines 
viewed themselves (with pride) as living in a relatively egalitarian society (Rohter 2006), 
which presumably would make them less concerned about inequality and less demanding 
of redistributive policies. With regard to political development, the organized political 
left has never been strong in Argentina, but it has had an important role in Peruvian 
politics during some periods. In light of this, one might expect the issue of inequality to 
be more salient and support for redistribution to be higher in Peru than in Argentina. 
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Plan of the Dissertation 
The remainder of this dissertation is divided into six chapters. Chapter 2 provides 
a thorough overview of existing theories that focus on interests and group identity. It also 
develops a theory of redistributive attitudes based on inequality frames. The chapter 
argues that the considerations emphasized by existing theories should not be as important 
in shaping redistributive attitudes in Argentina and Peru, and in developing democracies, 
more generally, as they are in advanced industrial democracies. The chapter attributes 
this expectation to a number of contextual factors. Finally, Chapter 2 advances a politico-
historical theory that explains why one inequality frame becomes dominant to the 
detriment of the other within a given polity. 
Chapter 3 uses public opinion data to characterize redistributive attitudes in 
Argentina and Peru. It shows that Argentines want more equality and state involvement 
in the provision of welfare than Peruvians. The chapter also examines redistributive 
policies in both countries, showing that the Argentine state spends more on such policies 
and taxes its citizens more progressively than its Peruvian counterpart. Chapter 3 
concludes that when it comes to redistributive attitudes and policies, Argentina is similar 
to Europe, while Peru is similar to the U.S. 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 examine variation in attitudes about the issue of 
redistribution within the two countries under study. Chapter 4 develops and assesses 
hypotheses derived from interest-based and group identity-based theories. This chapter 
shows that, with the exception of income, considerations suggested by these theories do 
not seem to shape support for redistribution in Argentina or Peru. It also develops an 
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explanation for why this is the case, identifying a number of contextual factors that make 
structural cleavages less salient in these two countries. 
Chapter 5 develops and assesses hypotheses derived from the belief-based theory 
of redistributive attitudes. It provides evidence suggesting that social beliefs shape 
support for redistribution according to expectations: individuals who hold beliefs that are 
in line with the redistributive frame are more supportive of redistribution than those 
whose views are closer to the self-reliance frame. Chapter 5 also shows that, in contrast 
to income, differences in the composition and salience of social beliefs can help explain 
the divergence in levels of support across Argentina and Peru. 
Chapter 6 provides an explanation for why the redistributive frame is relatively 
dominant in Argentina and the self-reliance frame is relative dominant in Peru. This 
chapter traces the origins and evolution of mass social beliefs by analyzing the political 
development of the two countries since the early twentieth century. In Argentina, the 
dominance of the redistributive frame is attributed to President Juan Perón’s rhetoric and 
policies when the popular and working classes were incorporated into politics. In Peru, 
the redistributive frame did not become dominant due to bad timing and ineffective 
policies. The public’s reaction to consistently exclusionary social policies finally led to 
the relative dominance of the self-reliance frame at the peak of the neoliberal era. 
Chapter 7 concludes. It first summarizes the main findings of the previous 
chapters and then discusses their theoretical and substantive implications. Finally, this 
chapter highlights some promising avenues for future research. 
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Chapter 2 
Toward a General Theory of Support for Redistribution 
Existing theories of support for redistribution focus on individuals’ position with 
regard to structural cleavages. Interest-based accounts contend that those who benefit 
from redistributive policies should support them while those who lose from them should 
oppose them. To identify winners and losers, these accounts make assumptions about 
interests based on individuals’ socioeconomic characteristics like income, class status, 
and sectors of employment. Theories emphasizing group identity focus on divisions along 
ethnic or racial lines. They argue that individuals who belong to ethnic or racial groups 
that disproportionately benefit from welfare policies should be more supportive of them 
regardless of their own material interests. Moreover, they contend that those who hold 
prejudiced attitudes toward such economically disadvantaged groups should be less 
supportive of these policies. 
In contrast to these theories that focus on structural cleavages, this chapter 
develops a theory that focuses on individuals’ social beliefs. More specifically, this 
account contends that variation in support for redistribution is explained by diverging 
views about the causes of economic outcomes, the extent to which society provides equal 
opportunities, and the nature of wealth accumulation. Individuals who believe that factors 
like birth or luck are essential in determining economic standing, that society is rigid and 
does not give people a fair chance at getting ahead, or that wealth can only be acquired by 
stripping it from others should support redistributive policies. Those who believe that 
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hard work and effort determine income, that society lives up to the ideal of equality of 
opportunity and is open to advancement, and that wealth can be accumulated by creating 
more of it should oppose such policies. Together, these “social beliefs” (Alesina and 
Angeletos 2005) make up inequality frames, simplified mental models of the causes of 
inequality that shape support for redistribution by informing individuals’ judgments about 
the distributive status quo. 
These three sets of theories identify distinct types of considerations that might 
explain variation in redistributive attitudes. Thus, they may be seen as complementary 
rather than competing accounts. This dissertation identifies the contextual factors that 
condition the extent to which structural cleavages inform views about redistribution. As 
will be discussed below, considerations derived from interests and group identity should 
be particularly salient in contexts that provide individuals with material and informational 
resources that make them more cognizant of their position with regard to structural 
cleavages. Wherever this is not the case, these considerations should not be very useful in 
explaining variation in support for redistribution. 
This chapter also develops a politico-historical theory of the origins of social 
beliefs. Beliefs are expected to be relatively stable during times of normal politics, and 
malleable at specific periods brought about by major developments like economic crises 
and political incorporation. During such times, individuals are particularly receptive to 
elite cues and messages provided not only through rhetoric but also through public 
policies. The actions (or omissions) of political actors at these junctures cause certain 
social beliefs to rise to prominence. These beliefs become consolidated as normal politics 
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resume. Using this critical juncture framework, this chapter develops an account of the 
political origins of inequality frames in Argentina and Peru. 
Interest-Bases Theories 
Casual observers and scholars alike have traditionally considered individuals’ 
redistributive attitudes to be a reflection of their position in the income distribution. 
Those who are well-off should oppose redistribution as their interests lie in avoiding 
taxation, while those who are worse-off should endorse it as they would be the likely 
beneficiaries of increased transfers and social services.2 Not surprisingly, multiple studies 
have found that the poor are more supportive of redistribution than the rich, and this 
result is robust across a wide cross-section of developed and developing countries. For 
example, Alesina and La Ferrara (2004), Alesina and Giuliano (2009), and Fong (2001) 
all find a negative correlation between income and support for redistribution in the U.S. 
Corneo and Grüner (2002), Cusack, Iversen, and Rehm (2006), Iversen (2005), and Rehm 
(2005) report similar findings for various cross-sections of advanced industrial 
democracies. In the developing world, Ravallion and Lokshin (2000) and Gaviria (2007) 
find this negative correlation in Russia and Latin America, respectively. 
These studies also find, however, that income is not nearly as powerful of a 
predictor of attitudes as simple pocketbook logic suggests. As discussed below, a couple 
of refinements seek to account for deviations from the basic pocketbook expectation 
                                                
2 More specifically, models à la Meltzer and Richard (1981) and Romer (1975) predict that individuals with 
incomes below that of the median voter will vote for higher taxes—and thus for more redistribution—, 
while those with incomes above it will vote for the opposite. In turn, the key factor determining the size of 
government is the difference between average and median income: the higher the difference, the higher the 
level of taxation chosen by the median voter. 
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while still focusing on individuals’ interests. These consider the relationship between 
redistributive attitudes and future income prospects on the one hand, and exposure to 
labor market risks on the other. 
Given that “today’s poor may be [or at least believe they will be] the wealthy of 
tomorrow, and vice versa” (Alesina and La Ferrara 2005, 898), economic prospects are 
likely to shape support for redistributive policies. Worse-off individuals expecting to 
move above the median income might refrain from demanding redistribution in the 
present to avoid increased taxation in the future. This expectation is known as the 
prospects of upward mobility (POUM) hypothesis (Benabou and Ok 2001). Conversely, 
well-off individuals expecting to move below the median income might demand 
redistribution in the present to receive the benefits of increased taxation in the future. Past 
mobility experiences should also inform support for redistribution as they are likely 
predictive of future chances of economic improvement (Piketty 1995). 
Again, several studies have found support for these arguments. For example, 
Alesina and La Ferrara (2004) show that positive expectations about future living 
standards, objective indicators predicting higher future income, and upward income 
trajectories decrease support for redistribution in the U.S. Also in that country, Alesina 
and Giuliano (2009) find that upward trajectories in occupational status are associated 
with lower demands for welfare policies. Ravallion and Lokshin (2000) find that upward 
income mobility decreases support for such policies in Russia. The authors also report 
that expectations of downward mobility increase support among well-off individuals. 
Using data from a number of Latin American countries, Gaviria (2007) finds that, in line 
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with expectations, positive perceptions of past mobility are associated with more negative 
attitudes toward redistribution. However, the author also finds that positive perceptions of 
future mobility are associated with more positive attitudes toward redistribution, but fails 
to discuss this unexpected result. 
Exposure to labor market risks is also likely to shape individuals’ redistributive 
attitudes as a number of welfare state policies serve social insurance purposes. Consider, 
for example, unemployment insurance. This policy redistributes income from sectors 
where the risk of becoming unemployed is low to those where that risk is high. This is 
because individuals in both sectors contribute equally to the insurance scheme, but those 
in the latter benefit more from it. Given that welfare state policies not only redistribute 
resources from well-off individuals to worse-off individuals but also from low-risk to 
high-risk sectors (Moene and Wallerstein 2003), individuals employed in high-risk 
sectors should be particularly supportive of redistributive policies. The level of specificity 
of individuals’ skills should also inform support, as it is an indicator of the ease with 
which displaced individuals can transition into new occupations (Iversen 2005; Iversen 
and Soskice 2001). 
Once again, several studies have found support for expectations related to labor 
market risks. Cusack et al. (2006), Iversen (2005), and Rehm (2005) show that skill 
specificity, unemployment risk, and unemployment status have positive effects on 
support for redistribution in various cross-sections of advanced industrial democracies. 
These expectations have yet to be analyzed in the developing world, however. 
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Finally, in a more sociological vein and focusing once again on redistribution 
from well-off individuals to worse-off individuals, one should consider the possibility 
that class interests shape redistributive attitudes. As power resource theorists would 
argue, members of the working class should be particularly supportive of welfare 
policies, while members of the business class should be opposed to them (Huber and 
Stephens 2001; Stephens 1979). Thus, one would expect factors such as occupational 
status and union membership to shape individuals’ attitudes. In particular, one should 
find high levels of support for redistribution among those who are employed in manual 
occupations or who are union members. 
Again, several studies have found evidence in line with these expectations, 
although these are limited to the context of advanced industrial democracies. The 
abovementioned studies by Cusack et al. (2006), Iversen (2005), and Rehm (2005) find 
that union membership has a positive effect on support for redistribution. Guillaud (2008) 
analyzes attitudes in Great Britain, Sweden, France, and Germany, finding that 
individuals with manual occupations are substantially more supportive of redistribution 
than those with managerial or professional occupations, while the attitudes of those with 
clerical or service sector occupations lie somewhere in between. That study also finds 
that individuals reporting that they belong to the upper class are less likely to support 
redistribution than those reporting that they belong to the middle class, and that the latter 
are less likely to support redistribution than those reporting that they belong to the 
working class. Isaksson and Lindskog (2007) report similar findings in their analysis of 
redistributive attitudes in the U.S., Germany, Sweden, and Hungary. 
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To sum up, the discussion thus far suggests a number of expectations from 
interest-based theories. Income, future income prospects, and occupational status should 
be negatively correlated with support for redistribution. Risk exposure should be 
positively correlated with support. Finally, union membership should be associated with 
higher levels of support. 
Theories Based on Group Identity 
A second set of explanations rests on the observation that solidarity has a hard 
time traveling across ethnic or racial lines.3 Indeed, diverse societies seem to be less able 
to implement and sustain effective redistributive policies than their more homogenous 
counterparts.4 Accordingly, the two main arguments focus on ethnic division. They 
differ, however, on the mechanisms via which they link group membership to attitudes. 
One highlights group conflict and interests; the other, social identity. 
In diverse societies, ethnic groups might conceive of each other as competing for 
access to scarce goods, social status, and privileges (Blumer 1958; Bobo and Hutchings 
1996). These conflicting interests over valuable commodities in turn become a central 
component of animosities between groups. In contexts in which inter-group relations are 
                                                
3 This dissertation uses “race” or “racial group” to refer to populations that share a number of phenotypic 
characteristics, the most salient of which is skin color. “Ethnicity” or “ethnic group” are used to refer to 
populations that share one or any combination of characteristics such as common geographical origin, 
history, culture, language, race, and so forth. To ease exposition, “ethnicity” and “ethnic group” are used to 
refer to both types of populations henceforth. 
4 The literature documenting the negative correlation between diversity and redistribution is ample. For 
example, Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and Weber (2008) find that greater levels of linguistic heterogeneity are 
associated with lower levels of redistributive spending across countries. Alesina and Glaeser (2004) 
conclude that racial fragmentation accounts for a substantial portion of the differences in welfare spending 
across Europe and the U.S. Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999), Gould and Palmer (1988) and Hero and 
Tolbert (1996) show that this latter type of fragmentation is strongly and negatively correlated with welfare 
spending across American states. 
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particularly strained and perceptions of threat between groups are high, individuals might 
develop the belief that their life chances are linked to whatever happens to their ethnic 
group as a whole, positive or negative. This should be the case especially among those 
who strongly identify as members of disadvantaged groups. Such a sense of “linked fate” 
explains, for example, the relative homogeneity of African American political attitudes 
across class lines and economic status (Dawson 2001; Jaynes and Williams 1989). 
As a result, in contexts in which a given ethnic group is overrepresented in the 
low-income population, its members should be more supportive of redistributive policies, 
as the group benefits disproportionately from them. Conversely, one would expect 
individuals who identify with privileged groups to oppose these policies because they, as 
a group, bear a disproportionate share of its costs. Note that this support reflects group 
interests rather than self-interests because it cuts across income, class, and social status 
lines. Thus, for example, this argument implies that well-off individuals who are 
members of a disadvantaged group support redistributive policies even if this support is 
at odds with their own pocketbooks. 
Explanations based on social identity highlight individuals’ ubiquitous tendencies 
to categorize others into social groups and to prefer members of groups with whom they 
identify. These tendencies often translate in discrimination against outgroup members 
(Bradley 1978; Miller and Ross 1975; Bar-Tal 1976). Preference and discrimination 
manifest themselves in many ways. For example, individuals tend to attribute positive 
traits and behaviors to themselves and members of their ingroup, but negative ones to the 
“others.” They also tend to attribute their failures or negative outcomes to structural 
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causes beyond their control, but attribute those of others to their traits and behaviors. 
Moreover, individuals are more disposed to help those who are similar to them. 
Thus, individuals might oppose redistributive policies because they conceive of 
them as benefiting ethnic groups to which they do not belong and toward which they 
have negative affect. On the extreme, some individuals might develop fully-fledged 
prejudiced attitudes toward these groups—attitudes that could themselves be informed by 
the fact that these groups are receiving assistance—and oppose redistribution even 
further. Indeed, wherever means-tested programs disproportionately benefit individuals 
that can easily be labeled as “others” by the general population, a process of 
stigmatization generally ensues, which in turn reinforces prejudice and erodes public 
support for such programs (Katz 1990). 
The symbolic politics approach offers an alternative explanation for the origins of 
attitudes toward outgroups as well as for the relationship between these attitudes and 
individuals’ policy positions and other political opinions. According to this theory, 
individuals learn affective responses to symbols in their pre-adult years, which become 
quite stable as political socialization ends in early adulthood. In turn, these affective 
predispositions might shape individuals’ opinions whenever a given attitude object is 
related to one of these symbols (Sears and Funk 1991, 13-15). At least in the U.S., racial 
prejudice is one of them most salient predispositions identified by the symbolic politics 
literature, shaping individuals’ opinions on policy issues such as “busing” and school 
integration, unemployment benefits, and welfare spending  (e.g., Sears, Hensler, and 
Speer 1979; Sears, Lau, Tyler, and Allen 1980). More specifically, among whites, 
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negative affect toward African Americans is associated with lower levels of support for 
these public policies, which evoke the “black” symbol, among others.  
Evidence supporting the claim that members of minority groups support 
redistributive spending when these groups benefit disproportionately from it comes 
almost exclusively from the U.S. In that country, African Americans are more supportive 
of redistribution than whites, even after controlling for other individual-level 
characteristics (Alesina and Glaeser 2004, 148-154; Alesina and Guiliano 2009; Alesina 
and La Ferrara 2005). Soroka, Banting, and Johnston (2007) question the generalizability 
of this finding using data from Canada, which is usually considered to be the most similar 
country to the U.S. among advanced industrial democracies. The authors find that 
membership in linguistic or racial minority groups—Anglophone majority vs. 
Francophone minority, and Caucasian majority vs. Chinese, South Asian, and Black 
minorities, respectively—has no or very little substantive effect on support for 
unemployment insurance, welfare programs, health care, and pensions. 
With regards to the second expectation, in the U.S., prejudiced attitudes toward 
African Americans and symbolic racism have a negative effect on support for social 
programs and welfare spending (Gilens 1995; Gilens 1996; Jacoby 1994). But research 
that explores the relationship between opinions on the issue of redistribution and attitudes 
toward (immigrant) minority groups in Europe finds a more complex picture. Dahlberg, 
Edmark, and Lundqvist (2011) find that increases in the share of immigrants in Swedish 
municipalities caused by a refugee relocation program decrease support for redistributive 
policies, especially among well-off individuals. 
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Using data from the European Social Survey, Finseraas (2007) finds that attitudes 
towards immigrants have mixed effects depending on respondents’ income and the type 
of attitudes whose effects are explored. Specifically, perceptions of immigrants as a threat 
to the national culture have a negative effect on support for redistribution among 
respondents with high incomes, but no effect among those with low incomes. In contrast, 
perceptions of immigrants as a threat to the national economy have a negative effect on 
support among respondents with low incomes, but no effect among those with high 
incomes. The author concludes that predictions of decreasing support for European 
welfare states in the face of increasing immigration are likely overstated.5 
In sum, the preceding discussion of theories emphasizing group identity suggests 
two expectations. First, individuals who belong to ethnic groups that are overrepresented 
in the low-income population should be more supportive of redistribution than those who 
belong to other groups. And, second, prejudiced attitudes towards groups that are 
overrepresented in the low-income population should be negatively correlated with 
support for redistributive policies. 
A Belief-Based Theory of Redistributive Attitudes 
In contrast to the structural-based arguments presented thus far, this section 
advances a belief-based theory of attitudes regarding redistribution. This explanation 
builds on recent research in the field of economics showing that opinions on this issue 
                                                
5 There are indeed numerous studies arguing that the increased diversity caused by immigration might 
threaten the generous European welfare states because it is likely to erode public support for redistribution. 
These studies base their predictions on cross-national and sub-national studies such as those mentioned in 
fn. 4, but there is very little research that actually analyzes the effects of immigration on redistributive 
attitudes. See Banting (2005) for a summary and critique of the studies with grim predictions about the 
future of European welfare states. 
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reflect beliefs related to the causes of individuals’ economic standing and to the extent to 
which society provides people with equal opportunities. In addition to these two types of 
beliefs, this explanation also considers the ways in which individuals conceive of wealth 
accumulation. Finally, it argues that these social beliefs matter because they inform 
individuals’ judgments about the fairness of the distributive status quo and about the 
moral worthiness of helping those in need. 
Consider, for example, beliefs about the factors that determine income. Some 
individuals might think that income is a product of personal effort and ability, while 
others might consider that factors over which people have no control such as birth, 
connections, and luck are more important. In the former case, individuals should be more 
likely to consider inequality as fair—to extent that “one gets what one deserves and 
deserves what one gets” (Alesina and Angeletos 2005, 966)—and refrain from 
demanding actions to address it. In the latter case, they should be more likely to support 
redistribution to offset an unfair status quo and provide assistance to those who are in 
need because of no fault of their own. Individuals might of course have beliefs and 
corresponding attitudes toward welfare policies that lie somewhere in between these two 
extremes. Similar expectations could be laid out for other related beliefs, such as those 
about the extent to which hard work is rewarded by society, about the causes of poverty, 
about equality of opportunity, and the like. 
There is ample empirical support for these expectations, even after controlling for 
income and other variables suggested by interest-based accounts. Studies analyzing 
attitudes in the U.S. also control for racial group membership. Using data from this 
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country, Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) find that those who believe that people can get 
ahead through their own hard work are less likely to demand redistribution than those 
who think that getting lucky breaks or help from others are more important; those who 
deem both sets of factors as important lie somewhere in between.6 The authors also report 
that individuals who state that family background or knowing the right people matter for 
economic success are more likely to support redistributive policies than those who think 
that these factors do not matter. Finally, they report that those who believe that there are 
equal opportunities are more averse to welfare policies than those who think that this is 
not the case. 
Also in the U.S., Fong (2001) finds that beliefs about the causes of economic 
(mis)fortunes shape support for redistribution as one would expect. Those who attribute 
poverty to lack of effort rather than to circumstances beyond individuals’ control are 
more supportive of it. The same is true about those who think that strong effort explains 
wealth, as opposed to luck and other factors external to individuals. The author also 
reports that respondents who believe that there is plenty of opportunity for the average 
person to get ahead are less likely to support redistributive policies than those who think 
that the opposite is true. 
Analyzing data from the U.S., Sweden, Germany, and Hungary, Isaksson and 
Lindskog (2007) report findings that are consistent with expectations regarding beliefs 
about the importance of family origin for economic advancement. They also report that 
beliefs about whether or not society rewards intelligence and skills, on the one hand, and 
                                                
6 Alesina and Giuliano (2011, 20-21) report a similar finding. 
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effort, on the other, shape support for state involvement in the alleviation of income 
inequality in line with expectations. Using data from a number of advanced industrial 
democracies and former communist countries,7 Corneo and Grüner (2002) find that 
individuals who think that hard work is important for getting ahead in life are less likely 
to support redistribution. The authors also report obtaining results consistent with 
expectations when using an item that asks individuals about the importance of coming 
from a wealthy family. 
Using data from Latin America, Gaviria (2007) finds that individuals who believe 
that success depends on connections are more likely to demand redistributive policies 
than those who feel that this is not the case. The author also finds that those who think 
that hard work does not guarantee success are more likely to support such policies than 
those who consider that it does. Finally, Alesina and Giuliano (2011) analyze the effects 
of social beliefs with pooled data from all waves and countries of the World Values 
Survey (WVS). They find that the more an individual agrees with the view that hard work 
brings a better life, the more he will support government responsibility in ensuring that 
everyone is provided for. 
In addition to beliefs about the causes of economic outcomes and the extent to 
which society affords equal opportunities, this dissertation also considers individuals’ 
conceptions about wealth accumulation. Some individuals might think that wealth is 
relatively finite and that accruing it likely entails taking it from others. These individuals 
                                                
7 The cross section includes 11 countries: Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Germany (although 
East and West Germany are analyzed separately), Hungary, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Russia, and the 
U.S. 
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will likely view those who are well-off as undeserving of their status and those who are 
worse-off as victims of this state of affairs. As a consequence, they should be more 
supportive of redistributive policies. In contrast, others might feel that everyone who is 
willing to try can create and accumulate wealth. Individuals who hold these beliefs 
should be more averse to redistribution because they are likely to judge existing 
inequalities to be fair and individual prosperity to be the product of industriousness. The 
view that wealth is relatively finite is part of the redistributive frame of inequality while 
the opposite belief is part of the self-reliance frame. 
To date, social beliefs remain completely overlooked by the comparative politics 
literature seeking to understand support for redistribution; economists are the ones who 
have produced much if not all work on the relationship between social beliefs and 
redistributive attitudes. In spite of their importance, the mechanisms by which social 
beliefs shape atttiudes, on the one hand, and the origins of such beliefs, on the other, 
remain under-theorized. The remainder of this section elaborates on the former issue 
while the following develops a politico-historical theory of the origins of social beliefs. 
The social beliefs introduced thus far are most likely not independent of each 
other. Individuals who think that society does not give people a fair chance at getting 
ahead are also likely to believe that forces over which individuals have no control 
determine economic standing. Moreover, they are likely to view those in need as having 
little chance to escape poverty. Beliefs in the opposite direction should also go together; 
those who think that society lives up to the ideal of equality of opportunity are also likely 
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to deem effort and hard work as the main determinants of economic standing as well as to 
view social structure as open to personal advancement. 
Thus, rather than disconnected thoughts, social beliefs should be understood as 
the components of larger “conceptual frames” about the issue of inequality. Conceptual 
frames are simplified mental models of reality that help people navigate complex issues 
(Lakoff 2006).8 Their key feature is that they provide individuals with information about 
the causes and consequences of social phenomena, which they then use to interpret new 
information and form opinions.9 The two sets of beliefs described above constitute two 
ideal-type inequality frames: the first set of beliefs comprises the “redistributive frame” 
which is associated with support for redistributive polices, and the second set of beliefs 
comprises the “self-reliance frame” which is associated with opposition to these policies. 
Individuals might, of course, hold beliefs—and corresponding redistributive attitudes—in 
between these two ideal-type frames. 
In the redistributive frame, factors external to individuals like injustice and 
exploitation are to blame for inequality and poverty. In the self-reliance frame, 
individuals themselves and their own traits and behaviors are responsible for their fates.10 
The former conception is conducive to greater support for welfare policies because 
individuals who hold beliefs in line with it should be more likely to judge the distributive 
                                                
8 Axelrod (1974) uses the term cognitive map to refer to a similar concept. 
9 Conceptual frames are thus similar to schemas (Conover and Feldman 1984). The main difference 
between the two is that conceptual frames contain beliefs about the causes and consequences of social 
phenomena, while schemas store all types of cognitions—i.e., factual information, beliefs, evaluations, and 
so forth. Another important difference is that while conceptual frames are organized and stored as simple 
narratives, schemas are organized and stored as networks of cognitions. In sum, one could argue that 
conceptual frames are a type of cognitive structure that likely populates larger schemas. 
10 Lane (2001, 475-476) refers to these as circumstantial and dispositional attributions, respectively. 
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status quo as unfair and the poor as morally deserving of assistance. This formulation 
implies that judgments about fairness and moral worthiness—or values—are a reflection 
of inequality conceptions. This is true to some extent, as individuals generally strive to be 
fair to others when dealing with issues of distributive justice (Hochschild 1981). 
However, this is more like a simplification, as beliefs and values usually interact to shape 
policy positions (Mitchell, Tetlock, Newman, and Lerner 2003, 520).  
Because beliefs and values are likely endogenous, focusing on one of them is a 
sensible choice. And focusing on beliefs over values is appropriate for at least a couple of 
reasons. First, given that beliefs are thoughts about what is held to be true in the world 
and values are cognitions about what ought to be true, the former are likely further away 
from redistributive attitudes in the “funnel of causality” (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and 
Stokes 1960, 24-25). Indeed, this proximity makes the findings of studies analyzing the 
relationship between values and support for redistribution not very surprising. 
For example, Feldman and Steenbergen (2001) find that humanitarian 
orientations—i.e., “a sense of obligation to help those in need”—are positively correlated 
with support for social welfare policies in the U.S. Also in that country, McClosky and 
Zaller (1984) report that those who value equality over individualism are more supportive 
of these policies. Jacoby (1994) and Jacoby (2006) report similar findings. In a 
comparative study of a number of advanced industrial democracies, Blekesaune and 
Quadagno (2003) find that egalitarianism is conducive to greater support for government 
assistance to the unemployed and the elderly. 
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Second, experimental research has provided strong evidence suggesting that 
social beliefs shape support for redistribution. For example, Krawczyk (2010) conducted 
an experiment in which a monetary incentive was initially allotted among participants 
either according to chance or to performance in a competitive task. The incentive was 
distributed after participants selected their preferred transfer levels. The author finds that 
transfers were substantially higher when the incentive was assigned randomly. Durante 
and Putterman (2007) report similar experimental findings. No similar evidence is 
available in the case of values. 
To summarize, the belief-based account of redistributive attitudes suggests three 
expectations. The more an individual believes that factors over which people have no 
control are responsible for wealth and poverty, and for economic outcomes more 
generally, the more he should support redistribution. The more an individual considers 
that society does not afford people with equal opportunities for advancement, the more he 
should support redistribution. Finally, the more an individual believes that wealth is finite 
and that accumulating wealth requires depriving others of it, the more he should support 
redistribution. In addition, individuals should hold relatively cohesive beliefs, which, at 
the extremes, should be consistent with the redistributive and self-reliance frames. 
Toward a General Theory of Support for Redistribution 
Redistributive attitudes, as any other opinion, are mental constructs. As such they 
are not automatic reflections of underlying interests, attitudes toward outgroups, or 
beliefs. Rather, these are considerations that can combine to lead individuals to support or 
oppose redistribution. Given the evidence reviewed in the preceding sections, all of these 
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considerations appear to matter to some extent, at least in advanced industrial 
democracies. Thus, rather than thinking of theories focusing on interests, group identity, 
and beliefs as competing, one should see them as complementary. 
Having this in mind, this dissertation advances scholarship on support for 
redistribution by identifying the contextual factors that make particular considerations 
more or less salient in shaping support for redistribution. As the following chapters 
reveal, explanations that focus on structural cleavages are useful only in certain contexts. 
Specifically, interests and attitudes toward outgroups are relevant wherever individuals 
have access to material and informational resources that make them more cognizant of 
their position along these structural cleavages. While this is often the case in advanced 
industrial democracies, it is not in Argentina and Peru. 
In the case of material interests, individuals in Argentina and Peru, and in the 
developing world more generally, are devoid of access to these resources because of the 
relative weakness of social and political organizations advancing the interests of groups 
defined by employment status, class, or sectors of occupation. The relative 
underdevelopment of social protection systems, which are characterized by insufficient 
coverage and targeted benefits, further contributes to this situation. In addition, the 
volatility that characterizes developing economies in combination with the greater 
complexity of their social stratification, make it more difficult for individuals to develop 
attitudes in line with their economic interests. The only exception to this assessment is 
income, which shapes support for redistribution in Argentina and Peru as expected. This 
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is likely the case because the link between individuals’ position in the income distribution 
and winning or losing from redistribution is rather straightforward. 
Considerations derived from theories based on group identity do not play a role in 
shaping support for redistribution in Argentina because of its ethnic homogeneity. In 
more diverse Peru, the weakness of ethnic-based organizations and the underdevelopment 
of social protection systems help explain why these considerations are not relevant. 
Extensive ethnic intermixing in this country has further contributed to making ethnic 
cleavages less salient. 
In contrast, overall, social beliefs shape support for redistribution as expected in 
Argentina and Peru. This is because social beliefs are inside-the-head constructs about 
inequality and poverty, issues that individuals are permanently confronted with in most 
societies. Moreover, social beliefs provide a partial explanation for why support for 
redistribution is higher in Argentina than in Peru. This divergence arises from 
heterogeneity in the distribution of inequality frames across countries’ populations. In 
Argentina, the redistributive frame is dominant with the average individual’s beliefs 
being closer to the redistributive ideal type. In contrast, the self-reliance frame is 
dominant in Peru with the average individual’s beliefs being closer to the self-reliance 
ideal type. 
This finding is in line with a number of studies suggesting that social beliefs play 
an important role in explaining divergences in redistributive attitudes across Europe and 
the U.S. (e.g., Alesina and Angeletos 2005; Alesina and Glaeser 2004, 183-216). These 
studies find that Europeans are more likely to believe that society is rigid, allowing for 
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very limited mobility. They also tend to view birth, connections, and luck as playing a 
defining role in determining economic standing and to view the poor as being stuck in 
that condition. In contrast, individuals in the U.S. are more likely to believe that 
economic advancement is a product of personal effort and ability, and that those living in 
poverty can escape from it through hard work and industriousness. These compositional 
differences in social beliefs help explain why support for redistribution is higher in 
Europe than in the U.S. 
The Political Origins of Inequality Frames 
How does a particular inequality frame become dominant? A critical juncture 
framework is useful to understand this process. In line with Zaller (1992), one should 
expect individuals to have relatively stable social beliefs during times of normal politics. 
The public (or at least a large share of it) should be receptive to new ways of thinking 
about inequality and poverty—and the issue of redistribution more generally—during 
certain periods of a country’s political development. There are three historical moments 
during which social beliefs are expected to be malleable. 
One is the period during which welfare systems are initially introduced. At such 
times, the mass public should be lacking well-organized information about the social 
problems public policy aims to tackle and about the system’s characteristics and likely 
consequences. Indeed, before the invention of the modern welfare state, the minimal state 
was the norm, and assistance to those in need was left, for the most part, to private 
initiative. While individuals might have already had some inequality “proto-frames” by 
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this time, these were likely not linked to the idea of state-sponsored redistribution in the 
minds of the mass public.  
Another critical period is during mass political incorporation. Being relatively 
foreign to politics, the newly incorporated should be lacking well-developed political 
predispositions, including frames about inequality. They should therefore be particularly 
receptive to new information. Finally, another period is during the aftermath of economic 
crises, as these trigger periods of uncertainty during which individuals are particularly 
open to new ideas and policy innovations (Blyth 2002; Weyland 2008). 
These periods are not, of course, mutually exclusive. For example, in several 
developing countries, including Argentina and Peru, the period of initial implementation 
of welfare and social protection systems significantly overlapped with the period during 
which the working class and the urban popular sectors were incorporated into politics. 
Likewise, in several advanced industrial democracies, initial implementation of welfare 
policies or major welfare reform took place immediately following economic crises 
(Blyth 2002; Huber and Stephens 2001). 
During critical junctures, political actors that achieve power can tilt the balance in 
favor of one inequality frame over the other by implementing—or failing to implement—
social policies and using rhetoric to justify their policy choices. Political elites and 
societal actors supporting and opposing particular policies use debate, deliberation, or 
more extreme means of political persuasion to advance their positions and to discredit 
those of the opposing side. Once in power, the winners of such political debates are in a 
position to consolidate the dominance of their inequality frame both by implementing 
 36 
their preferred policies and by reiterating the beliefs that lend support to their policy 
positions using their increased access to state and political resources. 
Social policies themselves are important because they provide individuals with 
additional information that reinforces inequality frames. Generous welfare systems 
generally feature universal programs. Given that these programs tend to foster high levels 
of social trust and social cohesion (Kumlin and Rothstein 2005; Rothstein and Uslaner 
2005), they should prompt individuals to develop social beliefs that are sympathetic to 
the poor and thus in line with the redistributive frame. In contrast, relatively modest 
welfare systems tend to rely on means-tested, targeted programs, which often lead to 
stigmatization, a process by which negative traits and behaviors are ascribed to program 
beneficiaries.11 This stigmatization likely fosters social beliefs that are hostile to the poor 
and that feature prominently in the self-reliance frame. Whenever generous welfare 
systems are implemented, it is also important that they are relatively successful at 
reducing inequality or producing welfare gains, as individuals will reject ineffective 
policies along with the rhetoric that justifies them. 
Thus, the redistributive frame should become dominant wherever progressive-
oriented political actors whose discourse prominently features populist, egalitarian, or 
class struggle elements are able to implement relatively successful comprehensive social 
policies. The self-reliance frame becomes dominant in countries where this combination 
of rhetoric and policies does not materialize. For example, this is the case wherever 
                                                
11 The literature on stigmatization of welfare program beneficiaries is ample (e.g. Spicker 1984; Colton, 
Casas, Drakeford, Roberts, Scholte, and Williams 1997; Fraser and Gordon 1994; Goffman 1963; Katz 
1990). 
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conservative elites introduce relatively modest welfare systems and actively use the self-
reliance frame to justify this choice; or wherever comprehensive policies are 
implemented, but do not produce welfare gains or result in economic or social turmoil.  
Finally, once normal politics resume, the window of opportunity provided by a 
given critical juncture closes and social beliefs become resilient to change. As time 
elapses, inequality frames should become more and more engrained in the minds of the 
public and become deeply held predispositions that inform more peripheral attitudes. This 
stability helps explain why support for redistribution is relatively stable over time. 
Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, at this stage, the dominant inequality frame and 
its corresponding levels of support for redistribution become constraints on the range of 
options that politicians and bureaucrats can pursue in this policy domain. As a result, 
policy changes should be relatively rare and, for the most part, incremental during times 
of normal politics. 
As this dissertation shows, in the two countries under study, the first critical 
juncture was the political incorporation of the working and the popular classes. This 
development overlapped with the period during which modern welfare systems were 
implemented in both countries. By the end of this juncture, the redistributive frame had 
risen to prominence in Argentina because President Juan Perón was able to implement 
extensive and relatively successful social policies while embracing anti-oligarchic, 
populist rhetoric. In contrast, the redistributive frame remained weak in Peru because the 
progressive political force of the time, the Peruvian Aprista Party, was unable to attain 
power. Later on, the progressive-oriented Revolutionary Government of the Armed 
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Forces (GRFA) failed to produce redistributive frame dominance because it attempted 
radical change during a period of normal politics when Peruvians held strong 
predispositions in line with the self-reliance frame. 
A second critical juncture took place in Argentina following the economic and 
political crises of the 1970s and 1980s. While the redistributive frame weakened during 
this time, allowing for the implementation of market reforms in the early-1990s, a new 
and deeper economic crisis in the early-2000s restored it to prominence. In Peru, the 
dominance of the self-reliance frame was consolidated after a major economic and 
political crisis in the late 1980s and the successful implementation of neoliberal reforms 
in the early-1990s. 
With regard to alternative explanations of inequality frame dominance, scholars 
have argued that social beliefs diverged across Europe and the U.S. because of 
differences in historical mobility experiences, arable land endowments, and religious 
beliefs (e.g., Alesina and Angeletos 2005; Benabou and Tirole 2006; Piketty 1995). 
Specifically, a class structure open to personal advancement and land abundance might 
have fostered relatively optimistic beliefs about mobility and opportunity in the U.S. 
Similarly, settlers’ Protestant religious background might have made the early Americans 
more inclined to believe in the power of effort and personal willpower in shaping life 
outcomes. 
While intuitively appealing, these ideas cannot account for divergence in social 
beliefs in Argentina and Peru. As will be shown in Chapter 6 in detail, if either of the two 
countries was, at some point in time, to be regarded as a “land of opportunity” it would 
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be Argentina at the turn of the twentieth century. Current levels of social mobility across 
the two countries are also comparable and thus cannot explain diverging social beliefs. 
Given that both countries had a deep-rooted Catholic tradition since colonial times and 
well into the twentieth century, it would be hard to make the case that religious beliefs 
can account for divergence in inequality frames and corresponding levels of support for 
redistribution. In contrast, the politico-historical explanation advanced here can 
successfully account for this divergence. 
Conclusion 
As this chapter has argued and the empirical analysis in the ensuing chapters will 
document, with the exception of current income, considerations suggested by theories 
that focus on structural cleavages are relatively unsuccessful in accounting for variation 
in redistributive attitudes in Argentina and Peru. In contrast, the belief-based theory 
advanced in this chapter is able to account for variation in both these countries. Indeed, 
individuals who hold beliefs that are in line with the redistributive frame are more 
supportive of redistribution than those whose views are closer to the self-reliance frame. 
In turn, the distribution of conceptual frames in the minds of the mass public helps 
explain the divergence in support for redistribution between Argentina and Peru. 
The dominance of a particular inequality frame is contingent on the actions of 
political elites at critical political junctures. The redistributive frame becomes dominant 
whenever progressively oriented elites are able to implement social policies that benefit 
large sections of the population while using rhetoric that invokes beliefs in line with the 
redistributive frame to justify their positions. The self-reliance frame becomes dominant 
 40 
wherever social policies develop in an incremental manner, as concessions from 
generally conservative elites, or whenever ambitious social policy reform is attempted 
outside the windows of opportunity provided by critical junctures. 
The following four chapters assess the expectations developed here in the context 
of Argentina and Peru. Chapter 3 characterizes support for redistribution and social 
policies in both countries. It also compares them to other Latin American countries as 
well as to European countries and the U.S. Chapter 4 examines expectations derived from 
theories focused on interests and group identity, while Chapter 5 explores the role played 
by social beliefs and examines the causes of divergence in levels of support for 
redistribution between Argentina and Peru. Finally, Chapter 6 analyzes the origins of 
inequality frames in these two countries through comparative historical case studies. 
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Chapter 3 
Redistributive Attitudes and Policies in Argentina and Peru 
Europe and the U.S. are the contexts in which attitudes toward redistribution have 
been most extensively studied (e.g. Alesina and Glaeser 2009; Alesina and La Ferrara 
2005; Iversen 2005; Cusack et al. 2006). In line with the conventional wisdom, this 
research shows that Europeans tend to be more supportive of redistribution than 
individuals in the U.S. and that actual levels of spending on welfare state policies are 
aligned with citizens’ opinions on both sides of the Atlantic. Extant theories of 
redistributive attitudes have been developed with this characterization in mind. They seek 
to account for the emergence of these two equilibria: one with high levels of public 
support for redistributive policies and high levels of spending on these policies and the 
other with low levels of support and spending. 
This chapter examines redistributive attitudes and policies in Argentina and Peru. 
It shows that the former country is more similar to Europe and the latter is more similar 
to the U.S. Argentines are more supportive of redistribution than Peruvians and levels of 
support in these countries are comparable to those observed in European countries and 
the U.S., respectively. The chapter also analyzes patterns of polarization in redistributive 
attitudes and shows that Argentines are more divided over this issue than Peruvians. In 
terms of actual levels of spending on welfare state policies, the parallel also applies, with 
Argentina spending substantially more than Peru—although both spend substantially less 
than their more advanced counterparts. 
 42 
The remainder of the chapter is divided into five sections. The first one introduces 
the survey data used for the analyses throughout the dissertation as well as the specific 
items that are used to measure redistributive attitudes. The second section examines 
support for redistribution in Argentina and Peru as well as the dispersion of attitudes on 
this issue. The third section characterizes redistributive policies in Argentina and Peru. 
The fourth section compares levels of support for and spending on redistribution in the 
two countries with other Latin American countries. Finally, the fifth section concludes. 
Data and Measurement 
This dissertation uses survey data from two main sources to examine attitudes 
toward redistribution in Argentina and Peru (and beyond). The World Values Survey 
(WVS) is the source on which the dissertation relies most heavily. The WVS is an 
ongoing study that collects data on individuals’ attitudes, values, and beliefs in a large 
number of countries throughout the world. Thus far, five waves of surveys have been 
completed, 1981-1984 (Wave 1), 1989-1993 (Wave 2), 1994-1999 (Wave 3), 1999-2004 
(Wave 4), and 2005-2008 (Wave 5); a sixth wave, 2010-2012, is currently underway.12 
Argentina and Peru were both included in the third, fourth, and fifth waves of the study. 
Argentina was surveyed in 1995 (Wave 3), 1999 (Wave 4), and 2006 (Wave 5), and Peru 
was surveyed in 1996 (Wave 3), 2001 (Wave 4), and 2008 (Wave 5). The WVS is useful 
because it includes items gauging not only individuals’ redistributive attitudes but also 
their social beliefs. Chapter 5 uses these items to characterize social beliefs and evaluate 
the belief-based explanation of support for redistribution. 
                                                
12 For further details about the WVS, visit www.worldvaluessurvey.org. 
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The second source is the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The 
Americas Barometer has collected survey data on individuals’ political attitudes and 
behaviors in almost all countries in the Americas in 2006, 2008, and 2010.13 Items 
measuring support for redistribution were only included in the latter two years, however. 
This dissertation thus only uses data from these years. Given that they collect extensive 
data on individuals’ socioeconomic status, economic prospects, and ethnicity, LAPOP 
studies are especially useful for the analysis of existing structural explanations presented 
in Chapter 4. 
Table 3.1 summarizes the wording of the four items used to measure support for 
redistribution throughout the dissertation. EQUALITY is a measure of the extent to 
which individuals think that income inequality should be increased or decreased. 
RESPONSIBILITY gauges the extent to which individuals hold views consistent with 
individual vs. government responsibility in providing for people. INEQUALITY 
measures the degree to which individuals think that the government should implement 
policies to address inequality. Finally, WELL-BEING gauges the degree to which 
individuals think that the government, as opposed to individuals, is responsible for 
people’s well-being. 
The EQUALITY and RESPONSIBILITY items are available for both Argentina 
and Peru in the third, fourth, and fifth waves of the WVS. The INEQUALITY and 
WELL-BEING items are available in the 2008 and 2010 surveys of the LAPOP. Table 
                                                
13 More information about LAPOP can be found at www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop. 
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A1.1 in Appendix 1 presents the descriptive statistics for these items.14 These and other 
very similar items have been used in a number of studies to measure support for 
redistribution.15  
Table 3.1 
Items Used to Measure Support for Redistribution 
 
Note: wording has been slightly modified to ease presentation. 
                                                
14 Waves rather than years are used to present responses to the EQUALITY and RESPONSIBILITY items. 
Again, Argentina was surveyed in 1995, 1999, and 2006, and Peru in 1996, 2001, and 2006 as part of the 
third, fourth, and fifth waves of the WVS, respectively. These are labeled Wave 3, Wave 4, and Wave 5 for 
simplicity throughout this study. Also, whenever the text uses “years” the reader should keep in mind that 
these refer to “waves” in the case of items taken from the WVS. 
15 Alesina and Giuliano (2009) use RESPONSIBILITY among other items. Chong and Gradstein (2006) 
and Lindqvist and Östling (2010) use EQUALITY and RESPONSIBILITY among other items. Gaviria 
(2006) uses an item very similar to RESPONSIBILITY and WELL-BEING available in the 1996 
Latinobarómetro. Corneo and Grüner (2000), Corneo and Grüner (2002), Cusack et al. (2006), and Iversen 
(2005) all use an item very similar to the INEQUALITY item that is available in several waves of the 
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). Rehm (2005) uses an item very similar to INEQUALITY 
that is available in the 2002/2003 European Social Survey. 
Source Label
EQUALITY
How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree
completely with the statement “Incomes should be made more equal;” 10
means you agree completely with the statement “We need larger income
differences;” and if your views fall somewhere in the middle, you can
choose any number in between.
RESPONSIBILITY
How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree
completely with the statement “People should take more responsibility to
provide for themselves;” 10 means you agree completely with the
statement “The government should take more responsibility to ensure that
everyone is provided for;” and if your views fall somewhere in the
middle, you can choose any number in between.
INEQUALITY
In the following scale, 1 represents “strongly disagree” and 7 represents
“strongly agree.” Numbers between 1 and 7 represent an intermediate
score. The (nationality) government/state should implement strong
policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. To
what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?
WELL-BEING
In the following scale, 1 represents “strongly disagree” and 7 represents
“strongly agree.” Numbers between 1 and 7 represent an intermediate
score. The (nationality) government/state, more than individuals, is the
most responsible for ensuring the well-being of the people. To what











These items provide good measures of individuals’ attitudes about income 
inequality and government involvement in its alleviation, but they are not free of 
potential limitations. One limitation is that the wording of the EQUALITY, 
RESPONSIBILITY, and WELL-BEING items makes responses potentially dependent on 
the redistributive status quo. In a context of extensive welfare provision, even individuals 
who support redistribution could be inclined to believe that more income differences and 
more individual responsibility are needed (Lindqvist and Östling 2010, 546). However, as 
will be shown below, support for redistribution as measured by these items is higher in 
Argentina than in Peru and welfare state policies are more developed in the former 
country. If anything, the items might underestimate the extent to which support differs 
across the two countries under study. 
Another limitation pertaining to INEQUALITY is that the item does not specify 
which “strong policies” should be used to reduce income inequality. Thus, it is possible 
that one individual might answer “7” while thinking that the government should fight 
inequality by improving education and health services while another provides the same 
answer but with policies like direct cash transfers to the poor or more radical measures 
such as expropriation in mind. The latter type of individual would be more supportive of 
redistribution than the former, but the item does not discriminate between the two. This 
could be potentially damaging especially if “stronger policies” carries substantially 
different meaning for respondents across Argentina and Peru. This item is still useful, 
however, because it discriminates between those who believe that the state should do 
nothing or very little to reduce inequality from those who believe it should do something 
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or very much, regardless of the specific policies they have in mind. Moreover, given that 
the welfare state is more extensive in Argentina than in Peru, individuals in Argentina 
should be more likely to have policies that directly transfer income in mind when 
answering this question. Again, this might result in underestimating the differences in 
support across the two countries. 
Finally, it is worth noting two limitations shared by the RESPONSIBILITY and 
WELL-BEING items. First, respondents might have different interpretations of what 
government as opposed to individual “responsibility” entails. Similarly, the meanings of 
ensuring “that everyone is provided for” and “well-being” are also open to interpretation. 
For example, some might answer having an abstract “moral responsibility” in mind, 
while others might conceive of responsibility in more concrete terms, expecting direct 
action from the state to provide for individuals. In the worst-case scenario, respondents 
would interpret the items differently across contexts. Once again, given the extent of 
welfare state development in Argentina and Peru, one would expect individuals in the 
former country to be more prone to interpreting these terms in a concrete way than those 
in the latter. Differences in support for redistribution across the two countries would be 
underestimated if this were the case. 
It is also worth noting the design differences among the items. First, EQUALITY 
and INEQUALITY differ from RESPONSIBILITY and WELL-BEING in important 
ways. While the former pair of items makes references to income inequality, the latter 
make reference to government as opposed to individual responsibility in “providing for” 
and “ensuring the well-being of” the people. Moreover, EQUALITY and INEQUALITY 
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differ in that the former asks respondents for their opinion on income inequality alone, 
while the latter inquires whether government should implement strong policies to reduce 
such inequality. Finally, items also differ in the scales they employ to record responses. 
Those from the WVS (EQUALITY and RESPONSIBILITY) use a ten-point scale with 
opposite statements at each end, while those from the LAPOP studies (INEQUALITY 
and WELL-EBING) use a seven-point scale with “strongly disagree” and “strongly 
agree” at each end. While the former forces individuals to make a choice between 
alternatives, the latter is probably susceptible to individuals’ tendency to acquiescence—
i.e., the tendency to agree with assertions made in a statement regardless of its content 
(Krosnick 1999, 552). 
Despite the fact that these items tap into the same underlying construct, the design 
differences just highlighted result in diverging estimates of support for redistribution 
across measures. These divergences should not be surprising given the vast literature on 
survey design effects; therefore, the ensuing analysis refrains from explaining them.16 
Instead, the analysis focuses on within-item cross-country comparisons to demonstrate 
that support for redistribution is substantially higher in Argentina than in Peru. As 
discussed earlier, the conclusions presented below can only be strengthened by the fact 
that the available items likely underestimate the extent to which support differs across the 
two countries under study. 
                                                
16 For a review of survey design effects see Krosnick (1999, 543-559). 
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Support for Redistribution in Argentina and Peru 
Figure 3.1 presents the mean response to the four items for each of the available 
country-years. As the figure shows, mean support for redistribution is higher in Argentina 
than in Peru for all the available item-year pairings. Differences are quite substantial in 
the case of EQUALITY, especially in Wave 4 and Wave 5. It is also important to point 
out that the smallest differences in EQUALITY and RESPONSIBILITY are observed in 
Wave 3. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, this is likely due to the political circumstances 
of the mid-1990s when this wave was conducted. Differences in INEQUALITY and 
WELL-BEING are relatively modest. 
Figure 3.1 
Mean Support for Redistribution in Argentina and Peru, 
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Table 3.2 compares mean support for redistribution across the two countries and 
assesses the statistical significance of observed differences. As the table shows, all 
differences are statistically significant at the 5% level; in fact, all but one of them are 
significant at the 0.1% level. Most importantly, the differences in mean support for 
redistribution across the two countries are quite substantial, especially in the case of the 
EQUALITY item. Indeed, in Wave 4, mean responses to this item across the two 
countries diverge by 2.59 points out of a possible nine and by 2.23 points out of a 
possible nine in Wave 5. Differences in support for redistribution as measured by the 
other items are more modest, but clearly not negligible. Observed differences are more 
remarkable if one considers that the items used to measure support are likely to 
underestimate the divergence in opinion across the two countries. 
Together, Figure 3.1 and Table 3.2 also show that mean support for redistribution 
is quite stable over time within each country. While mean responses to the items vary 
from year to year, change is only incremental. The largest changes are observed in the 
case of the EQUALITY item; from Wave 3 to Wave 4, mean response increased by 
21.37% in Argentina and dropped by 20.30% in Peru. The mean is, of course, very 
sensitive to extreme values and thus might overstate the extent to which support varies 
over time. Median responses are presented below to address this weakness. 
Figure 3.2 presents the medians for the four items. The figure shows that median 




Comparisons of Mean Support for Redistribution in Argentina and Peru, 
by Item and Year 
 
All results reported correspond to independent samples t-tests assuming unequal variances. 
a Ho: Difference=0; Ha: Difference>0. 
EQUALITY item in Argentina is “5” in the third wave and “6” in the other two waves, 
while the median response in Peru is “3” in all waves. In the case of RESPONSIBILITY, 
the median responses are “6,” “7,” and “6” in Argentina and “6,” “5,” and “5” in Peru. 
Thus the only instance in which median support does not diverge is RESPONSIBILITY-
Wave 3. As mentioned earlier, the fact that opinions in the two countries are more similar 
during the mid-1990s, as measured by both EQUALITY and RESPONSIBILITY, is 
likely a product of the political circumstances of the time. This will be discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter 5. 
Argentina Peru
Wave 1 5.01 4.38 0.63 0.1368 4.64 0.000
Wave 2 6.08 3.49 2.59 0.1191 21.76 0.000
Wave 3 5.73 3.50 2.23 0.1394 15.99 0.000
Wave 1 5.77 5.46 0.31 0.1368 2.29 0.011
Wave 2 6.64 5.29 1.35 0.1241 10.87 0.000
Wave 3 6.05 5.14 0.91 0.1429 6.34 0.000
2008 6.17 5.75 0.42 0.0521 8.05 0.000
2010 5.90 5.56 0.34 0.0565 5.97 0.000
2008 6.01 5.5 0.51 0.0541 9.35 0.000














Median Support for Redistribution in Argentina and Peru, 
by Country and Year 
 
In the case of the items taken from the LAPOP surveys (i.e., INEQUALITY and 
WELL-BEING), all median responses are “7” in Argentina and “6” in Peru. Overall, 
differences in support for redistribution across the two countries are quite substantial in 
the case of EQUALITY, but more modest in the case of the other three items. Again, it is 
worth noting that these differences are likely underestimated because of the limitations of 
the items discussed in the previous section. Finally, the analysis of median support also 
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In sum, as the above figures and table show, support for redistribution is clearly 
higher in Argentina than in Peru. This divergence is consistently observed in all of the 
years for which data are available in the WVS and the LAPOP surveys—the only 
exception being the case of median support for redistribution as measured by 
RESPONSIBILITY in Wave 3 of the WVS. The following section discusses the policy 
implications of these differences in public opinion. 
Redistributive Policies in Argentina and Peru 
The level of support for redistribution within countries has implications for the 
policies that get implemented. Indeed, a country’s social policies are usually rather 
aligned with the opinions of its public. The following paragraphs detail Argentina’s 
rather extensive welfare state, especially compared to Peru’s less redistributive social 
policies. In addition to providing an overview of the social policies and revenue 
collection systems in Argentina and Peru, this section also considers their distributive 
implications.  
Table 3.3 summarizes several indicators of government spending. All figures 
correspond to 2007, the last year for which data are available, and are expressed as a 
share of GDP to facilitate comparison. First, consider total government expenditures, 
which is a common proxy for the amount of welfare provision in a given country. 
Looking at this measure in the table, the Argentine state seems massive when compared 
to that of Peru. In the former country, government expenditures amount to about one third 
of gross domestic product (GDP), while in the latter, government expenditures are well 
below 20%. As the table shows, Argentina devotes three times as much of its GDP as 
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Peru to social spending. Disaggregated data provide a more detailed picture of 
redistributive efforts in each country. Argentina spends more than Peru in each of the 
four categories, with disparities ranging from a little over twice as much in education to a 
little over four times as much in health. 
Table 3.3 
Government Expenditures in Argentina and Peru, 
as a percentage of GDP, 2007 
 
All figures include central, state, and local levels of government; in addition, social spending figures 
include expenditures made by nonfinancial public enterprises. Source: total expenditures figure taken from 
IMF (2011); all others taken from ECLAC (2011a). 
a Includes expenditures in education, culture, recreation, and sports. 
b Includes expenditures in health and nutrition; might also include some expenditures in sanitation. 
c Includes expenditures in social security, social protection, social work, social assistance, and training. 
d Includes expenditures in housing, water, sanitation, and other areas not included in previous categories. 
Following a trend in Latin America (Huber, Mustillo, and Stephens 2008, 423-
425), expenditures in education and health are allocated more progressively than 
expenditures on social insurance schemes like old-age pensions and unemployment 
compensation. Also like in the rest of the region, funds allotted to highly progressive 
social assistance programs such as conditional cash transfers are on the rise in both 
countries, but are still limited to a small fraction of total social spending. Thus, 
altogether, government cash transfers—i.e., pensions, unemployment compensation, and 
social assistance receipts—do not improve the distribution of income in either of the two 









Argentina 5.46 5.07 10.80 1.91 23.23 33.60
Peru 2.60 1.24 3.70 0.60 8.14 17.72
Country
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0.50 in Peru before and after considering these transfers (Goñi, López, and Servén 2011, 
1560). However, if both cash and in-kind transfers—i.e., the value of free public health 
and education services—are included in the income calculations, the coefficient drops to 
0.45 in Argentina and to 0.49 in Peru (Goñi et al. 2011, 1565). The greater improvement 
in Argentina is due to higher levels of spending on education and health, as patterns of 
spending on these services are equally progressive in the two countries. 
Beyond levels of spending, there are also a number of other differences in social 
policies across the two countries that are worth highlighting. When looking at pensions, 
the major differences between the two countries are related to coverage and institutional 
design. In Argentina about 76% of those that are 70 or more years old receive pensions or 
retirement benefits; in Peru the figure is only 27% (ECLAC 2006, 117). The difference 
stems not only from better coverage by the contributory pension system, but also from a 
more developed scheme of non-contributory pensions in the former country.  
In terms of institutional design, a single, state-run, pay-as-you-go system is in 
place in Argentina. In contrast, Peruvians have the option of choosing between a public, 
pay-as-you-go system and a privately run, individual capitalization system.17 The latter 
system, which by definition does not redistribute income, is the preferred option of high-
                                                
17 In the 1990s, pension systems in both countries underwent major reforms. In Argentina, a mixed system 
was put in place, in which workers contributed to both a pay-as-you-go system that guaranteed a minimum 
pension upon retirement, and to an individual capitalization system. In 2008, all funds in the private system 
were nationalized and a single, state-run, pay-as-you-go system reinstated. In contrast, in Peru a parallel 
system in which individuals are given the option of choosing between a public pay-as-you-go system and a 
private individual capitalization system upon entering the labor force was put in place. Only those who 
initially chose the public system have the option to switch to the other system. In 2007, a series of reforms 
were introduced including a state funded, minimum pension scheme for individuals in the private system. 
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income Peruvians. Given these characteristics, the Argentine pension system is clearly 
more redistributive in aim than that of Peru. 
Additionally, the social security system in Argentina includes two schemes whose 
likely outcome is to redistribute from well-off individuals to worse-off individuals, at 
least among the formally employed. Unemployment insurance provides income 
replacement for an amount and a period of time that are contingent on contributions while 
employed. A system of family allowances (asignaciones familiares) financed by a payroll 
tax allots transfers to workers with low incomes for a number of reasons, including 
marriage, maternity, birth, and number of children. In contrast, in Peru, workers are 
protected from unemployment by a system of individual savings accounts paid for by 
employers, and there is nothing that resembles the system of family allowances in place 
in Argentina. Again, there are striking differences in the coverage of social security; in 
Argentina, 56.0% of the employed urban population contributes to social security; in 
Peru, only 18.7% does (ECLAC 2006, 45). 
With regard to social assistance programs, the two countries share some 
similarities, but Argentina’s programs are more ambitious. Both countries have several 
nutritional programs targeting vulnerable populations and temporary employment 
programs in public works and community services. More recently, conditional cash 
transfer programs have been added to the mix. Figures that would allow one to compare 
the scope of social programs across the two countries are hard to come by, but 
highlighting a program recently introduced in Argentina can help shed light on the 
differences in redistributive efforts across the two countries. The Asignación Universal 
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por Hijo (“Universal Allowance per Child”) extends access to family allowances to the 
unemployed and those employed in the informal sector. As a condition, children in 
participating households are required to attend school and receive vaccinations.  No plan 
with such an ambitious mandate exists in Peru where the only conditional cash transfer 
program in existence is still very targeted and timidly expanding. 
Moving on to revenue collection, Table 3.4 presents several indicators. Like in the 
previous table, all figures correspond to 2007, the last year for which data are available, 
and are expressed as a share of GDP to facilitate comparison. Again, looking at total 
government revenue, the Argentine state seems massive when compared to that of Peru. 
Most of the difference across the two countries is explained by indirect taxes, but the 
Argentine state collects more than one percentage point of its GDP more than that of Peru 
in direct taxes and almost three times as much in social contributions. 
Table 3.4 
Government Revenue in Argentina and Peru, 
as a percentage of GDP, 2007 
 
All figures include central, state, and local levels of government. Source: total 
revenue figures taken from IMF (2011); all others taken from ECLAC (2011b). 
A number of differences in the tax systems across the two countries are worth 
highlighting. First, the tax rate on corporate profits is 35% in Argentina and 30% in Peru. 
These are also the highest marginal tax rates on individual income in each country. 
Direct        
Taxes




Total      
Revenue
Argentina 8.67 15.53 4.51 31.52
Peru 7.54 7.85 1.56 20.91
Country
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Nominal tax rates in each country for a number of incomes are shown in Figure 3.4. 
Detailed information about income brackets and tax rates used to build the figure can be 
found in Table A1.2 of Appendix 1. As shown by the figure, nominal rates are much 
higher in Argentina than in Peru regardless of income level. For example, the rate for an 
individual earning US$ 12,000 a year would be about 17.6% in Argentina while it would 
be only about 3.5% in Peru. This is a product of two reasons: income brackets are much 
more narrow and the highest marginal tax rate starts to apply at a lower income level in 
Argentina. Moreover, while the nominal individual income tax is progressive in both 
countries, individuals at the lower end of the income distribution are taxed in Argentina 
but not in Peru. 
Figure 3.4 
Nominal Tax Rates on Individual Income in Argentina and Peru, 
by Income 
 

















































































These characteristics lead to different outcomes in terms of effective income tax 
rates. In Argentina, all income quintiles pay income tax; the first three contribute about 
1% of their gross income, while the fourth and fifth ones contribute about 2% and 4%, 
respectively. In Peru, only the fifth quintile pays this type of tax, contributing about 5% 
of its gross income (Goñi et al. 2011, 1563). The distributive implications of these 
income tax schemes are quite similar, however. After considering direct taxes, income 
inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient decreases by one point in each country. 
More specifically, the coefficient drops from 0.49 to 0.48 in Argentina and from 0.50 to 
0.49 in Peru (Goñi et al. 2011, 1560). 
Second, with regard to indirect taxes, the Argentine state obtains significantly 
more revenue from this source than that the Peruvian state and, in turn, this could 
potentially have regressive implications. However, value added taxes are almost neutral 
in Argentina, but severely regressive in Peru. Indeed, all income quintiles pay around 
10% of their gross income for this type of tax in Argentina, while the first and fifth 
quintiles pay around 17% and 12%, respectively, in Peru (Goñi et al. 2011, 1563). After 
considering indirect taxes, the Gini coefficient remains at 0.48 in Argentina, but increases 
from 0.49 to 0.51 in Peru (Goñi et al. 2011, 1560). 
Moreover, in Argentina, a big proportion of indirect tax revenue comes from two 
sources: export and financial transactions taxes. According to the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), these taxes collected revenue amounting to about 4% of the GDP in 2004 
(IMF 2005, 12). In Peru, there is no export tax, and at 0.08%, the financial transactions 
tax is substantially lower than the 0.6% charged in Argentina (IMF 2005, 23). Given that 
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export and financial transaction taxes are likely to place a higher burden on the rich, 
overall, the Argentine tax system is more progressive than its Peruvian counterpart. 
To sum up, Argentina not only spends substantially more funds than Peru in 
social policies but also allocates a larger share of this spending progressively across 
income groups. Social insurance transfers are regressive in both countries, but less so in 
Argentina. Additionally, education and health spending is more progressive in Argentina 
than in Peru. On the revenue side, the Argentine tax system is progressive, while that of 
Peru is regressive. Overall, and in line with citizens’ opinions on this issue, Argentine 
public policies redistribute more income from well-off individuals to worse-off 
individuals than Peruvian public policies. 
Support for Redistribution and Social Policy in Latin America 
Looking beyond Argentina and Peru, this section explores the relationship 
between support for redistribution and redistributive policies in other Latin American 
countries. Figure 3.5 presents the relationship between support for redistribution and 
government social expenditures as a share of the GDP. Support is measured as mean 
responses to EQUALITY and RESPONSIBILITY in Wave 5 of the WVS and to 








Support for Redistribution and Government Social Spending in Latin America, 
circa 2005-2008 
 
Figures for EQUALITY and RESPONSIBILITY correspond to Wave 5 (2005-2008) of the WVS; figures 
for INEQUALITY and WELL-BEING correspond to the 2008 LAPOP surveys; government expenditures 
figures correspond to 2007 in plots involving items from the WVS and to 2008 in plots involving items 
from the LAPOP; included countries are Argentina (AR), Bolivia (BO), Brazil (BR), Chile (CL), 
Colombia (CO), Costa Rica (CR), Dominican Republic (DR), Ecuador (EC), El Salvador (SV), Guatemala 
(GT), Honduras (HN), Jamaica (JM), Mexico (MX), Nicaragua (NI), Panama (PA), Paraguay (PY), Peru 
(PE), Trinidad and Tobago (TT), and Uruguay (UR). Source for government expenditures: ECLAC (2012). 
As the figure shows, there is a positive correlation between mean support for 
redistribution and government social spending in Latin American countries. The 
correlation is particularly strong in the case of EQUALITY and RESPONSIBILITY. 
These correlations suggest that there is correspondence between levels of support for 
redistributive policies and levels of provision of such policies. In other words, when it 
comes to the issue of redistribution, Latin Americans seem to be getting what they ask 
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redistribution and the supply of redistributive policies are in equilibrium (Alesina and 
Angeletos 2005; Benabou and Tirole 2006).  
Finally, as can be seen in Figure 3.5, Argentina (AR) is among the countries in 
which both support for redistribution and government spending are relatively high. Also 
evident is the fact that Peru (PE) is among the countries in which levels of support and 
spending are relatively low. And this is the case regardless of the item used to gauge 
support for redistribution. Having this in mind, one could argue that when it comes to the 
politics of redistribution, Argentina is similar to Europe and Peru is similar to the U.S. 
Conclusion 
Argentina and Peru are located on distinct redistributive equilibria in which 
citizens’ demands and public policies on this issue domain are in line with one another. 
With high levels of public support for and government provision of welfare policies, 
Argentina has a high-redistribution equilibrium. With low levels of support and 
provision, Peru has a low-redistribution equilibrium. Thus, when it comes to the politics 
of redistribution, the former country is more similar to Europe while the latter is more 
similar to the U.S. The next two chapters explores how well the theories introduced in 
Chapter 2 explain variation in support for redistribution within Argentina and Peru and 
the extent to which these individual-level insights help explain differences in aggregate 
levels of support across the two countries. 
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Chapter 4 
Interests, Social Identity, and Support for Redistribution 
in Argentina and Peru 
This is the first of two chapters that together seek to explain why support for 
redistribution is higher in Argentina than in Peru. The present chapter analyzes the role 
that the considerations emphasized by theories based on interests and group identity play 
in shaping redistributive attitudes. The following chapter explores the role of social 
beliefs and examines the sources of divergence in support for redistribution across the 
two countries under study. 
The evidence provided below suggests that, with the exception of current income, 
the factors suggested by interest-based and group identity-based theories do not shape 
support for redistribution to a significant extent. Current income informs attitudes as one 
would expect: the higher the income of an individual, the less he supports redistribution. 
The other considerations emphasized by interest-based theories—economic prospects, 
exposure to risks, class status, and union affiliation—do not shape support for 
redistribution according to expectations. With regard to the factors suggested by accounts 
emphasizing group identity, support for redistribution is not higher among disadvantaged 
ethnic groups nor is it undermined by prejudice against these groups in Argentina. In 
Peru, the evidence is mixed at best. With these findings, this chapter shows that 
explanations focused on structural cleavages do not seem to travel well outside the 
context of advanced industrial democracies to explain support for redistribution in the 
developing contexts of Argentina and Peru. 
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The remainder of this chapter is organized in five sections. The first one derives 
specific hypotheses from the interest-based and group identity-based explanations 
discussed in Chapter 2. The second section provides details about the empirical strategy 
and data used for the analyses. Results of the statistical analysis are presented and 
discussed in the other two sections. The third one deals with hypotheses derived from 
interest-based theories; the fourth one, with those derived from explanations emphasizing 
group identity. The last section summarizes the main findings and concludes. 
Hypotheses 
Interest-based explanations suggest that income and future income should have a 
negative effect on support for redistribution, while exposure to risk, union membership, 
and class status should have a positive effect. Expectations regarding income and union 
membership can be stated as hypotheses in a straightforward way: 
Hypothesis 4.1.1 The higher the income of an individual, the less he should support 
redistribution. 
Hypothesis 4.1.2 Individuals who belong to unions should be more supportive of 
redistribution than their non-unionized counterparts. 
Expectations regarding future income, exposure to risk, and class status require 
further discussion. As discussed in Chapter 2, scholars have analyzed both subjective 
assessments about economic prospects and past mobility experiences to tap into 
individuals’ future income (e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara 2004; Alesina and Giuliano 
2009; Gaviria 2007; Ravallion and Lokshin 2000). These constructs seem to predict 
individuals’ future trajectories in the reasonably stable, predictable economic contexts of 
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advanced industrial democracies. Data available for the countries under study only allow 
for testing expectations about subjective assessments.18 Thus only hypotheses pertaining 
to this construct are stated here: 
Hypothesis 4.1.3 Individuals who expect their economic situation to improve should be 
less supportive of redistribution than those who expect no change. 
Hypothesis 4.1.4 Individuals who expect their economic situation to worsen should be 
more supportive of redistribution than those who expect no change. 
Scholars generally decompose exposure to risk into three interrelated concepts: 
skill specificity, unemployment risk, and realized risk (Iversen and Soskice 2001; Cusack 
et al. 2006; Rehm 2005). Since data limitations make it impossible to test hypotheses 
related to the first two constructs, a single hypothesis pertaining to realized risk, namely 
being currently unemployed, is presented here.19 
                                                
18 More specifically, available surveys for Argentina and Peru—the studies from the WVS and the LAPOP 
introduced in Chapter 3—do not contain measures capturing individuals’ past mobility experiences of any 
kind—i.e. intergenerational or intragenerational income, occupational, or educational mobility. LAPOP 
studies do contain items capturing individuals’ subjective assessments about their past economic situation, 
but given that these are very correlated with subjective assessments about future economic situation, only 
the latter are used in the ensuing analyses. 
19 Existing studies measure skill specificity using a set of alternative indicators first introduced by Iversen 
and Soskice (2001, 881-883). One set of measures is calculated for occupational categories using the 
International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) and national labor force surveys. An 
alternative set of measures is calculated using an item that asks individuals to assess their prospects of 
finding an acceptable job in case of unemployment, which was included in the International Social Survey 
Programme (ISSP) surveys used by the authors. Unemployment risk is measured with unemployment rates 
by occupational categories at the two- or three-digit level of the ISCO. These are calculated using national 
labor force surveys (Cusack et al. 2006; Rehm 2005). Unfortunately, the surveys available for Argentina 
and Peru do not ask respondents about their occupations using a classification scheme that is compatible 
with the schemes used by these countries’ national labor surveys. Available surveys do not include items 
gauging individuals’ prospects of finding a job in case of unemployment either. A question gauging 
individuals’ fears of becoming unemployed was included in the 2008 LAPOP study but only for Argentina 
and thus is not considered in the ensuing analysis. 
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Hypothesis 4.1.5 Individuals who are unemployed should be more supportive of 
redistribution than those who are employed. 
“Class” is a multi-dimensional concept. As such, classifying individuals into 
distinct classes could potentially require considering a number of socioeconomic factors 
such as income, wealth, occupation, educational attainment, values, and consumption 
patterns. Following the arguments of power resource theorists summarized in Chapter 2, 
the ensuing analyses use occupation as the defining characteristic determining class 
membership. Three occupational categories are particularly important: business owners 
and managerial and professional occupations; non-manual clerical, supervisory, or 
technical occupations; and manual occupations of all skills levels. 
Individuals with the first type of occupations are assumed to belong to the upper 
class while those with the last type of occupations are assumed to belong to the working 
class. In the Latin American context, scholars of social stratification have labeled the 
former group as the “dominant classes” and the latter as the “manual formal proletariat” 
(Portes 1985; Portes and Hoffman 2003). Individuals with non-manual occupations are 
assumed to belong to the middle class. The following hypotheses reflect expectations 
based on class: 
Hypothesis 4.1.6 Individuals who are business owners or are employed in managerial 
or professional occupations should be less supportive of redistribution 
than those who are employed in non-manual occupations. 
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Hypothesis 4.1.7 Individuals who are employed in manual occupations should be more 
supportive of redistribution than those who are employed in non-
manual occupations. 
One important feature that distinguishes developing from developed economies is 
the size of the “informal sector,” comprised of micro-entrepreneurs, workers of small, 
unregistered businesses, and independent workers in the service sector. In Latin America, 
the size of the informal sector has been estimated to be around 40% to 50% of the 
employed urban population (Hoffman and Centeno 2003, 372). According to statistics 
compiled by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
the figures corresponding to Argentina and Peru in 2009 are 39.9% and 57.6%, 
respectively (ECLAC 2012). 
Developed with the class structure of advanced industrial democracies in mind, 
existing scholarship is silent about the relationship between employment in the informal 
sector and redistributive attitudes. Following the logic of interest-based explanations, one 
needs to analyze whether informal workers win or lose from redistribution in order to 
hypothesize about their position on this issue. 
Since informal workers do not benefit from or contribute to employment-based 
programs—e.g., old-age pensions and unemployment benefits—, it is reasonable to 
assume that considerations regarding this type of programs do not inform their 
redistributive attitudes. Informal workers have the lowest incomes of all occupational 
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classes in Latin America (Portes and Hoffman 2003, 55-65).20 Being relatively worse-off, 
they likely benefit from spending on education, health, education, and social assistance. 
On the revenue side, while informal workers do not pay income tax, they pay indirect 
taxes and thus contribute to fund government spending. However, given that the bulk of 
government revenue is collected from the highest income quintiles in both Argentina and 
Peru (Goñi et al. 2011, 1563), it seems reasonable to assume that informal workers are 
net winners from redistributive policies. Accordingly, following the logic behind interest-
based theories, employment in the informal sector should be associated with higher levels 
of support for redistribution. 
Hypothesis 4.1.8 Individuals who are employed in the informal sector should be more 
supportive of redistribution than those who are employed in the formal 
sector. 
Explanations based on social identity suggest two additional expectations. First, 
individuals who belong to ethnic groups that are overrepresented in the low-income 
population should be more likely to support redistribution than those who belong to other 
groups. Second, levels of prejudice towards groups that are overrepresented in the 
population benefiting from redistributive policies should be negatively correlated with 
support. The following paragraphs develop these general expectations into hypotheses 
that take into account the characteristics of the two countries under study. 
                                                
20 According to the ECLAC (2011c, 25-26), the share of workers employed in the informal sector in urban 
areas in Latin American has fallen from 48.1% in 1990 to 42.7% in 2009, but the income gap between the 
two sectors has significantly widened. This is due to the fact that wages in the formal sector significantly 
increased during this period, while wages in the formal sector remained stagnant. Moreover, those who 
transitioned from the informal to the formal sector were probably disproportionately well-off. 
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Argentina’s population is quite homogenous. While there are no official figures 
about the ethnic composition of the population, whites are a clear majority with around 
95% of the population. With between 4% and 6% of the population circa 2005, the Afro-
descendent population is the largest minority group, followed by the indigenous 
population with about 1.56%.21 The few studies that exist on the topic point to the fact 
that Afro-descendent and indigenous minorities are more burdened by poverty and have 
more limited access to education and health services than the white majority (Universidad 
Nacional del Tres de Febrero 2006; Villalpando 2005). 
Official narratives of racial homogeneity have kept widespread prejudiced 
attitudes and practices in the shadows in Argentina.22 Discrimination against the poor and 
members of the working class by the white middle and upper class of Buenos Aires is 
common, however. They use the derogatory terms negro (black) or cabecita negra (little 
black head) and villero (village-dweller) to refer to members of these groups, who are 
                                                
21 Figure for the Afro-descendent population was taken from Dawnes, Patricio. April 2, 2005. Negros en el 
país: censan cuántos hay y cómo viven. Clarín (cited in Universidad Nacional del Tres de Febrero 2006, 
11). The Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos (INDEC) estimated Argentina’s population to be 
38,592,150 in 2005 (INDEC 2012a). The Encuesta Complementaria de Pueblos Indígenas (ECPI) 2004-
2005, estimated the indigenous population at 600,329 (INDEC 2012b), thus the 1.56% estimate. A question 
asking respondents whether any members in the household were indigenous or had indigenous ancestry 
was first included in the 2001 Census. Information from this census was then used to carry out the ECPI 
2004-2005, the first nationally representative sample of people with indigenous ancestry. The 2010 Census 
was the first census in over 100 years to include a question on African ancestry. According to the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook, 97% of the population is white while the remaining 3% is 
comprised of various minorities (CIA 2012a). 
22 According to the popular narrative, Argentina is a crisol de razas (a melting pot of races) where racial, 
cultural, and linguistic unity is the product of extensive mixing (Carrasco 2000, 15). This intermixing took 
place among whites of different national, ethnic, and religious origins, as indigenous and Afro-descendent 
populations were “seen as having conveniently disappeared” (Sutton 2008, 107). The alleged disappearance 
of the indigenous population was attributed to conquest and military occupation of their territories and that 
of Afro-descendants to death in war and disease. Both groups “disappeared” in the 1800s. It is also worth 
noting that there was a deliberate effort by local elites to “Argentinize” white immigrants (Devoto 2003). 
About the crisol de razas narrative and “Argentinization” see also Caggiano (2005). 
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often dark-haired and brown-skinned and reside in shantytowns located in the inner city 
and outskirts of Buenos Aires.23 More recently, undocumented immigrants from Bolivia, 
Paraguay and Peru have also become targets of discriminatory attitudes. On the one hand, 
being poor and mostly indigenous and mestizo, they have been included in the negro and 
villero categories. But, most importantly, they are the victims of a xenophobic discourse 
that accuses them of contributing to the increase of social maladies and that resonates not 
only among the upper and middle class, but also among poor and working-class 
Argentines as well as among some sectors of the press and the political establishment.24 
In sum, being overrepresented in the low-income population, one should expect 
Afro-descendents and indigenous minorities to be more supportive of redistribution. At 
the same time, prejudiced attitudes toward these groups should be associated with less 
support for redistribution among whites. Finally, as in the case of Europe, prejudiced 
attitudes toward immigrants should be associated with less support for redistribution 
among all Argentines. 
                                                
23 Starting in the 1930s, a significant migration process brought relatively poor, dark-haired, and dark-
skinned mestizos from rural areas in the provinces to serve as manual workers in the capital. As it grew in 
size, this group later became part of the popular base of Peronism. Upper and middle class white Porteños 
(natives of the port city of Buenos Aires), who were also generally opposed to Peronism, started to refer to 
the poor mestizos as cabecitas negras (Ratier 1971a). The term villero started to take hold in the 1950s as 
economic decline led mestizo immigrants to permanently settle in shantytowns—as opposed to using them 
as temporary dwellings en route to permanent and adequate living arrangements (Ratier 1971b). 
24 This discourse accuses new immigrants of occupying vacant land and property, contributing to the 
spread of disease, and being responsible for increases in crime, drug trafficking, and unemployment. Since 
there has always been a sizable share of immigrants from neighboring countries in Argentina, authors 
blame the development of this xenophobic discourse to the intersection of three factors: the predominantly 
indigenous and mestizo character of the new immigrants, their arrival en masse to Buenos Aires starting in 
the 1990s, and the economic troubles that started in the last years of that decade and the deep 2001-2002 
recession. For more information see Casaravilla (2000), Caggiano (2005), and Grimson (2005). 
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Hypothesis 4.2.1 In Argentina, Afro-descendents and the indigenous should be more 
supportive of redistribution than those who do not self-identify as 
such. 
Hypothesis 4.2.2 In Argentina, the higher an individual’s level of prejudice against 
Afro-descendent or indigenous minorities, the less he should support 
redistribution. 
Hypothesis 4.2.3 In Argentina, the higher an individual’s level of prejudice against 
immigrants, the less he should support redistribution. 
The Peruvian population is much more diverse than that of Argentina. According 
to the National Continuous Survey of 2006, 57.6% of those who answered the question 
about ethnic origin self-identified as mestizo (a mix of white and indigenous), 26.9% as 
indigenous, 4.8% percent as white, and 1.5% as black or mulatto. The remaining 9.1% 
includes those who self-identified with other categories or declined to answer (INEI 
2012a).25 Whites and mestizos generally have higher incomes and greater access to 
educational opportunities, assets, and services, while the indigenous population is the 
most socioeconomically disadvantaged; Afro-descendents are located in between the 
other groups (Benavides, Torero, and Valdivia 2006; Ñopo, Saavedra, and Torero 2007; 
Valdivia, Benavides, and Torero 2007). 
Given that they are relatively worse-off, one should expect the indigenous to be 
the group most supportive of redistribution, while the relatively well-off whites and 
                                                
25 According to CIA World Factbook, 45% of the Peruvian population is indigenous, 37% is mestizo, 15% 
is white, and the remaining 3% is of African, Asian, or other descent (CIA 2012b). 
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mestizos should be at the other extreme. In turn, the attitudes of Afro-descendents are 
likely to be informed by two competing considerations. On the one hand, they might feel 
inclined to oppose redistribution, as it disproportionately benefits the indigenous. At the 
same time, however, they might feel inclined to support redistribution given that they 
benefit more from it than whites and mestizos. The following hypotheses assume that the 
attitudes of Afro-descendents are equally informed by both considerations and thus are 
located in between those of the indigenous and those of whites and mestizos. 
Hypothesis 4.2.4 Peruvians who self-identify as indigenous should be more supportive 
of redistribution than those who self-identify as Afro-descendents or 
mestizos. 
Hypothesis 4.2.5 Peruvians who self-identify as Afro-descendent should be more 
supportive of redistribution than those who self-identify as whites or 
mestizos, but less supportive than those who self-identify as 
indigenous. 
Understanding prejudiced attitudes and practices in Peru is not an easy task given 
their complex and covert nature. The indigenous and Afro-descendents are the most 
important targets of such practices, but the discrimination they face is different. In the 
case of Afro-descendents, discrimination is based on physical appearance; in the case of 
the indigenous, elements such as clothing, language, and social origin are also important 
(Valdivia et al. 2007, 613). Thus while discrimination is somewhat inescapable for Afro-
Peruvians, people of indigenous ancestry might be able to avoid it by “shedding their 
culture,” getting formal education, or improving their economic standing—that is, by 
 72 
doing what the white elite might refer to as becoming mestizo (de la Cadena 2000, 3-6). 
Another consequence of this type of discrimination is that mestizos can become targets of 
prejudice or actively discriminate against other mestizos (Twanama 1992).26 
Even if covert and complex, prejudiced attitudes and practices are widespread in 
Peru.27 For example, racist narratives have traditionally blamed underdevelopment on the 
indigenous population, who was seen as “racially degenerate” and “irrationally tied to the 
past […] and adverse to capitalism” (Drinot 2006, 19). These narratives advocated for 
mestizaje as a solution to this problem. More recently, a survey study (Sulmont Haak 
2005) documented the prevalence of racist and discriminatory practices. It found that 
30% or more of respondents had found themselves in the following situations: “people 
behaved as if they were better than me;” people treated me “with less respect than other 
people;” and people treated me “as if I were not intelligent.” Around 15% of those who 
experienced these situations believed that this was due to their race or ethnic origin. This 
was the third most mentioned reason, after economic status and age (just under 45% and 
25%, respectively).28 Finally, another recent study (Espinosa, Calderón-Prada, Burga, and 
                                                
26 Indeed, a given mestizo can be more indigenous, less educated, or economically worse-off and thus 
discriminated against when interacting with another mestizo (or white). The same mestizo can discriminate 
against others that are more indigenous, less educated or economically worse-off than him. 
27 Racist and discriminatory practices against the indigenous in Peru can be traced back to the institutions 
of colonial times and those against Afro-descendents to the institution of slavery. Those against the 
indigenous are well documented; for a historical overview see Drinot (2006). In contrast, practices against 
Afro-descendents remain understudied. This is likely a function of a process of “invisibilization,” by which 
the rest of society (and the state) systematically ignored this population (Valdivia et al. 2007, 623). 
28 The study also finds that those who speak an indigenous language or who identify themselves as “people 
from the mountains” experience more discrimination than those who do not, and that the opposite is true 
about those that identify as “people from the coast,” “Limeños,” and “mestizos.” Another interesting result 
is that only between 10% and 15% of respondents thought that indigenous people could enforce their rights 
“all the time” or “almost all the time.” The figure for Afro-descendents is between 25% and 30%, that for 
mestizos is between 45% and 50%, and that for whites is around 95% (Sulmont Haak 2005). 
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Güímac 2007) found that the Andean indigenous were described as “sad,” “hard-
working,” “backward,” “prone to solidarity,” and “conformist,” and Afro-descendents as 
“happy,” “conformist,” “untrustworthy,” “lazy,” and “backward.” Characterizations of 
these groups are in stark contrasts with that of whites, which were seen as “developed,” 
“individualists,” “successful,” “corrupt,” and “capable.”29 
Given data limitations, ensuing analyses cannot analyze hypotheses about 
attitudes toward each of the ethnic groups identified in Peru. Depending on the survey 
used for analysis, only hypotheses about attitudes toward ethnic outgroups as a whole or 
towards the indigenous population can be explored. Thus, the hypothesis below 
formalizes expectations about prejudice toward the indigenous population only. 
Hypothesis 4.2.6 In Peru, the higher an individual’s level of prejudice against the 
indigenous minorities, the less he should support redistribution. 
Methods and Data 
The following equation represents a generic model of the i-th individual’s level of 
support for redistribution (SUPPORTi): 
SUPPORTi = !0 + !1INCOMEi + !2UNIONi + !3POUMi 
 + !4FODMi + !5UNEMPLOYEDi + !6MANAGERi 
 + !7WORKERi + !8INFORMALi + !9MINORITYi 
 + !10PREJUDICEi + !11MINORITYi*PREJUDICEi + !Zi + ei (4.1) 
                                                
29 Mestizos were characterized as “hard-working,” “unreliable,” “corrupt,” “happy,” and “conformist.” The 
same attributes were the most salient in descriptions of Peruvians in general, which is in line with the fact 
that the average Peruvian is (or self-identifies as) mestizo. The study also explored characterizations of the 
Amazonian indigenous and population of Asian-descent (Espinosa et al. 2007). 
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where INCOMEi is the individuals’ income; UNIONi is a dichotomous variable indicating 
whether he belongs to a union; POUMi and FODMi are dichotomous variables indicating 
whether he expects his economic situation to improve or to worsen, respectively; 
UNEMPLOYEDi is a dichotomous variable indicating whether he is unemployed; 
MANAGERi is a dichotomous variable indicating whether he is a business owner or has a 
managerial or professional occupation; WORKERi is a dichotomous variable indicating 
whether he has a manual occupation; INFORMALi is a dichotomous variable indicating 
whether he is employed in the informal sector; MINORITYi is a dichotomous variable 
indicating whether he self-identifies with a minority group; PREJUDICEi is the 
individuals’ level of prejudice toward economically disadvantaged groups; the term 
MINORITYi*PREJUDICEi is included to allow the effect of prejudice to vary across 
groups; Zi is a vector of control covariates—with its corresponding vector of coefficients 
(!)—; and ei is a random error term. 
The ensuing analyses evaluate the hypotheses laid out above by estimating 
parameters !0 through !11 in Equation 4.1. Given hypotheses 4.1.1 through 4.1.8, the 
coefficients associated with income (!1), prospects of upward mobility (!3), and being a 
business owner or being employed in managerial or professional occupations (!6) should 
be negative, while those associated with union membership (!2), prospects of downward 
mobility (!4), unemployment (!5), being employed in manual occupations (!7), and being 
employed in the informal sector (!8) should be positive. Expectations about the 
coefficients associated with group membership and prejudice require more discussion. 
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The models estimated for Argentina do not include the interaction term 
(!11MINORITYi*PREJUDICEi) due to data limitations discussed below. Hypothesis 4.2.1 
suggests that individuals self-identifying as Afro-descendent or indigenous should be 
more supportive of redistribution. Thus, the coefficient associated with minority self-
identification (!9) should be positive. Hypothesis 4.2.2 specifies that prejudice should 
have a negative effect on support. Thus, !10 should be negative. Hypothesis 4.2.3 is 
explored by adding the i-th individual’s level of prejudice toward immigrants 
(IMMIGRANTi) to the model with its corresponding coefficient (say !12), which is 
expected to be negative. 
In Peru, the hypotheses regarding racial and ethnic minorities are group-specific. 
Thus, the term !10MINORITYi in the model above will be replaced with three 
dichotomous variables to identify the four groups in that country, whites (the baseline 
category), mestizos, Afro-descendents, and the indigenous, with their corresponding 
coefficients (!MMESTIZOi, !AAFRO-DESCENDENTi, and !IINDIGENOUSi). 
Accordingly, the interaction term (!11MINORITYi*PREJUDICEi) will be replaced with 
the following three interaction terms: !M*PMESTIZOi*PREJUDICEi, !A*PAFRO-
DESCENDENTi*PREJUDICEi, and !I*PINDIGENOUSi*PREJUDICEi. These 
interactions allow the identification of the effect of prejudice among whites, the group for 
whom the effect of prejudice is most relevant. 
Assuming that mestizos support redistribution more than whites, and given 
hypotheses 4.2.4 and 4.2.5, the effects of the three ethnic identification variables should 
be positive. Additionally, the effect of being indigenous should be greater than the effect 
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of being an Afro-descendent, and the latter should be greater than the effect of being 
mestizo. Stated mathematically, this translates into the following expectation: 
!M+!M*PPREJUDICEi > !A+!A*PPREJUDICEi > !I+!I*PPREJUDICEi > 0. Finally, given 
hypothesis 4.2.6, the effect of PREJUDICEi should be negative among whites. Thus, !10 
should be negative. 
No single available survey contains items measuring all the hypothesized 
covariates of support for redistribution for the two countries under study. In an effort to 
assess all of the hypotheses laid out above, the ensuing analyses use data from five 
surveys: the third, fourth, and fifth waves of the WVS, and the 2008 and 2010 LAPOP 
studies. What follows is a detailed discussion of the dependent and independent variables 
used in the analyses reported and discussed later in this chapter.  
Dependent Variables 
Support for redistribution (SUPPORTi in the generic model above) is measured 
using the four items introduced in Chapter 3: EQUALITY and RESPONSIBILITY in the 
WVS, and INEQUALITY and WELL-BEING in the LAPOP studies. These four items 
are available for all of the relevant country-year pairings. The variables constructed using 
these items (EQUALITYi, RESPONSIBILITYi, INEQUALITYi, and WELL-BEINGi) are 
treated as continuous in the ensuing analyses. 
The two items from the WVS ask respondents to provide their level of agreement 
with two opposing statements using a 10-point scale in which a response of “one” 
represents total agreement with the statement not in support of redistribution, and a 
response of “10” represents total agreement with the statement in support of 
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redistribution. The statements for EQUALITY are “We need larger income differences” 
and “Incomes should be made more equal.” The statements for RESPONSIBILITY are 
“People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves” and “The government 
should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for.” 
The LAPOP items, INEQUALITY and WELL-BEING, ask respondents to 
provide their level of agreement with a single statement using a seven-point scale in 
which “one” represents total disagreement and “seven” represents total agreement. The 
statements in these items are “The (nationality) government/state should implement 
strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor” and “The 
(nationality) government/state, more than individuals, is the most responsible for 
ensuring the well-being of the people,” respectively. Full wording for these four items is 




 is measured using items that ask respondents to locate themselves in 
one of 10 income brackets in both the WVS and LAPOP studies. The WVS income item 
is available for all waves in Peru, but only for Wave 3 in Argentina. To avoid losing 
Wave 4 and Wave 5 for Argentina, the income variable is imputed for these waves 
according to the procedure detailed in Appendix 2. This variable is treated as continuous. 
The way in which UNION
i
 is measured depends on the data source. In the case of 
the WVS, it is measured using an item that asks respondents about their membership 
status in labor unions. In the case of LAPOP, for lack of a better alternative, UNION
i
 is 
measured using an item that asks respondents about their attendance to labor union 
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meetings. All respondents who stated that they had attended meetings are coded as union 
members. The WVS item is available for all waves, but the LAPOP item is only available 
in 2008. 
The only study that contains an item gauging individuals’ economic prospects is 
the LAPOP 2010 survey. This survey asks respondents the following question: “Do you 
think that in 12 months your economic situation will be better than, the same as, or worse 
than it is now?” Response categories are “Better,” “Same,” and “Worse.” This item is 







 is measured using an item that asks respondents about their 
employment status. It is available for all country-years. Since the item about employment 
status mentioned above classifies individuals into several categories, additional 
dichotomous variables are constructed to make currently employed individuals the base 







 are self-explanatory. OTHER STATUS
i
 indicates whether the 
individual declared being a homemaker, not working and not looking for work, or in 
another status. For lack of a better alternative, self-employment is used as a proxy for 
employment in the informal sector (a proxy for INFORMAL
i
). Thus, being self-employed 
is expected to have a positive effect on support for redistribution. Retired people should 
also be more supportive of redistribution as at least some of them are likely to be 
recipients of government pensions. There are no clear expectations for students and those 
in the residual category. 
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The LAPOP surveys include another measure related to UNEMPLOYMENT
i
. It 
asks currently employed individuals if they experienced an unemployment episode in the 
recent past. A dichotomous variable indicating whether the individual experienced such 
an episode (UNEMPLOYMENT EXPERIENCE
i
) was constructed using this item. Like 
current unemployment, having recently experienced unemployment is expected to have a 





 are measured using items that classify the occupations 
of employed individuals. In the WVS, this item is available in all waves for Argentina 
and in Wave 3 and Wave 4 for Peru. In the LAPOP studies, the item is available in 2008 
for Argentina and in 2008 and 2010 for Peru. Individuals who are business owners or 
have managerial or professional occupations are considered members of the upper class, 
and those with manual occupations at all skill levels are considered members of the 
working class. To facilitate the discussion of results, individuals in the former group are 
referred to as “managers” or said to have “managerial occupations,” while those in the 
latter are referred to as “workers” or said to have “manual occupations.” 
The way in which ethnic group membership is measured depends on the data 
source. In analyses using data from the LAPOP, it is measured using a self-identification 







, and OTHER MINORITY
i
 
(with whites comprising the base category). In the case of WVS data, ethnic group 
membership is measured using an item that asks interviewers to classify respondents by 
observation. The item is available for Peru in all three waves. The same four dichotomous 
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variables constructed using data from the LAPOP are also constructed using this WVS 
item, but only for Wave 3 and Wave 5. The Wave 4 fails to appropriately distinguish 
between mestizos, indigenous, and Afro-descendents, so only two variables, MESTIZOi 
and OTHER MINORITYi, are constructed for this wave. In Argentina, this item is only 
available in Wave 5. Given the response categories and distribution of responses in 
Argentina, a single dichotomous variable indicating whether the individual is a minority 
(MINORITYi) is constructed. 
The way in which prejudice is measured depends on the data source. Analyses of 
WVS data include RACEi, a variable constructed using an item that asks respondents to 
select groups of people who they would not like to have as neighbors from a list. The 
item is available for all country-waves. An individual is considered prejudiced (and thus 
RACEi = 1) if he selected “people from a different race.” This variable does not capture 
prejudice towards a specific group; rather it reflects attitudes towards racial outgroups in 
general, and is used because no better alternative is available. 
In the case of the LAPOP studies, items about ethnic prejudice are only available 
for Peru in 2010. One item presents respondents with the following prompt: “Racial 
mixing is good for Peru. To what extent to do you agree or disagree with this statement?” 
The prompt in the other item is: “I would agree with a daughter or son of mine getting 
married to an indigenous person. To what extent to do you agree or disagree with this 
statement?” Responses to both items are recorded on a seven-point scale where “one” is 
“strongly agree” and “seven” is “strongly disagree.” In other words, higher values 
reflected higher levels of prejudice. It is important to note that while the first item 
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captures attitudes towards racial outgroups, it could also reflect identification with the 
ingroup. Responses to these items are used to construct two variables that are treated as 
continuous in ensuing analyses, PREJUDICE1i and PREJUDICE2i. 
Prejudice against immigrants (IMMIGRANTi) is measured using the item in the 
WVS that asks respondents to select groups of people who they would not like to have as 
neighbors from a list. An individual is considered prejudiced against immigrants (and 
thus IMMIGRANTi = 1) if he selected “immigrants or foreign workers.” This item is only 
constructed for Argentina as hypothesis 4.2.3 only pertains to that country. The LAPOP 
surveys contain no items that could be used to measure prejudice against immigrants. 
Analyses reported below also include a number of controls. Control variables 
from the WVS data include the following: a dichotomous variable indicating whether the 
respondent is female (FEMALEi); continuous variables capturing the respondents’ age 
(AGEi) and its square (AGEi*AGEi), which is included to allow its effect to vary along the 
life cycle; and a set of dichotomous variables indicating the highest level of educational 
attainment that the individual completed (PRIMARY SCHOOLi, SECONDARY SCHOOLi, 
and COLLEGEi). Analyses using data from the LAPOP include these controls as well as 
a dichotomous variable indicating whether the respondent resides in a rural area or not 
(RURALi). 
Expectations about these controls are tentative and not central to the analyses 
below. Briefly, women might be expected to be more supportive of redistributive policies 
given their role as primary caregivers in family units, as this puts them at a disadvantaged 
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position in the labor market compared to men (Cusack et al. 2006, 372). Moreover, this 
role also makes them more concerned with family welfare (Sapiro 1997, 499). 
With regard to age, there are two distinct expectations. From a political life cycle 
perspective, one would expect individuals to incrementally but steadily transition from 
progressive to conservative orientations. This suggests that the effect of age on support 
for redistribution should be negative. From an economic life cycle perspective, one would 
expect young adults and the elderly to be more dependent on—and thus to be more 
supportive of—social policies than mature adults at the peak of their productive years. 
Thus, one would expect an inverted-U relationship between age and support: support 
should decrease at progressively lower rate as age increases until a critical age beyond 
which it should increase at a progressively higher rate. 
Educational attainment is included in all analyses to control for the possibility that 
more educated individuals might be less supportive of redistribution because of better 
economic prospects. Support might also decrease with educational attainment because it 
is related to socioeconomic status—i.e., individuals with higher educational attainment 
generally have higher socioeconomic status than their less educated counterparts. The 
effect of educational attainment on support could also be positive due to the greater 
exposure to progressive ideologies among the more educated.  
Finally, individuals residing in rural areas are expected to be less supportive of 
redistribution than those residing in urban areas given their more limited exposure to 
progressive ideologies. 
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Descriptive statistics for all dependent variables measures as well as for all the 
independent variables used in the current and the following chapters are reported in 
Appendix 1. Table A1.1 presents the descriptive statistics for the four measures of 
support for redistribution; Table A1.3 presents those corresponding to the independent 
variables in the analyses that use data from the WVS; and Table A1.4 presents those 
corresponding to the independent variables in the analyses that use data from the LAPOP. 
Interest-Based Explanations: The Role of Income, Employment, and Class 
All the models reported below are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). 
The independent variables available for analysis vary across countries, surveys, and 
years. Accordingly, several regression models of the four measures of support for 
redistribution are estimated for each of these triads. To ease the presentation and 
discussion of results, only results corresponding to models of support for redistribution as 
measured by the EQUALITY and INEQUALITY items are discussed here. Results 
corresponding to RESPONSIBILITY and WELL-BEING are presented in tables A1.5 to 
A1.7 in Appendix 1. The results for models using those items are largely consistent with 
the results presented here. It is also worth noting that, as a general rule, dichotomous 
variables are only included in the regressions below when the categories they identify 
include 30 or more respondents. This is to avoid presenting misleading estimates based 




Table 4.1 reports estimates for models of support for redistribution in Argentina 
as measured by the EQUALITY item. These models only include independent variables 
suggested by interest-based explanations, along with the controls. Model 1, Model 3, and 
Model 5 explore the effects of income, union membership, and employment status for 
Wave 3, Wave 4, and Wave 5, respectively. In these models, the levels of support for 
redistribution of individuals that are unemployed, self-employed, retired, studying or in 
other employment status are compared to those of currently employed individuals (the 
base category). This model specification is referred to as “base model” henceforth. Note 
that Model 3 and Model 5 do not include the control variables because they were used to 
predict—and thus are highly correlated with—the income variable for these waves in the 
case of Argentina; this will be the case for Model 4 and Model 6 discussed later as well.  
The negative and significant effect of income in all three waves indicates that, in 
line with expectations, support for redistribution decreases with income. In Wave 3, the 
only one in which a true measure of income is available, individuals in the highest 
income category are, on average, 1.15 points less supportive of redistribution than 
individuals in the lowest category. This effect is substantively important, but not nearly 
as strong as one would expect if self-interest were the primary factor shaping support.30 
 
 
                                                




Models of Support for Redistribution in Argentina 
(EQUALITY Item) 
 
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. * prob<0.10; ** prob<0.05; ***<prob<0.01. 
Controls not included in waves four and five as they were used to predict—and thus are highly correlated 
with—the income variable, which is the one of substantive interest. 
The effect of union membership is in the hypothesized positive direction in waves 
three and four, and the effect of unemployment status is in the expected positive direction 
in waves four and five, but none of these effects is statistically significant. Contrary to 
-0.1278 *** -0.1249 *** -0.3787 *** -0.3760 *** -0.2251 *** -0.2178 **
(0.0451) (0.0456) (0.0679) (0.0700) (0.0784) (0.0849)
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0.1309 0.3085 -0.8278 *** -0.8550 *** -0.4509 -0.2367
(0.3236) (0.3646) (0.2650) (0.3114) (0.3290) (0.3905)
0.5542 0.7540 -0.3159 -0.3406 -0.4437 -0.2220
(0.4399) (0.4801) (0.3048) (0.3547) (0.3746) (0.4352)
0.2212 0.3694 -0.8905 ** -0.9193 *** 0.3356 0.5469
(0.4948) (0.5161) (0.3488) (0.3836) (0.4148) (0.4650)
0.1620 0.3305 -0.2108 -0.2359 -0.2943 -0.0757

















6.0928 *** 5.8992 *** 8.1952 *** 8.2086 *** 6.9828 *** 6.7307 ***
(0.9569) (0.9819) (0.3939) (0.4628) (0.4713) (0.5624)
N 864 864 1239 1239 974 974
R-squared 0.0266 0.0280 0.0401 0.0404 0.0159 0.0169
Wave 4 Wave 5Wave 3




















expectations, the effect of being self-employed, used as a proxy for employment in the 
informal sector, is negative and statistically significant in Wave 4; it is in the 
hypothesized positive direction only in Wave 3, but it is not statistically significant. In 
turn, the effects of being retired or in the “other employment status” category are not 
statistically significant and are inconsistent across waves; positive in Wave 3, but 
negative in the other two waves. The effect associated with being a student is negative 
and statistically significant in Wave 4 and is positive but not statistically significant in the 
other waves. Finally, none of the controls has a statistically significant effect. 
Model 2, Model 4, and Model 6 explore the effects of class status as measured by 




 to the base specification 
model with income. Employed individuals who are not managers or workers are the base 
category for comparison of all variables related to employment status in these models.  
The effect of having a manual occupation is in the expected positive direction in 
all waves but is not statistically significant. The effect of being a manager is in the 
hypothesized negative direction only in Wave 4, but it is not statistically significant. 
Thus, the levels of support for redistribution among managers and workers are no 
different from the levels of support observed among other employed individuals. The 
effect of income remains significant in this specification in all waves. Also, the negative 
effects of self-employment and student status remain statistically significant with this 
model specification in Wave 4. 
The negative and significant effects of self-employment and student status in 
Wave 4 for both specifications deserve further discussion since these variables have 
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essentially no effect in the other waves. The result corresponding to self-employment is 
likely due to the intersection of two factors. First, self-employment might not be an 
accurate measure of employment in the informal sector as this category is also likely to 
include independent professionals, contractors, and skilled technicians who are relatively 
well-off. This type of self-employed individual, who is so by choice rather than necessity, 
might be inclined to oppose redistribution. For example, Iversen and Soskice (2001, 883) 
argue that the self-employed are expected to favor the free market and low levels of 
social protection “because they depend on flexible labor markets and often on relatively 
low-paid workers.”31 This factor helps explain why the effect of being self-employed is 
not positive and statistically significant in any of the waves, but not why it is negative 
and significant in Wave 4 and not in the other waves. 
The political circumstances in 1999, the time when the Wave 4 survey was carried 
out, provide a plausible explanation for that significant effect. It was an election year in 
Argentina. In that election, the eventually victorious opposition coalition of the Radical 
Civic Union (UCR) and the Front for a Country in Solidarity (FREPASO) focused its 
strategy on social issues and a commitment to increased social spending (Corrales 2002, 
34-35). The prominence of these issues during the campaign likely made the self-
employed “by choice” particularly concerned about potential increases in labor market 
regulations, hiring costs, taxes, and the like. This salience would in turn explain the lower 
than usual support for redistribution within this group in Wave 4. Similar concerns might 
                                                
31 Alesina and La Ferrara (2005, 915) mention that the self-employed might be less supportive of 
redistribution because they have a higher propensity to take risks or more “individualistic” attitudes, among 
other possible reasons. Of course, it is also possible that they might be less supportive because they have 
more limited access to benefits such as pensions or unemployment insurance than dependent workers. 
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explain the negative and significant coefficient associated with being a student in Wave 
4. Not yet integrated into the labor market, students might have worried about the 
consequences of increased costs and regulations on their future employment chances. 
Table 4.2 reports estimates for the same two sets of models of support for 
redistribution in Peru. In the base models (Model 1, Model 3, and Model 5), the effect of 
income is negative as hypothesized and statistically significant in waves three and five. It 
is also negative but not significant in Wave 4. The effect in the first two waves is also 
quite sizable. In Wave 3, the wave in which it is the smallest, individuals in the highest 
income category are, on average, 1.68 points less supportive of redistribution than 
individuals in the lowest category.  
Other significant effects are those associated with union membership in Wave 3 
and unemployment status in Wave 4, respectively. In both cases, the effect is in the 
expected direction; union members are more supportive of redistribution than non-
unionized individuals, and the unemployed are more supportive of redistribution than the 
currently employed. The effects of all other substantive variables are not statistically 
significant. The one corresponding to self-employment is in the hypothesized positive 
direction only in Wave 4 and that of being retired is in the expected positive direction in 






Models of Support for Redistribution in Peru 
(EQUALITY Item) 
 
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. * prob<0.10; ** prob<0.05; ***<prob<0.01. 
Occupational category variable not included because item was not available in Wave 5. 
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(1.0603) (1.1440) (0.8778) (0.9288) (0.7462)
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With regards to the controls, support for redistribution decreases as educational 
attainment increased in Wave 3. Individuals with less than a primary school education 
(the base category) are more supportive of redistribution than individuals who completed 
primary school; this difference is statistically significant at the 10% level in the 
specification that includes occupational categories (Model 2). Those who finished 
secondary school are less supportive than those who completed primary school, while 
college graduates are the least supportive. This finding is in line with the expectations 
derived from educational attainment’s link with socioeconomic status and economic 
prospects. 
As shown in Model 2 and Model 4, when it comes to supporting redistribution, 
managers and workers seem no different than other employed individuals. The effect of 
being a manager is in the hypothesized direction only in Wave 3, while that of being a 
worker is in line with expectations only in Wave 4. Neither of these effects is significant, 
however. It is also worth noting that all the effects that are significant in the base models 
remain so in this specification. 
Some of the estimated effects are not consistent across models. The negative 
effect of income is not statistically significant in Wave 4, unlike the other two waves in 
which it is. While the effect of being a union member is essentially non-existent in Wave 
4 and Wave 5, it is positive and significant in Wave 3. Likewise, the effect of 
unemployment status is positive and significant in Wave 4, but not in the other waves. 
Finally, the effects of the variables measuring educational attainment are negative and 
significant in Wave 3, but not in other waves. 
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As in Argentina, political circumstances seem to provide a plausible explanation 
for these inconsistencies. The survey corresponding to Wave 3 in Peru was carried out in 
1996, just following the first reelection of Alberto Fujimori. That election was essentially 
a referendum on the neoliberal policies adopted by Fujimori, including privatization, 
social program restructuring, and pension system reform. During his campaign, Fujimori 
emphasized his economic accomplishments as well as his triumph over terrorism, while 
promising to focus on social issues like unemployment and poverty (Wehner 2004, 47-
50). In this context, it is possible that actors who were “losers” from the reforms and who 
viewed them as too socially costly were more willing to demand redistribution, while 
winners were less willing to do so. This in turn might explain why union membership 
matters in Wave 3 since union members were typically losers in the wake of neoliberal 
reforms, and the election likely enhanced the salience of these concerns. This might also 
help explain why educational attainment matters in Wave 3 but not in the other waves 
since neoliberal reforms placed an especially high burden on less educated individuals. 
The political circumstances are also helpful in understanding some of the results 
for Wave 4. Wave 4 was conducted in 2001, an election year. That electoral season 
witnessed the remarkable political comeback of ex-president Alan García. By the end of 
his 1985-1990 presidency, the country was facing a major recession, hyperinflation, and 
extreme political violence. In spite of his disastrous record in office, and having returned 
to the country only 10 weeks before the first round of the election after several years in 
exile, García was able to squeeze into the runoff by making use of his electioneering 
skills and his party’s (APRA) apparatus, and by campaigning on social issues (Taylor 
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2005, 575-576). While García eventually lost the election, his prominent role likely had 
important consequences on Peruvians’ positions on many issues. 
The memory of García’s disastrous record, including failed redistributive fiscal 
policies, likely led many low-income individuals who would have normally supported 
redistribution to oppose it. In contrast, several higher-income individuals who would 
have normally opposed redistribution might have supported it because they actually 
benefited from García’s previous policies. Together, these two patterns could account for 
the non-significance of income’s effect in Wave 4. In turn, the prominence of social 
issues during the campaign might have channeled the discontent of the unemployed into 
higher than usual demands for redistribution, and thus explain why unemployment status 
matters in this wave but not in others. 
Table 4.3 presents the estimates of models of support for redistribution in both 
countries, as measured by the INEQUALITY item from the LAPOP surveys. In addition 
to the base specification and the specification including occupational categories, a third 
specification with individuals’ income prospects is included for both countries in 2010 
(Model 4 for Argentina and Model 9 for Peru). Results corresponding to these models are 
of particular interest because they are the only ones that allow an assessment of 
hypotheses 4.1.3 and 4.1.4, which relate to economic prospects. In this model 
specification, the base category includes individuals who have neutral expectations about 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Contrary to hypothesis 4.1.3, individuals with positive prospects are more 
supportive of redistribution than those with neutral expectations. These effects are 
significant at the 1% level in Argentina and at the 10% level in Peru. Also contrary to 
hypothesis 4.1.4, the effect of having negative prospects is negative and significant—and 
almost twice the magnitude of that corresponding to positive prospects—in Argentina. 
The effect is positive, but not significant, in Peru. 
The effects of economic prospects reported here are in stark contrast to those 
found in other studies carried out in the U.S. and Russia. As mentioned in Chapter 2, 
Alesina and La Ferrara (2004) find that positive economic prospects have a negative 
effect on support for redistribution in the U.S. Using data from Russia, Ravallion and 
Lokshin (2000) find that expectations of downward mobility increase demands for 
redistribution among well-off individuals—for insurance purposes, the authors argue. 
It might be the case that the hypothesized rationale linking economic prospects 
and support for redistribution is not the only possible one. For example, it is reasonable to 
imagine that individuals who expect their economic situation to improve could actually 
be more willing to help others to a greater extent than those who are less optimistic about 
the future. Similarly, the expectation of tough economic times could make individuals 
less willing to help others. 
It is also possible that rather than reflecting expectations or educated guesses 
about future income, economic prospects are a reflection of individuals’ personality 
attributes. In particular, they might be reflective of individuals’ pessimistic or optimistic 
orientations. Individuals with the first type of orientations tend to be less politically 
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efficacious and attempt to avoid conflict (Miller 1958, 249). This might in turn explain 
why individuals with negative expectations might be less inclined to demand strong 
policies to reduce inequality between the rich and the poor than those with positive 
expectations. 
Moving on to other substantively important variables, the effect of income is 
statistically significant and in the expected negative direction in both countries in 2008. It 
is also in the hypothesized direction, but not significant, in 2010 in Peru. Its effect is 
essentially nonexistent in 2010 in Argentina.  
The effects of all other covariates of substantive importance are either not 
significant or significant in one year but not in the other. In Argentina, the effect of 
unemployment experience is positive and thus in line with expectations in both years, but 
is only significant in 2010. The effect of self-employment is negative in all models but it 
is significant only in the second specification in 2008. Thus, in that year, the level of 
support for redistribution among the self-employed was significantly different when 
compared to that among all the employed, but not when it is compared to that among 
those employed in non-manual occupations. In turn, the effect of union membership is 
positive and significant, as hypothesized, in the only year for which the variable is 
available. In Peru, only the effects of unemployment and unemployment experience are 
significant and in the expected positive direction in 2010. Both effects are in the opposite 
direction, but not significant in the other year. In the two countries, the effects of 
occupational categories are not significant. 
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Finally, with regard to the control variables, the only effect that is consistently 
significant across the two years is that of primary education in Argentina. The negative 
effect indicates that those who completed primary school are less supportive of 
redistribution than those who did not complete it or did not attend school at all. This 
effect is not in line with any of the expectations regarding educational attainment laid out 
earlier in the chapter. 
Like in the analyses of WVS data, the effects of some variables vary within 
countries across the two years. Changing political circumstances might also help 
understand the differing results. In Argentina, 2008 was a time of political and social 
turmoil caused by the government’s attempt to increase export taxes on agricultural 
commodities. President Cristina Fernández and her husband, ex-president Néstor 
Kirchner, justified this measure as an attempt to redistribute a larger share of the windfall 
profits caused by high international prices among the poorest sectors of the population 
(Leira and Cruzalegui 2009, 234). In turn, 2010 might have been an atypical year because 
of the general elections that took place in both countries the following year. These 
changing circumstances may have made some considerations more salient in a given 
year. 
Overall, political circumstances seem to play a role in explaining within-country 
over-time variation in the salience of considerations informing support for redistribution. 
The shift from a political environment centered on neoliberal adjustment in the 1990s to 
one in which social issues became prominent in the 2000s is the overarching theme for 
the changing political environment discussed throughout. During the 1990s, there are 
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inconsistencies in results that can be explained by the stances adopted by political actors 
with regard to the economic reforms. During the late-1990s and 2000s, inconsistencies in 
results correspond to political actors’ positions on social issues that were central to 
political debates at that time. 
Altogether, the results presented thus far only provide consistent support for 
hypothesis 4.1.1. The higher the income of an individual, the less supportive of 
redistribution he tends to be. Other hypotheses do not hold up well against the data; they 
are either supported only sporadically or not at all. For example, hypotheses 4.1.2, 4.1.5 
and 4.1.8, which concern union membership, unemployment, and self-employment, 
respectively, are supported sporadically. None of the results support the hypotheses about 
class status (4.1.6 and 4.1.7). Finally, the results do not support hypotheses 4.1.3 and 
4.1.4 pertaining to economic prospects, and even outright contradict them in the case of 
Argentina. 
Discussion 
Why do interest-based explanations fare poorly in these two Latin American 
countries? Certain features of the economies, political systems, and redistributive social 
programs of Argentina and Peru that are also common to most developing countries are 
the likely culprits. Due to exposure to international markets, terms of trade fluctuations, 
and financial constraints, developing economies are more volatile than those of advanced 
industrial democracies (Wibbels 2006). This volatility creates economic opportunities as 
well as vulnerability at the individual level and causes individuals’ income to be 
permanently in flux (Graham and Pettinato 2000: 69-70). In this context, economic 
 99 
prospects might become more reflective of individuals’ personality attributes than of 
educated guesses about their future income. 
Economic volatility, paired with greater structural complexity, might also explain 
the lack of support for hypotheses derived from power resource theory. In Latin America, 
the rise and demise of import substitution industrialization (ISI) along with an accelerated 
process of urbanization, and the later enactment of market reforms have led to great 
complexity in the class structure. The concentration of income in the top decile of the 
population increased, public sector employment contracted, and the “classes” of micro-
entrepreneurs and informal sector workers rapidly expanded (Hoffman and Centeno 
2006; Portes and Hoffman 2003). Class interests are not likely to shape redistributive 
attitudes in contexts where a large share of the labor force does not have secure 
employment and is forced to transition between the formal and informal sectors, and 
where the size of the informal proletariat dwarfs the business and working classes. 
Moreover, unlike in advanced industrial democracies, manual workers and union 
members are generally not part of the lowest strata in developing countries. At least in 
Latin America, the consequence of this stratification pattern is that welfare states 
generally offered disproportionate benefits to an “elite proletariat” comprised of skilled 
blue-collar workers employed in strategic economic sectors, while sidelining relatively 
worse-off peasants, unorganized rural workers, and underemployed and unskilled urban 
workers (Mesa-Lago 1978, 5-16). This has been the case in Peru since the introduction of 
modern social security systems in the first half of the 1900s and is increasingly the case 
in Argentina after the collapse of ISI and the economic crises of the 1980s and 2000s. In 
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this context, workers and union members are less likely to be supportive of social policies 
aimed at producing greater equality as these might not necessarily benefit them—and 
might in fact involve stripping them of their privileged status. 
Another important difference between developing and developed democracies 
that helps explain the lack of support for interest-based explanations is related to the 
strength of political and social organizations of interest aggregation and representation. 
For Varieties of Capitalism scholars, sector-based risk coalitions of workers and 
employers are essential to explain demands for and later implementation of social 
insurance policies (Mares 2003; Mares 2005). For power resource theorists, strong labor 
unions and leftist parties, as well as strong ties between these actors, are essential to 
sustain demands for redistribution among the working class (Huber and Stephens 2001; 
Stephens 1979). Among other resources, these organizations provide people with 
information that makes them more likely “to discover their own position in the 
stratification system” and “to develop attitudes consistent with that position” (Kumlin 
and Svallfors 2007, 21). 
In most of the developing world, in general, and in Latin America, in particular, 
these vehicles of interest aggregation and representation have tended to be weak or 
altogether absent (Schmitter 1974). Arguably, the Argentine labor movement does not fit 
this characterization as it has been relatively strong and successful at establishing and 
maintaining ties with that country’s major political movement, Peronism.32 As shown 
                                                
32 Throughout the mid-1900s, the General Confederation of Labor (CGT) provided important support to 
Perón in his route to power, although only to be controlled by the populist leader later on. This period saw 
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above, union membership and working-class status fail to significantly predict support for 
redistribution even in this relatively favorable context. 
Finally, another reason that might explain the underperformance of interest-based 
explanations is related to the characteristics of the social protection systems in the 
countries under study. As argued by Pierson (1993), redistributive policies provide 
material resources and incentives that are key to sustaining collective action efforts aimed 
at protecting acquired benefits, organized interest groups included. Moreover, and 
perhaps more importantly, such policies provide individuals with cues and information 
“that may influence individuals’ perceptions about what their interests are” (Pierson 
1993, 621). Together, these material and cognitive influences help create new bases of 
support for welfare policies among mass publics (Pierson 1993; Pierson 1996). 
As discussed in Chapter 3, social protection systems in Argentina and Peru have 
limited coverage. For example, in Argentina about 76% of those that are 70 or more years 
old receive pensions or retirement benefits, and 56% of the employed urban population 
contributes to social security; in Peru the figures are only 27% and 19%, respectively. 
The difference in pension coverage stems not only from better coverage by the 
contributory pension system in Argentina but also from the introduction of non-
contributory pension schemes targeted at the poor. A state-run unemployment benefit 
                                                
unprecedented, pro-working class changes in labor legislation and industrial and social policies (Collier and 
Collier 2002, 337-350). Like in the rest of Latin America, the abandonment of ISI, the debt crisis of the 
1980s, and the introduction of market reforms in the 1990s significantly weakened Argentina’s labor 
movement, as well as its ties with the Peronist Party (Hagopian 1998; Levitsky 2003, Oxhorn 1998). The 
CGT in fact split in 1991, when a number of unions defected from the Confederation and created the leftist 
Central Union of Argentine Workers (CTA). During the last decade, however, labor recovered a significant 
share of its lost power, and the CGT became a political ally of the two Peronist presidents that have 
governed the country since 2003 (Etchemendy and Collier 2007). 
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scheme based on workers’ contributions is available only in Argentina—although 
targeted workfare programs were introduced in both countries during the 2000s. 
The combination of limited coverage and targeting likely accounts for the absence 
of pockets of support for redistribution among populations like the retired and the 
unemployed, which are, at least in theory, net beneficiaries. The combination of these 
strategies divides the population of potential beneficiaries and thus makes their opinions 
on the issue of redistribution less cohesive. Those that are covered will likely support 
redistribution, but those that are not might be indifferent or even choose to oppose it. 
Moreover, limited coverage and targeting can have an indirect effect by hindering the 
development of interest groups that could raise awareness about programs and contribute 
to solidify support. While the unemployed are likely hard to organize given their 
(hopefully) temporary status, the American Association of Retired People (AARP) shows 
that retiree associations can become pivotal interest groups (Campbell 2003). 
Explanations Based on Social Identity: The Role of Ethnic Groups and Prejudice 
This section evaluates hypotheses about ethnic group identification and prejudice. 
As in the previous section, results for models estimated with WVS data are presented 
first. These are followed by the results for models using data from the LAPOP. Finally, 
the results are discussed. Results corresponding to the RESPONSIBILITY and WELL-
BEING items are presented in tables A1.8 to A1.10 in Appendix 1. 
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Results 
Table 4.4 reports estimates for models of support for redistribution in Argentina, 
as measured by the EQUALITY item. These models include the independent variables 
from the base model specification plus ethnic identification, racial prejudice, and 
prejudice against immigrants. Models including interactions between ethnic identification 
and prejudice are not estimated because of data limitations (see table notes for details). 
The different prejudice variables are included in separate models because they are highly 
correlated with one another. Model 1 and Model 3 include the variable measuring 
prejudice against racial outgroups. Model 2 and Model 4 include the variable measuring 
prejudice against immigrants. Finally, Model 5 includes the variable indicating minority 
status as well as prejudice against immigrants. 
The effect of minority status is in the hypothesized positive direction but not 
significant in the only wave in which it is estimated (Wave 5). Thus, levels of support for 
redistribution among minority respondents are no different from those among white 
respondents. The effect of racial prejudice is negative as expected in Wave 4 (Model 1), 
and prejudice against immigrants is negative as expected in all waves (models two, four 







Models of Support for Redistribution in Argentina, 
Including Ethnic Identification and Prejudice 
(EQUALITY Item) 
 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * prob<0.10; **<prob<0.05; ***prob<0.01. 
a Interactions between minority identification and the two types of prejudice not included because 
intersections contained less than 30 respondents. 
b Item used to construct ethnic identification dummy was only available in Wave 5. 
c Dummy indicating prejudice toward racial outgroups not included in Wave 5 because category 
contained less than 30 respondents. 
-0.1263 *** -0.1279 *** 0.3844 * 0.3906 * -0.0032
(0.0451) (0.0450) (0.2183) (0.2177) (0.2633)
0.0451 0.0644 0.1754 0.1705 -0.4161
(0.3963) (0.3958) (0.6020) (0.6017) (0.3713)
-0.2077 -0.1613 0.1920 0.2019 0.4526
(0.3749) (0.3732) (0.3189) (0.3187) (0.4554)
0.1348 0.1358 -0.7135 *** -0.7097 *** -0.3246
(0.3238) (0.3236) (0.2709) (0.2710) (0.3427)
0.5678 0.5219 -0.5419 -0.5383 0.2247
(0.4408) (0.4406) (0.3924) (0.3916) (0.4868)
0.2320 0.2069 -1.0902 *** -1.0964 *** -0.0452
(0.4947) (0.4943) (0.3891) (0.3886) (0.4619)
0.1750 0.1460 -0.2634 -0.2623 0.0276







0.1797 0.1847 0.4750 ** 0.4779 ** -0.2112
(0.2330) (0.2325) (0.2213) (0.2216) (0.2621)
-0.0068 -0.0088 -0.0676 ** -0.0673 ** -0.0466
(0.0403) (0.0407) (0.0315) (0.0315) (0.0394)
-0.0002 -0.0002 0.0008 ** 0.0008 ** 0.0002
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004)
0.2336 0.2562 -1.9058 *** -1.9069 *** -1.0087 *
(0.3903) (0.3888) (0.4030) (0.4034) (0.5413)
-0.1810 -0.2082 -3.2916 *** -3.2968 *** -1.7941 **
(0.4093) (0.4094) (0.7191) (0.7188) (0.8877)
0.6046 0.6050 -4.4798 *** -4.4937 *** -1.4622
(0.5334) (0.5335) (1.2232) (1.2225) (1.4875)
6.0597 *** 6.1413 *** 7.7400 *** 7.7027 *** 8.5312 ***
(0.9491) (0.9579) (1.1013) (1.0955) (1.3356)
N 864 864 1239 1239 952
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 105 
Table 4.5 reports estimates of similar models for Peru. Interactions between 
identification and racial prejudice are only included as allowed by the data (details are 
provided in the table’s notes). Contrary to expectations, the effect of Afro-descendent 
identification is negative and significant in Wave 3. The effect of mestizo identification is 
also contrary to expectations—i.e., negative and significant—in Wave 3 among those 
who are not prejudiced (RACEi=0). All other estimated effects corresponding to ethnic 
identification are not significant, and only those corresponding to indigenous 
identification in Wave 3 and Afro-descendent identification in Wave 5 are in the 
expected positive direction. 
With regards to prejudice toward racial outgroups among whites, its effect is in 
the hypothesized negative direction in waves three and five, but it is not significant. This 
indicates that prejudiced whites are equally supportive of redistribution as their non-
prejudiced counterparts. In sum, as in the case of Argentina, evidence from the WVS fails 
to provide support for hypotheses pertaining to ethnic identification and prejudice in Peru 









Models of Support for Redistribution in Peru, 
Including Ethnic Identification and Prejudice 
(EQUALITY Item) 
 
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. * prob<0.10; ** prob<0.05; *** prob<0.01. 
Models include a constant and the usual controls. Coefficients not reported to economize 
space, but consistent with those in Table 4.2. 
a Interactions between Afro-descendent and other minority identifications and prejudice not 
included because intersections contained less than 30 respondents. 
b Mestizos, indigenous, and Afro-descendents are classified into a single category in Wave 
4 due to item limitations. 
c Other minority identification not included in Wave 5 because category contained less than 
30 respondents; these respondents are included in the base category. 
d Interaction between indigenous identification and prejudice not included in Wave 3 
because intersection contained less than 30 respondents. 
-0.2012 *** -0.0264 -0.2436 ***
(0.0558) (0.0492) (0.0505)
0.6509 ** -0.0041 -0.3580
(0.2695) (0.3869) (0.2872)












































N 970 1466 1294
R-squared 0.0797 0.0187 0.0366
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Table 4.6 presents the estimates for models of support for redistribution measured 
by the INEQUALITY item from the LAPOP surveys in both countries. In addition to the 
covariates from the base specification model, these models include ethnic identification 
and prejudice as covariates. As noted in the table, the coefficients reported for indigenous 
identification in Argentina correspond to respondents that identify as indigenous or Afro-
descendent. Also as noted, the prejudice measures are only available for Peru in 2010. 
Again, the results for Argentina are not consistent with hypothesis 4.2.1 regarding 
the effect of being a minority. The effect of self-identification as indigenous or Afro-
descendent (the coefficient reported for the indigenous category in the table) is in the 
expected positive direction but not significant in 2008 (Model 1), and negative and 
significant in 2010 (Model 2). In that year, the indigenous and Afro-descendents are, on 
average, 1.62 points less supportive of redistribution than whites.33 While no hypothesis 
was laid out pertaining to mestizos, results are in line with what one might expect: their 
level of support is in between that of the indigenous and Afro-descendents and that of 
whites. 
In contrast, results for Peru provide some support for expectations. While not 
statistically significant, estimated effects are consistent with hypotheses 4.2.4 and 4.2.5 in 
2008. In that year, the indigenous, Afro-descendents, and mestizos are all more 
supportive of redistribution than whites. The magnitude of the effects is also in line with  
 
                                                




Models of Support for Redistribution in Argentina and Peru, 
Including Ethnic Identification and Prejudice 
(INEQUALITY Item) 
 
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. * prob<0.10; ** prob<0.05; *** prob<0.01. Models 
include a constant and the usual controls; coefficients are not reported to economize space, but are 
consistent with those in Table 4.3. 
a Other minority identification dummy not included because category contained less than 30 respondents 
for all country-years. These respondents are included in the base category. 
b Item used to construct union membership dummy was only available in 2008 surveys. 
c Item used to construct economic prospects dummies was only available in 2010 surveys. 
d Afro-descendent respondents dummy not included for Argentina models because category contained less 
than 30 respondents. These respondents are included in indigenous category. 
-0.0553 *** 0.0052 -0.0606 ** -0.0348
(0.0192) (0.0292) (0.0245) (0.0235)
-0.3555 -0.0106 0.0787 0.3306 *
(0.4197) (0.1785) (0.1930) (0.1951)
0.3985 0.6375 *** 0.0658 0.2263
(0.3323) (0.1634) (0.2506) (0.1594)
-0.1884 -0.2151 * -0.0428 -0.0272
(0.1179) (0.1295) (0.1184) (0.1077)
-0.2517 -0.0480 -0.1681 -0.0622
(0.2082) (0.3245) (0.2671) (0.2689)
-0.5054 *** -0.2639 -0.0100 -0.0639
(0.1766) (0.2258) (0.1743) (0.1797)
-0.2243 0.1801 0.0225 0.0655







0.0987 -0.3613 *** 0.0395 0.2688 **
(0.0973) (0.1226) (0.1234) (0.1246)
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expectations—the indigenous are the most supportive, followed by Afro-descendents, 
and mestizos. In 2010, the effects of indigenous identification and mestizo identification 
are in line with expectations and statistically significant, but the level of support for 
redistribution among Afro-descendents is not significantly different from that among 
whites. 
With regard to prejudice, as shown in Model 4 and Model 5, both measures have 
negative and significant effects in line with hypothesis 4.2.6. The more prejudiced an 
individual, the less he supports redistribution. It is also worth noting that the prejudice 
measure reflecting attitudes about racial mixing has a stronger effect than that capturing 
attitude towards the indigenous. Models whose results are not reported here for the sake 
of space included interactions between identification and prejudice to allow the effects of 
the latter to vary across ethnic groups. Results indicated that this was not the case, 
however. 
Discussion 
Altogether, these results indicate that theories emphasizing social identity do not 
travel well to Argentina and Peru. The results fail to provide any support for hypotheses 
4.2.1 and 4.2.2 pertaining the effects of ethnic identification and racial prejudice in 
Argentina. While not statistically significant, one could interpret the consistently negative 
effect of prejudice against immigrants in Table 4.4 as tentative support for hypothesis 
4.2.3. In the case of Peru, support for hypotheses 4.2.4, 4.2.5, and 4.2.6 is mixed. 
Estimates based on data from the WVS provide no support for these hypotheses, while 
those based on the LAPOP data generally conform to expectations. 
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The difference between these findings might be due to changes that occurred 
between the time the WVS were conducted and the time the LAPOP surveys were 
conducted. It might be that an awakening of ingroup interests among non-whites occurred 
during this period. In that scenario, non-whites could support redistributive policies from 
which they should expect to benefit. In the face of such an awakening there could have 
been a reaction among some against outgroups which would result in lower levels of 
support among prejudiced individuals. This interpretation is compatible with recent 
developments in Peruvian politics, such as the increasing ethnic-based mobilization 
against extractive industries and especially the political ascent of ethno-populist leader 
Ollanta Humala (Madrid 2012). 
Given Argentina’s homogeneous population, it is not surprising that explanations 
based on social identity are not relevant in that country. But it is somewhat surprising that 
these explanations not more powerful in Peru. After all, Peru is even more ethnically 
heterogeneous than the U.S., the context in which these explanations thrive. 
Again, limited coverage of social protection systems is one of the likely culprits. 
Given that the indigenous, Afro-descendents, and mestizos are relatively worse-off than 
whites, they are also likely to have less access to social protection. As discussed earlier, 
this implies that individuals also have limited access to material and information 
resources that could in turn make them more aware of their group interests and create 
support for such programs. The introduction of a conditional cash transfer program 
directly targeted at the rural poor—who are mainly indigenous—in 2005, and its 
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expansion since then, constitute a major departure from this exclusionary pattern.34 This 
development might explain the possible awakening of ingroup interests among non-
whites in the late 2000s discussed above. Support for redistribution might be growing 
among direct beneficiaries who are predominantly indigenous. Additionally, this 
development might also be spurring stigmatization of beneficiaries and thus fostering a 
backlash against redistribution among those with prejudiced attitudes toward the 
indigenous.35 
The relative weakness of social movements and organizations advancing the 
interests of ethnic groups provides another explanation. The Peruvian indigenous 
movement is fragmented into a plethora of organizations with very specific platforms 
(Madrid 2012, 114-117). Moreover, few of these organizations explicitly assume an 
ethnic identity and even fewer incorporate demands for public policies aimed at 
providing concrete material benefits or greater opportunities for the indigenous 
population as a whole. Attempts to organize a politically important indigenous-based 
movement or organization have been generally unsuccessful. These include the efforts of 
the country’s latest military government (1968-1980) to transform the “indigenous” into 
“peasants,” and thus free them from the stigma associated with that label, and incorporate 
                                                
34 The Juntos (Together) National Program of Direct Support for the Poor is the first and only conditional 
cash transfer program existing in Peru. The program was originally implemented in 70 districts, but up until 
December of 2010 it had expanded to 646 districts. During the same period, coverage expanded from 
22,550 to almost 500,000 poor or extremely poor households (Juntos 2012a; Juntos 2012b). 
35 For example, a recent study of six districts in which the program operates identified that three myths (or 
stigmas) about the beneficiaries are prevalent among the rest of the population (Huber and Zárate 2009). 
These myths are: beneficiaries “do not want to work anymore” and “become lazy;” women get pregnant to 
qualify for the program or to remain enrolled; and beneficiaries do not use the transfers appropriately and 
usually spend them buying alcohol. 
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this new class into its progressive political project.36 Among Afro-descendents the 
situation is no different. In a context in which Afro-descendent identity is very weak and 
constituted only by race—i.e., skin color—, existing organizations have few members 
and are distant from the population they claim to represent (Valdivia et al. 2007). 
A final explanation relates to mestizaje or extensive racial intermixing. By 
blurring the lines that separate groups, mestizaje has reduced polarization and fostered 
generally harmonious relations (Madrid 2012, 120). This does not mean that exclusion, 
discrimination, and racism against the indigenous and Afro-descendents are not 
widespread in Peru. As discussed above, these practices are indeed prevalent, but 
mestizaje has contributed to keeping them in the shadows. Most importantly, extensive 
intermixing has made it more difficult for strong ethnic identities to develop. In short, 
mestizaje has made it difficult for Peruvians of indigenous or African descent to develop 
the sense of linked fate that has made African-American attitudes, for example, toward 
welfare policies so cohesive. 
Conclusion 
Theories centered on individuals’ position along structural cleavages are not very 
useful to explain variation in support for redistribution within Argentina and Peru. With 
the exception of income, none of the considerations emphasized by interest-based 
explanations consistently shape support according to expectations. This is because 
                                                
36 As argued by McClintock (1981), this newly created “peasantry” failed to coalesce in a way that was 
compatible with the corporatist political project of the military government. Peasants remained alienated 
from and skeptical towards the national government and its attempts to control the agricultural cooperatives 
that replaced haciendas. Moreover, while solidarity between peasants increased within cooperatives, this 
was not the case of peasant class solidarity, which was undermined by economic competition and political 
uncertainty. 
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economic volatility and greater structural complexity make it difficult for individuals to 
develop attitudes in line with their constantly changing economic interests. The relatively 
weak social and political organizations of these counties further deprive individuals of 
opportunities and resources to become cognizant of their economic interests as they relate 
to redistributive policies. Finally, limited and targeted coverage of social protection 
systems has similar consequences while also contributing to the fragmentation of 
potential pockets of support for social policies. 
Considerations emphasized by accounts based on social identity do not fare much 
better. Ethnic identification and prejudice do not play a role in shaping support for 
redistribution in relatively homogenous Argentina. Evidence from ethnically diverse Peru 
is mixed at best, indicating that group identification and prejudice are not as powerful 
predictors of redistributive attitudes as the literature informed by the U.S. experience 
would suggest. Again, limited social protection coverage as well as weak ethnic-based 
organizations partly explain this result. By blurring the lines that separate ethnic groups 
and weakening ethnic identities, mestizaje is the other factor that likely plays a role. 
Overall, while theoretically sound, interest-based and group identity-based 
accounts need to be overhauled to consider the role played by economic, political, and 
social contexts. The structural cleavages these theories emphasize do not have the same 
consequences in Argentina and Peru, and in the developing world more generally, as they 
do in advanced industrial democracies. Depending on the specific cleavage, context can 
make them less salient—and sometimes even irrelevant—or cut across the citizenry in 
different ways and thus lead to different interests vis-à-vis the issue of redistribution. A 
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number of economic-structural differences across developed and developing contexts 
make the one-size-fits-all expectations of interest-based theories rather uninformative in 
the latter context. Accounts emphasizing group identity might prove to be informative in 




Social Beliefs and Support for Redistribution 
in Argentina and Peru 
This chapter goes beyond structural explanations and examines the belief-based 
account of redistributive attitudes that focuses on inequality frames. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, inequality frames are simplified mental models of reality comprised of a 
collection of cognitions about the causes of inequality and poverty. By allowing 
individuals to assign blame for the distributive status quo, these social beliefs inform 
attitudes about redistributive policies. 
According to the redistributive frame, effort is not necessarily rewarded with 
success, economic standing is mostly caused by factors over which individuals have no 
control, and social structure is rigid. Individuals who conceptualize the issue of inequality 
in this way will tend to attribute the distributive status quo to societal shortcomings and 
to support redistributive policies. In contrast, according to the self-reliance frame, effort 
generally pays off, individuals are responsible for their (mis)fortunes, and society is open 
to personal advancement. Individuals who hold these beliefs will tend to believe that all 
individuals—rich or poor—get what they deserve. From this standpoint, it follows that 
the solution to inequality and poverty is for the worse-off to “pull themselves up by their 
bootstraps.” Thus, individuals who hold beliefs in line with this frame will tend to oppose 
redistributive policies. 
The analysis below shows that social beliefs shape support for redistribution in 
line with expectations. Interestingly, social beliefs seem to be more salient in Peru than in 
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Argentina. Thus, while structural considerations (save income) do not explain individual-
level variation in support for redistribution, social beliefs do. The analysis also shows that 
individuals’ social beliefs are not independent of each other, forming relatively coherent 
conceptual frames on the issue of inequality. The chapter then examines how the 
individual-level results help account for divergence in support across Argentina and Peru. 
It argues that differences in the aggregate composition and salience of social beliefs can 
help explain the divergence in levels of support across the two countries under study. It 
also shows that income cannot account for this divergence. 
This chapter is organized in six sections. The second section lays out a number of 
hypotheses about the effects of inequality frames on redistributive attitudes. The third 
section provides details about the empirical strategy and data used to examine these 
hypotheses. The fourth and fifth sections present and discuss the results of the individual-
level, within-country analyses. The sixth section explores the extent to which individuals’ 
beliefs are interdependent. The seventh section builds upon these findings and those of 
the previous chapter to provide an explanation for diverging levels of support for 
redistribution across Argentina and Peru. The final section presents some concluding 
remarks. 
Hypotheses 
Individuals who hold beliefs in line with the redistributive frame should be more 
supportive of welfare policies than those who hold beliefs in line with the self-reliance 
frame. The former believe that income and economic standing, more generally, are 
products of factors over which individuals have no control, like birth, connections, and 
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luck. They believe that those living in poverty are not responsible for their misfortune; 
instead, the poor are the victims of societal shortcomings like lack of opportunities, 
unfairness, and exploitation. Moreover, they believe that the stock of wealth is rather 
finite and wealth accumulation resembles a zero-sum game in which one’s wins are 
another’s losses. 
In contrast, individuals who hold beliefs in with the self-reliance frame see 
economic standing as a product of personal abilities and effort. In a world in which 
individuals can get ahead by trying hard enough, the poor themselves—their traits and 
behaviors—are to blame for their misfortune. In turn, in such a world, everybody has 
opportunities to get ahead, and wealth is not finite. Individuals who see the world through 
the lens of this self-reliance frame consider inequality to be fair and thus oppose 
redistributive policies. 
As argued in Chapter 2, the redistributive and self-reliance frames are ideal-type 
constructs. Most individuals likely hold views that are in between these two extremes. 
The hypotheses below focus on three types of social beliefs: beliefs about the nature of 
wealth accumulation, beliefs about the causes of economic outcomes, and beliefs about 
the causes of poverty. The focus on views about these specific issues is driven by data 
availability. That said, these three types of beliefs are a good representation of the range 
of cognitions that populate inequality frames. The following hypotheses formalize 
expectations about the relationship between these three types of beliefs and support for 
redistribution. 
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Hypothesis 5.1 Individuals who believe that wealth accumulation is a zero-sum game 
should be more supportive of redistribution than those who believe 
that wealth accumulation is a positive-sum game. 
Hypothesis 5.2 Individuals who believe that income is a product of factors over which 
individuals have no control, such as birth, connections, and luck, 
should be more supportive of redistribution than those who believe 
that income is a product of factors that individuals can control, such 
as effort and hard work. 
Hypothesis 5.3 Individuals who believe that societal shortcomings cause poverty and 
that the poor do not have a chance to escape poverty should be more 
supportive of redistribution than those who believe that poverty is 
caused by individuals’ traits and behaviors and that the poor have a 
fair chance at getting ahead. 
Methods and Data 
The hypotheses laid out above are explored by adding the i-th individual’s social 
beliefs to the general model of support for redistribution (SUPPORTi) presented in 
Equation 4.1 in the previous chapter. The new model is as follows: 
SUPPORTi = !0 + !1INCOMEi + !2UNIONi + !3POUMi 
 + !4FODMi + !5UNEMPLOYEDi + !6MANAGERi 
 + !7WORKERi + !8INFORMALi + !9MINORITYi  
 + !10PREJUDICEi + !11MINORITYi*PREJUDICEi 
 + "1WEALTHi + "2OUTCOMESi + "3POVERTYi + !Zi + ui (5.1) 
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where the new terms WEALTHi, OUTCOMESi, and POVERTYi represent the i-th 
individual’s beliefs about the nature of wealth accumulation, the causes of economic 
outcomes, and the causes of poverty, respectively. These variables indicate the location 
of the i-th individual’s beliefs in continua that go from beliefs that are consistent with the 
self-reliance frame on one end to beliefs that are consistent with the redistributive frame 
on the other. The ensuing analyses assess the hypotheses laid out above by estimating the 
parameters in Equation 5.1. Given hypotheses 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3, one should expect all of 
the coefficients associated with social beliefs to be positive (!1, !2, and !3). 
The data used come from the WVS. The items used to measure social beliefs are 
only available in the third and fourth waves, so the analyses below are limited to these 
country-years. Support for redistribution is measured using the EQUALITY and 
RESPONSIBILITY items used in Chapter 4. As a reminder, both of these variables are 
measured on 10-point scales where higher values correspond to more support for 
redistribution.37 The following discussion details the measurement for the main 
independent variables of interest in the analyses reported below—i.e., individuals’ beliefs 
about the nature of wealth accumulation, the causes of economic outcomes, and the 
causes of poverty. All other independent variables remain as introduced in Chapter 4. 
Beliefs about the nature of wealth accumulation are measured using an item that 
asks respondents to indicate their level of agreement with the following opposing 
statements: “Wealth can grow so there is enough for everyone” and “People can only get 
rich at the expense of others.” Responses are recorded using a 10-point scale; a response 
                                                
37 Full wording for these items is provided in Table 3.1 in Chapter 3. 
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of one represents total agreement with the former statement while a response of 10 
represents total agreement with the latter. A similar item—and response scale—is used to 
measure beliefs about the causes of economic outcomes. In this item, the first statement is 
“In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life,” and the second is “Hard work 
doesn’t generally bring success—it’s more a matter of luck and connections.” The 
ensuing analyses treat the variables constructed using responses to these items (WEALTHi 
and OUTCOMESi, respectively) as continuous. Their effects are expected to be positive 
as higher values indicate beliefs that are more consistent with the redistributive frame. 
Beliefs about poverty are measured using two items available in Wave 3. The first 
one asks respondents for their opinions on why there are people living in need. Two 
response options are provided: “They are poor because of laziness and lack of will 
power” and “They are poor because society treats them unfairly.” The second item 
explores respondents’ views about individuals’ chances to escape from poverty. 
Response options are “They have a chance” and “There is very little chance.” These 
items are cross tabulated to classify respondents into four categories. Three dichotomous 
variables (POVERTY1i, POVERTY2i, POVERTY3i) are created to identify the four 







Coding Scheme for Beliefs About Poverty 
 
The coefficients associated with these three variables should be positive given 
that the beliefs corresponding to the base category are the most consistent with the self-
reliance frame. Most importantly, the coefficient associated with POVERTY3i should be 
greater than those associated with the other two variables, as believing that the cause of 
poverty is society’s unfairness and that the poor have very little chance to get ahead are 
characteristic of the redistributive frame. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Descriptive statistics for all dependent and 
independent variables are provided in tables A1.1, A1.3, and A1.4 in Appendix 1. 
Results 
As in Chapter 4, all the models reported below are estimated using ordinary least 
squares (OLS). In the interest of space, only the results corresponding to models of 
support for redistribution as measured by the EQUALITY item are discussed here. 
Results corresponding to the RESPONSIBILITY item are consistent with the ones 
presented below and are reported in tables A1.11 and A1.12 in Appendix 1. 
Individuals' laziness and 
lack of will power
Base category POVERTY2i=1




Chance to escape poverty
There is chance There is very little chance
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Table 5.2 reports estimates for models of support for redistribution in Argentina. 
In addition to social beliefs, which are the variables of main interest in the ensuing 
analyses, these models include the independent variables included in the base 
specification introduced in the previous chapter.38 Beliefs are included in separate models 
because, as one would expect, they are highly correlated with each other. Model 1 and 
Model 4 estimate the effect of beliefs about the nature of wealth accumulation in Wave 3 
and Wave 5, respectively. Model 2 and Model 5 estimate the effect of beliefs about the 
causes of economic outcomes in the two waves. Model 3 estimates the effects of beliefs 
about poverty in Wave 3. 
Overall, the results for Argentina are mixed. The estimated effects of beliefs about 
the nature of wealth accumulation are in line with hypothesis 5.1 in both waves (Model 1 
and Model 4), although these effects are not significant. The effect of beliefs about the 
causes of economic outcomes is in the hypothesized positive direction (hypothesis 5.2), 
but is not significant in Wave 3 (Model 2), and is contrary to expectations and significant 
in Wave 5 (Model 5). In Wave 5, individuals who believe that effort does not always lead 
to success are less supportive of redistribution than those who believed that hard work 
usually brings a better life in the long run. Potential explanations for this finding are 
considered in the discussion later in this chapter. 
 
 
                                                
38 Models including class status, ethnic identification, and prejudice are also estimated. Results are 
consistent with those presented here and in the previous chapter and thus are not reported. 
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Table 5.2 
Models of Support for Redistribution in Argentina, 
Including Beliefs about Wealth, Economic Outcomes, and Poverty 
(EQUALITY Item) 
 
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. * prob<0.10; ** prob<0.05; *** prob<0.01. 
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Wave 5
 124 
The effects of beliefs about poverty are in line with hypothesis 5.3 (Model 3). 
Results indicate that those individuals who think that poverty is caused by an unfair 
society and that the poor have little chance to escape poverty (POVERTY3i=1) are more 
supportive of redistribution than those who hold the opposing beliefs—i.e., those in the 
base category who blame poverty on laziness and lack of will power among the needy 
and who think that the poor have a chance to escape poverty. At 1.08 points, this effect is 
both substantively and statistically significant. The effects for the other two variables are 
also in the hypothesized, positive direction, but they are not statistically significant. For 
example, individuals who believe that society is to blame for poverty but that those in 
need have a chance to escape it (POVERTY1i=1) are also more supportive of 
redistribution compared to the base category, but this difference is not statistically 
significant. Likewise, individuals who believe that laziness and lack of will power are to 
blame for poverty but that there is very little chance to escape poverty (POVERTY2i=1) 
are more supportive of redistribution compared to the base category, but, again, this 
difference is not statistically significant. 
Table 5.3 reports estimates for models of support for redistribution in Peru. Like 
for the case of Argentina, Model 1 and Model 4 estimate the effect of beliefs about the 
nature of wealth accumulation in Wave 3 and Wave 5, respectively. Model 2 and Model 
5 estimate the effect of beliefs about the causes of economic outcomes in the two waves. 




Models of Support for Redistribution in Peru, 
Including Beliefs about Wealth, Economic Outcomes, and Poverty 
(EQUALITY Item) 
 
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. * prob<0.10; ** prob<0.05; *** prob<0.01. 
-0.1882 *** -0.1889 *** -0.1442 ***
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Overall, these results are consistent with hypotheses 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3. The effect 
of beliefs about the nature of wealth accumulation is positive as expected and is 
statistically significant in both waves (Model 1 and Model 4). The effect is also quite 
substantively significant in both waves. Those who completely agree with the idea that 
wealth is finite and wealth accumulation is a zero-sum game are, on average, 1.51 points 
more supportive of redistribution than those who completely agree with the idea that 
wealth can grow so there is enough for everyone. Moreover, the magnitude of this effect 
is comparable to estimated effect of current income presented in Chapter 4. 
The effect of beliefs about the causes of economic outcomes is in line with 
hypothesis 5.2 in Wave 3 (Model 2). Individuals who completely agree with the idea that 
hard work eventually leads to a better life are, on average, 0.75 points less supportive of 
redistribution than those who believe that hard work does not generally bring success. In 
Wave 5 (Model 5), the effect of these beliefs is negative and thus contrary to 
expectations, but not statistically significant. 
Beliefs about poverty have the hypothesized effects on support for redistribution. 
As in Argentina, believing that poverty is caused by an unfair society and there is little 
chance to escape poverty (POVERTY3i=1) is associated with higher levels of support for 
redistribution than those holding opposite beliefs (the base category). At 0.85 points, the 
effect is smaller than in the case of Argentina, but still substantial. Individuals who 
believe that society is to blame for poverty but that it can be escaped (POVERTY1i=1) are 
also more supportive of redistribution than those in the base category. In contrast to the 
results for Argentina, this difference is statistically significant. Individuals who believe 
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that laziness and lack of will power are to blame for economic misfortune but that 
poverty cannot be escaped (POVERTY2i=1) are also more supportive compared to the 
base category, but this difference is not statistically significant. 
Discussion 
Not every hypothesis is consistently supported by the results presented in the 
preceding section. Taken together, however, these results support the overarching 
argument that social beliefs matter and help explain individual-level variation in support 
for redistribution. This section discusses the results in more depth and tries to make sense 
of results that are contrary to expectations. 
The evidence presented thus far suggests that the effect of beliefs about the nature 
of wealth accumulation on redistributive attitudes differs between Argentina and Peru. 
Those who believe that wealth accumulation is zero-sum are more supportive of 
redistribution in Peru. The effect is in this hypothesized, positive direction in Argentina 
as well, but it is not statistically significant. Thus, the evidence provides strong support 
for hypothesis 5.1 in Peru, but only tentative support in the case of Argentina. 
In Argentina, individuals who believe that wealth is rather finite and wealth 
accumulation amounts to a zero-sum game are not more supportive of redistribution than 
those who believe that wealth can grow so that there is enough for everyone. In Peru 
those that believe the former are substantially more supportive than those who believe the 
latter. 
The evidence regarding the effect of beliefs about the causes of economic 
outcomes is mixed. In Peru, the effect of these beliefs is positive as expected and is 
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statistically significant in Wave 3. In Wave 5, however, it is in the opposite direction, but 
not statistically significant. In Argentina, the effect is in the expected direction but not 
statistically significant in Wave 3 and is actually contrary to expectations—i.e., negative 
and significant—in Wave 5. These mixed findings are likely a product of item wording.39 
The question used to construct the measure might not only tap into individuals’ beliefs 
about the causes of economic outcomes, but also into their pessimistic or optimistic 
orientations. Again, the item in question asks individuals to state their level of agreement 
with one of two opposing statements using a ten-point scale. The statements are “In the 
long run, hard work usually brings a better life” and “Hard work doesn’t generally bring 
success—it’s more a matter of luck and connections.” If one does not focus on the 
qualifying phrase in the second statement, as respondents to a survey might very well do, 
the items could be interpreted to be more about individuals’ orientations than on their 
beliefs about the causes of income and economic outcomes.40 
                                                
39 Besides the explanation discussed below, another plausible one is that individuals might adjust their 
beliefs in response to their own economic (mis)fortunes and thus justify these in a way that exonerates them 
for negative outcomes but claims responsibility for positive ones (Bradley 1978; Miller and Ross 1975). 
Thus those that are worse-off should be more likely to believe that luck and connections, rather than hard 
work, explain economic success and the opposite should be true for those that are well-off. Interests, in 
turn, would explain the attitudes of these groups towards redistribution. Available evidence does not 
support this explanation, however, as the results reported in Table 5.2 already control for income. 
Moreover, this explanation cannot account for why the effects vary from positive to negative from one 
wave to the next in the two countries under study. 
40 It is worth noting that studies that do find that beliefs about the causes of economic outcomes have the 
hypothesized effect on preferences use items that do not suffer from this shortcoming. For example, Corneo 
and Grüner (2002) use two items with the following prompts: “How important is hard work for getting 
ahead in life?” and “How important is coming from a wealthy family for getting ahead?” Response options 
are “essential,” “very important,” “fairly important,” “not very important,” and “not important at all.” 
Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) use the following item: “Some people say that people get ahead by their own 
hard work; others say that lucky breaks or help from other people are more important. Which do you think 
is most important?” Respondents could choose from these two options or indicate that both factors were 
equally important. 
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If responses to this item reflect both individuals’ orientations and beliefs about the 
causes of economic outcomes, estimated effects would depend on which one of these 
considerations is more salient at a given time. Beliefs might have been more salient in the 
Wave 3—and thus explain the positive effects in line with expectations—, while 
orientations could have been more salient in the other wave. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, individuals with pessimistic orientations tend to be less politically efficacious 
and attempt to avoid conflict (Miller 1958, 249). This might in turn explain why 
pessimists might be less inclined to demand equality and support redistribution, leading 
to the negative effect observed. 
Political circumstances provide a plausible explanation for why beliefs might 
have been more salient in Wave 3 than in Wave 5. In the mid-1990s, market reforms and 
state retrenchment were in full swing in both Argentina and Peru. These reforms were 
supported by a discourse that emphasized individual initiative and achievement as the 
route to collective progress. This type of discourse likely reinforced beliefs, minimizing 
the salience of individuals’ orientations. In contrast, this type of discourse had subsided 
by the mid-2000s. Thus, individuals’ orientations could have taken precedence over 
beliefs in informing answers to the item in question for Wave 5. 
Finally, results corresponding to beliefs about poverty are consistent with 
hypothesis 5.3. Those who believe that poverty is caused by an unfair society and that 
disadvantaged individuals have very little chance to escape this condition are more 
supportive of redistribution than those who believe the opposite—i.e., that poverty is 
caused by individuals’ laziness and lack of will power and that there is a chance to escape 
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poverty. The effects of beliefs that lie in between these extremes are in the expected, 
positive direction, but are not generally statistically significant. 
Overall, the evidence presented thus far is consistent with the idea that inequality 
frames shape support for redistribution. Individuals who hold beliefs that are closer to the 
redistributive frame are more supportive of redistribution than those whose views are 
closer to the self-reliance frame. 
Social Beliefs and Inequality Frames 
Thus far, it has been assumed that social beliefs populate conceptual frames about 
the issue of inequality. This section explores if this is in fact the case. More specifically, 
it analyzes the extent to which individuals’ beliefs about the nature of wealth 
accumulation, beliefs about the causes of economic outcomes, and beliefs about poverty 
are interrelated and form relatively coherent inequality frames. Since the latter type of 
beliefs is only included in Wave 3 of the WVS, the analysis below is limited to that wave. 
Table 5.4 presents correlations between these three types of beliefs. Beliefs about 
wealth accumulation (WEALTH
i
) and beliefs about the causes of economic outcomes 
(OUTCOMES
i
) are defined in the same way as in the previous analyses. In the case of 
beliefs about poverty, the two original items included in the WVS are considered. As 
stated previously, one item asks respondents why they think people are living in need and 
provides the following response options: “They are poor because of laziness and lack of 
will power” (CAUSES
i
=0) and “They are poor because society treats them unfairly”  
(CAUSES
i
=1), The other item asks respondents about the poor’s chance to escape from 
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poverty. Response options are “They have a chance” (ESCAPE
i





Correlations of Social Beliefs in Argentina and Peru, 
Wave 3 of the WVS 
 
* prob<0.10; ** prob<0.05; *** prob<0.01. 
As Table 5.4 shows, all pair-wise correlations are positive in both countries. With 









 in Peru, all these correlations are also statistically significant at the 5% level. In 
general, these results suggest that individuals hold social beliefs that are relatively 
aligned with each other, which is in turn consistent with the claim that these beliefs 
populate larger conceptual frames about the issue of inequality. The results also reveal 
that individuals’ views about the causes of poverty (CAUSES
i
) seem to be a more closely 
Variables
Wealth 1.0000
Outcomes 0.1706 *** 1.0000
Causes 0.0813 ** 0.1214 *** 1.0000
Escape 0.1045 *** 0.0813 *** 0.3815 ***
Wealth 1.0000
Outcomes 0.2222 *** 1.0000
Causes 0.0394 0.0342 1.0000













related to the other beliefs in Argentina than in Peru. This could be taken to indicate that 
this specific belief does not populate individuals’ inequality frames in the latter country. 
Overall, however, the positive and significant correlations indicate that beliefs are 
interrelated. 
Factor analysis is used below to explore whether or not individuals’ social beliefs 
are the reflection of underlying inequality frames. Table 5.5 summarizes the results of the 
analyses. Only those corresponding to the first factor extracted are reported. 
Table 5.5 
Factor Analyses of Social Beliefs in Argentina and Peru, 
Wave 3 of the WVS 
 
 
The table shows that the latent variable that accounts for most of the common 

























833 0.6433 1.6611 
983 0.5029 
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four beliefs in Argentina and Peru. Remarkably, the correlations are relatively similar 
across the two countries, the only substantial difference being in the one corresponding to 
beliefs about the causes of poverty (CAUSES
i
). Uncovering such latent variables suggests 
that the social beliefs analyzed here are part of larger conceptual frames about the issue 
of inequality and that these frames lay in a continuum that goes from the self-reliance 
frame to the redistributive frame. 
In sum, altogether, these analyses indicate that individuals’ social beliefs are 
interrelated and populate larger inequality frames. Individuals who think that acquiring 
wealth entails stripping others from it are also be more likely to consider that economic 
success is a product of factors like luck and connections. These individuals are also more 
likely to believe that poverty is caused by an unfair society and that the poor have very 
little chance to escape poverty. In turn, those who think that wealth can grow so that there 
is enough for everyone are also inclined to believe that economic success is a product of 
effort and hard work, that poverty is the product of individuals’ laziness and lack of will 
power, and that poor have a chance to escape poverty. 
Differences in Support for Redistribution across Argentina and Peru 
The present chapter and the preceding one have shown that current income and 
social beliefs are the main considerations shaping support for redistribution in Argentina 
and Peru. As documented in Chapter 3, Argentines are more supportive of redistributive 
policies than Peruvians. This section examines how compositional and salience 
differences in income and beliefs help account for the divergence in support for 
redistribution across the two countries. 
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Compositional differences are differences in the distribution of a given individual-
level covariate between the countries. These differences are assessed by comparing 
measures of central tendencies—e.g., means and modes. Salience differences are 
differences in the effects of a given individual-level covariate between the countries. 
These differences are assessed by comparing the magnitude of coefficients estimated in 
the models above. To help illustrate these differences, the discussion below relies on an 
examination of changes in the conditional mean of support for redistribution with respect 
to the covariates of interest—i.e., predicted levels of support based on the models 
estimated above. Current income is examined first, followed by beliefs about the nature 
of wealth accumulation and beliefs about poverty. 
Current Income 
Figure 5.1 presents the conditional mean of support for redistribution with respect 
to this consideration in Argentina and Peru. The plot reflects the estimates from Model 1 
in tables 5.1 and 5.2, respectively. Similar results are obtained using estimates from other 
models. The conditional mean is calculated by setting the values of all other covariates to 
those corresponding to a hypothetical “average” respondent.41 By plotting the results 
assuming the same values in the two countries, the conditional means in the figure below 
control for any differences between the countries due to other covariates—e.g., 
                                                
41 This individual is constructed by fixing the values of the covariates at their average across the two 
countries. Values of dichotomous variables are set to represent the most frequent category. Averages and 
frequencies are calculated for the respondents included in the models whose estimates are used to plot the 
conditional means. In this case, the average respondent is either a homemaker or not working and not 
looking for work (OTHER STATUSi=1), does not belong to a union (UNIONi=0), has middle-of-the-road 
beliefs about the nature of wealth (WEALTHi=4.26), is a man (FEMALEi=0), is approaching middle 
adulthood (AGEi=38.79), and has completed high school (HIGH SCHOOLi=1). 
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differences in aggregate levels of education, aggregate social beliefs, etc. This allows an 
examination of income’s influence on support for redistribution independent of these 
other factors. 
Figure 5.1 
Conditional Mean of Support for Redistribution 
with respect to Income 
 
The figure provides a number of insights about the divergence in support for 
redistribution across the two countries. First, the different intercepts indicate that an 
individual with the characteristics of the average respondent would be more supportive of 
redistribution in Argentina than in Peru, regardless of his income level. Second, the plot 
shows that the gap in support increases as income increases. In other words, the higher 
the income of the hypothetical individual, the larger the divergence in support across the 
two countries. This salience difference is characterized by greater magnitude in the 



































While interesting, this salience difference does not help explain the divergence in 
support for redistribution for two reasons. First, as can be seen in Figure 5.1, the 
difference in the slopes is not very big (-0.13 in Argentina; -0.19 in Peru). Second, this 
salience difference could only help explain divergence in support for redistribution if 
Peruvians were, on average, richer than Argentines. But this is not the case as the 
following discussion about the compositional differences shows.  
The average income value in Argentina is 4.59 and 3.29 in Peru. The 
corresponding conditional means of support for redistribution for these average income 
levels are 4.82 and 3.81, respectively (a difference of 1.01). The divergence in support 
between the two countries would be even greater if they had the same average income 
levels. Indeed, if the average income observed in Argentina (4.59) were also observed in 
Peru, divergence would increase from 1.01 (4.82 minus 3.81) to 1.25 (4.82 minus 3.57). 
Similarly, if the average income observed in Peru (3.29) were also observed in Argentina, 
divergence would increase to 1.18 (4.99 minus 3.81). In other words, closing the gap in 
the average income between the two countries would actually increase the divergence in 
support for redistribution. Altogether, this discussion indicates that neither salience nor 
compositional differences regarding current income can account for the observed 
divergence in levels of support across Argentina and Peru. 
Beliefs about the Nature of Wealth Accumulation 
Figure 5.2 depicts the conditional means of support for redistribution with respect 
to beliefs about the nature of wealth accumulation. Again, the plot reflects the estimates 
from Model 1 in tables 5.1 and 5.2, respectively, and the conditional mean is calculated 
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after setting the values of all other covariates to those of a hypothetical average 
respondent.42 As in the case of income, the different intercepts indicate that this average 
respondent would be much more supportive of redistribution in Argentina than in Peru, 
even after accounting for beliefs about the nature of wealth accumulation. 
Figure 5.2 
Conditional Mean of Support for Redistribution 
with respect to Beliefs about Wealth Accumulation 
 
In contrast to the case of income, differences in beliefs about wealth accumulation 
can help explain why support for redistribution is higher in Argentina than in Peru. As 
will be shown below in detail, individuals in Argentina tend to hold beliefs that are closer 
to the redistributive frame, while those in Peru tend to hold beliefs that are closer to the 
self-reliance frame. This compositional difference plays a key role in explaining 
differences in support. Additionally, as the slopes in Figure 5.3 indicate, beliefs are much 
                                                
42 In this case, the average respondent has an intermediate level of income (INCOMEi=3.94). All other 
imputed values remain the same as in the case of the previous figure, except for those corresponding to 




































more salient in Peru than in Argentina. This salience difference, too, is important for 
understanding differences across the two countries.  
The average respondent of each country holds beliefs that lie toward the middle of 
the scale, 4.49 in Argentina and 4.03 in Peru. The conditional means of support for 
redistribution corresponding to these beliefs are 4.91 and 3.65, respectively. This 
amounts to a divergence of 1.26 in support. This divergence would decrease if Peruvians 
held beliefs more aligned with Argentines’ beliefs. If the average respondent in Peru held 
the beliefs of the average Argentine respondent, divergence would decrease to 1.18 (4.91 
minus 3.73). At 6.2%, this decrease is not very impressive, but it likely underestimates 
the potential explanatory power of differences in beliefs about wealth accumulation. As 
discussed below, this small decrease is probably related to the political context 
surrounding the Wave 3 surveys in both countries. Indeed, a glance at conditional means 
using Wave 5 data suggests a larger decrease. 
As mentioned earlier, the implementation of market reforms was an important 
economic, political, and social development in both countries during the mid-1990s. 
Given the dominant neoliberal rhetoric of the time, it is not surprising that beliefs about 
wealth accumulation differ the least in Wave 3 (4.49 vs. 4.03, differing by 0.46). In the 
following decade, as the countries experienced disparate developments, beliefs became 
less similar. Indeed, in Wave 5 (mid-2000s), the average levels of beliefs are 4.51 in 
Argentina and 3.63 in Peru, amounting to a difference of 0.88. The divergence in mean 
conditional support corresponding to these Wave 5 beliefs amounts to 1.32 (4.91 minus 
3.59). If the average respondent in Peru held the beliefs of the average Argentine 
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respondent in Wave 5, the divergence would decrease to 1.18 (4.91 minus 3.73), a 
reduction of 10.6%.43 
Beliefs about Poverty 
Finally, Figure 5.3 depicts the conditional mean of support with respect to beliefs 
about poverty. The plot reflects the estimates from Model 3 in tables 5.1 and 5.2, 
respectively, and as in the previous figures, the mean is calculated after setting the values 
of all other covariates to those of the average hypothetical respondent.44 Beliefs in line 
with the self-reliance frame—i.e., believing that laziness and lack of will power are to 
blame for poverty and that the poor have a chance to get ahead—constitute the base 
category. Views in line with the redistributive frame—i.e., thinking that those in need are 
poor because society treats them unfairly and that there is very little chance to escape 
poverty—are at the other extreme (POVERTY3i=1). The other combinations of beliefs 






                                                
43 Note that the effects of beliefs about the nature of wealth accumulation estimated for waves three and 
five (models one and four in Tables 5.1 and 5.2) are very similar. Thus, the divergences in conditional 
means would be comparable if the effects corresponding to the latter wave were used for the calculations. 
44 In this case, the average respondent has an intermediate level of income (INCOMEi=3.91), is either a 
homemaker or not working, is a woman (FEMALEi=1), is approaching middle adulthood (AGEi=38.88), 
and has completed high school (HIGH SCHOOLi=1). 
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Figure 5.3 
Conditional Mean of Support for Redistribution 
with respect to Beliefs about Poverty 
 
Like in the case of beliefs about the nature of wealth accumulation, compositional 
and salience differences in beliefs about poverty help explain part of the divergence in 
support for redistribution across Argentina and Peru. Indeed, there are important 
compositional differences in beliefs about poverty across the two countries. In Argentina, 
62.00% of respondents hold beliefs in line with the redistributive frame (POVERTY3i=1); 
11.93% believe that poverty is due to individuals’ laziness and lack of will power, but 
that the poor have little chance to escape poverty (POVERTY2i=1); 11.23% believe that 
poverty is due to societal shortcomings, but that the poor have a chance of getting ahead 
(POVERTY1i=1); and, 14.84% hold beliefs in line with the self-reliance frame (base 
category). To facilitate the following discussion, imagine that the average Argentine 
holds each of these beliefs in proportion to their distribution among all respondents. In 


































14.84% are consistent with the self-reliance frame, and so forth. The predicted level of 
support for redistribution for this hypothetical person—who is average in all other 
respects45— is 4.89. 
In Peru 36.18% of respondents hold beliefs in line with the redistributive frame 
(POVERTY3i=1); 11.29% believe that poverty is due to individuals’ laziness and lack of 
will power, but that the poor have a little chance to escape poverty (POVERTY2i=1); 
24.66% believe that poverty is due to societal shortcomings, but that the poor have a 
chance of getting ahead (POVERTY1i=1); and, 27.88% hold beliefs in line with the self-
reliance frame (base category). Using the same strategy described above, the average 
Peruvian’s predicted level of support for redistribution would be 3.79.  
If this average Peruvian held beliefs about poverty consistent with the proportions 
of the average Argentine described above, her predicted level of support would increase 
to 3.94. Thus, if these compositional differences did not exist, divergence in support for 
redistribution across Argentina and Peru would decrease from 1.10 points (4.89 minus 
3.79) to 0.95 points (4.89 minus 3.79). In other words, compositional and salience 
differences in beliefs about poverty close the gap in support for redistribution by 13.64%. 
To sum up, the discussion thus far suggests that the belief-based account can help 
explain why support for redistribution is higher in Argentina than in Peru. If there were 
no compositional or salience differences in beliefs about the nature of wealth 
accumulation and views about poverty, the levels of support for redistribution across the 
                                                
45 See the previous footnote for details about this average individual. 
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two countries would diverge to a lesser extent. When it comes to compositional and 
salience differences in income, this is not the case. 
This section also indicates that a significant portion of cross-country variation 
remains unexplained after controlling for individual-level differences. Indeed, as shown 
in the analyses of mean conditional support above, there were important differences in 
support across the two countries regardless of the levels of the three covariates examined 
and after controlling for differences in additional covariates. The concluding chapter of 
the dissertation speculates about how inequality frames could explain these population-
wide differences and how this could be an interesting avenue for future research. 
Additional Descriptive Analysis of Beliefs 
Given that part of the divergence in support for redistribution across the two 
countries stems from compositional differences in these beliefs, it is worth examining 
these differences in more detail. The following paragraphs provide a more detailed 
characterization of social beliefs in Argentina and Peru. The analysis describes the 
distribution of views about the nature of wealth accumulation and beliefs about poverty 
as documented by the WVS. It also examines other beliefs hypothesized to populate 
inequality frames as documented by data from additional surveys. 
Figure 5.4 plots the relative frequencies of responses to the item measuring beliefs 
about wealth accumulation. The first pattern that stands out is the relative stability of 
these beliefs across the two survey waves in each country. This is similar to what was 
reported in the case of redistributive attitudes in Chapter 3. The plot also shows clustering 
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patterns that are quite different across the two countries. In Argentina, responses cluster 
at both ends of the scale, at “3” and at “6.” In Peru, they cluster at “1,” “3,” and “6.” 
Figure 5.4 
Beliefs about the Nature of Wealth Accumulation in Argentina and Peru, 
Wave 3 and Wave 5 of the WVS 
 
Moving on to measures of central tendency, mean responses are 4.40 in Wave 3 
and 4.60 in Wave 5 in Argentina, and 4.09 and 3.64 in Wave 3 and Wave 5, respectively, 
in Peru. The median response in the former country is “4” in both waves; in the latter, “3” 
in both waves. Thus, beliefs about the nature of wealth accumulation are more proximate 
to the redistributive frame in Argentina than in Peru. 
Earlier, the fact that the difference in mean beliefs is smaller in Wave 3 was 
attributed to a political environment in which market reforms and neoliberal discourse 
were quite dominant. As pointed out in the discussion of Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3, 
differences in support for redistribution as measured by both the EQUALITY and 





















































distributions of beliefs and support for redistribution provide yet another indication of the 
link between the two constructs. 
Table 5.6 presents the cross-tabulation of the two items measuring beliefs about 
poverty. It shows that respondents’ views about this issue are closer to the redistributive 
frame in Argentina than in Peru. Indeed, 62.20% of respondents in the former country 
believe that a society that treats individuals unfairly is the main cause of poverty and that 
there is very little chance to escape poverty. In Peru, only 37.49% of respondents hold 
these views. The proportion of respondents that holds the opposite beliefs in Peru 
(26.81%) is almost double the proportion in Argentina (13.80%). It is also worth noting 
that views about the causes of poverty and about the poor’s chances to escape poverty 
seem to be more closely associated in Argentina than in Peru. In Argentina, combinations 
of beliefs that are off the diagonal amount to 24.01% (12.09% plus 11.92%), while in 
Peru they amount to 35.70% (24.34% plus 11.36%). 
Table 5.6 
Beliefs About Poverty in Argentina and Peru, 
Wave 3 of the WVS 
 
Argentina Peru Argentina Peru
Individuals' laziness and 
lack of will power
13.80% 26.81% 11.92% 11.36%
Society treats individuals 
unfairly
12.09% 24.34% 62.20% 37.49%
There is chance There is very little chanceCauses of poverty
Chance to escape poverty
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Finally, Table 5.7 summarizes responses to a set of items gauging social beliefs 
that are taken from various editions of the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes 
Project and the Latinobarómetro surveys. Items one and two measure beliefs about the 
factors determining success. A slight majority of Argentines completely or mostly agrees 
with the statement that forces outside individuals’ control mostly explain achievement 
(51.8% in 2002 and 52.5% in 2007). In contrast, there is not a majority opinion in Peru 
about this issue. A slight plurality of respondents agrees that forces outside individuals’ 
control are essential in 2002 (45.0% vs. 42.4%), while a slight plurality disagrees with 
this assertion in 2007 (42.5% vs. 43.4%). 
Item 3 also captures beliefs about the causes of success but provides respondents 
with two options, “society’s failures” and “individual failures.” Surprisingly, Argentines 
blame individuals slightly more often than society (44.5% vs. 41.7%). Interestingly, 
however, a large proportion (13.9%) offer “don’t know” responses or do not answer this 
question at all, indicating some ambivalence on this issue—and more than double the 
amount of ambivalence in Peru (6.2%). In Peru, a comfortable majority of respondents 
blames individual failures (64.6%). 
Item 4 captures beliefs about the causes of poverty. Responses are pretty much in 
line with those from the WVS. A majority of respondents blames circumstances over lack 
of effort in both countries, but the majority is overwhelming only in Argentina. Indeed, 
more than three-quarters of respondents blame circumstances in Argentina (76.8%) while 
only a slight majority do so in Peru (54.0%) 
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Table 5.7 
Social Beliefs in Argentina and Peru in the 2000s, 
from Additional Surveys 
 
Source: Global Attitudes Project (2002; 2007); Latinobarómetro (2000; 2006). 
a Surveys are representative of 75% and 52% of the population in Argentina and Peru, respectively. 
Item 5 measures beliefs about the extent to which society provides equal 
opportunities and allows for upward mobility. The difference in responses is quite 
remarkable. By a ratio of more than two to one, Argentines are more likely to believe that 
it is not possible for a person to move from “rags to riches” by working hard. The 
situation is quite different in Peru; by a ratio of more than three to one, individuals in this 
country are more likely to believe that it is possible for a person to move from “rags to 
riches.” This is perhaps the most important piece of evidence included in the table as it 
No. Year Sample Item Options
Peru              
(%)
Completely agree 21.0 14.1
Mostly agree 30.8 30.9
Mosty disagree 20.3 26.5
Completely disagree 16.5 15.9
DK/NA 11.4 12.6
Completely agree 16.3 10.2
Mostly agree 36.2 32.3
Mosty disagree 22.8 32.1
Completely disagree 15.5 11.3
DK/NA 9.2 14.1
Society's failures 41.7 29.3
Individual failures 44.5 64.6
DK/NA 13.9 6.2
Lack of effort 19.6 43.2
Due to circumstances 76.8 54.0
DK/NA 3.6 2.8
It is possible 38.3 73.7










Success in life is pretty much 
determined by forces outside our 
control?
2000 Othera
Which of the following comes closer 
to your point of view about the 
causes of poverty in (country)?
2006
2002 National
Success in life is pretty much 
determined by forces outside our 
control?
2002 National
Why people do not succeed? Which 
of the following comes closer to you 
point of view?
National
Do you believe that in (country) it is 
possible that a person that is born 
poor and works hard becomes rich?
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clearly shows that Argentines’ views about equality of opportunity and social mobility 
are closer to the redistributive frame than those of Peruvians. 
Overall, this discussion shows that the redistributive frame is relatively dominant 
in Argentina, while the self-reliance frame is more prominent in Peru. This has been the 
case at least since the 1990s. Available evidence also suggests that divergence in social 
beliefs across the two countries has become more pronounced starting in the 2000s, after 
the neoliberal era came to an end in Argentina. 
Conclusion 
Inequality frames play an important role in shaping support for redistribution. 
Results from both Argentina and Peru show that individuals who believe that poverty is 
the product of societal shortcomings and that the needy have a chance to escape poverty 
are more supportive of redistribution than those who believe otherwise. In addition, 
evidence from Peru indicates that individuals who think that wealth is rather finite are 
more supportive of redistribution than those who believe that wealth can grow so that 
there is enough for everyone. 
Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, this chapter has shown that inequality 
frames can partly account for why support is higher in Argentina than in Peru. 
Individuals in the former country tend to hold beliefs that are closer to the redistributive 
frame, while those in the latter are more inclined to hold views consistent with the self-
reliance frame. If beliefs were less divergent, aggregate levels of support for 
redistribution in these countries would be more similar. Thus, unlike theories focused on 
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interests and group identity, the belief-based explanation is very useful to understand 




The Political Origins of Inequality Frames 
in Argentina and Peru 
The previous chapter established that inequality frames account for an important 
part of the difference in redistributive attitudes observed across Argentina and Peru. In 
Argentina, individuals are more likely to hold social beliefs in line with the redistributive 
frame and thus tend to be more supportive of redistributive policies. In Peru, less 
favorable attitudes towards these policies are grounded in beliefs that are closer to the 
self-reliance frame. Given the importance of inequality frames in shaping attitudes 
toward redistribution, this chapter digs deeper into the “funnel of causality” (Campbell et 
al. 1960, 24-25) to explore the origins of these frames. 
What explains the relative dominance of the redistributive frame in Argentina and 
the relative dominance of the self-reliance frame in Peru? As argued in Chapter 2, the 
historical evolution of mass beliefs about inequality can be understood using a critical 
juncture framework. Specifically, mass inequality frames are expected to be relatively 
stable during times of normal politics, but malleable during important periods, or critical 
junctures, produced by events like mass political incorporation and economic crises. 
During such times, individuals are particularly receptive to elite cues and messages that 
are provided not only through rhetoric but also through public policies. This chapter 
traces the origins and evolution of mass inequality frames by analyzing redistributive 
politics in Argentina and Peru since the early twentieth century. 
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In Argentina, the dominance of the redistributive frame is attributed to President 
Juan Perón’s use of anti-oligarchic, populist rhetoric and ability to implement extensive, 
progressive social policies during his first government (1946-1955). This combination 
had a lasting impact on mass beliefs because it coincided with the political incorporation 
of the popular and working classes. As this chapter will show, the new critical juncture 
spurred by the political and economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s undermined the 
dominance of the redistributive frame. This weakness was a contributing factor to the 
passage of neoliberal reforms in the 1990s by a Peronist president. However, the 
prominence of redistributive views was ultimately restored by the economic crisis of the 
early-2000s and the return to power of the progressive wing of Peronism. 
In Peru, an analysis of the role that the populist Peruvian Aprista Party (APRA) 
played during the critical juncture of the 1930s and 1940s shows that populist rhetoric 
alone cannot produce lasting changes in mass beliefs, while a discussion of the 
progressive Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces (GRFA) (1968-1980) 
suggests that the combination of redistributive rhetoric and policies can succeed only 
under certain circumstances that make the public receptive to new frames. Finally, the 
chapter argues that the ultimate “triumph” of the self-reliance frame after the 1980s 
critical juncture should be attributed to the public’s reaction to exclusionary social 
policies. 
Before advancing this politico-historical explanation, this chapter first discusses a 
set of potential competing explanations of the origins of inequality frames. It shows that 
arguments linking the development of frames to social mobility experiences, land 
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abundance, and religious views fail to account for the patterns of social beliefs—and 
support for redistribution—observed in Argentina and Peru. It also argues that 
immigration from Europe to Argentina should be considered as an antecedent condition 
to the rise of Perón to power rather than as an immediate cause of redistributive frame 
dominance in that country. 
The ensuing analysis employs process tracing (George and Bennett 2005) to 
identify critical junctures and the immediate causes of inequality frame dominance as 
well as to rule out alternative explanations. The analysis draws mostly on secondary 
sources that document Argentine and Peruvian political development. Historical public 
opinion data documenting social beliefs and attitudes toward redistribution—gathered 
from primary or secondary sources—are included whenever possible. The earliest period 
for which data are available for Argentina is the 1960s and for Peru, the 1970s. Most of 
the data available, however, is concentrated in the 1990s for both countries. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized in four sections. The first one considers 
alternative explanations of the origins of inequality frames. The second and third sections 
synthesize the political trajectories of Argentina and Peru since the early 1900s using the 
theoretical insights developed in Chapter 2. The final section summarizes the main 
findings and discusses their broader implications. 
Alternative Explanations 
Scholars analyzing redistributive attitudes in advanced industrial democracies 
have argued that social beliefs diverged across Europe and the U.S. because of 
differences in social mobility, arable land endowments, and religious creeds. Noting that 
 152 
the U.S. and Europe have similar current mobility rates, Piketty (1995) and Alesina and 
Angeletos (2005) speculate that differences in past mobility experiences could help 
explain differences in present beliefs. In Europe, class rigidity severely restrained 
opportunities for mobility before the twentieth century, while at that same time the U.S. 
was characterized as a “land of opportunity,” where those who tried hard enough could 
make it. Benabou and Tirole (2006) argue that land abundance might have shaped initial 
views about mobility and opportunity in the U.S. and that the early Europeans settlers in 
the U.S. might have had more “effort-promoting” beliefs because of their Protestant 
religious background. 
Alesina and Glaeser (2004) have questioned these accounts as explanations of 
differences in beliefs between Europe and the U.S. First, with regard to past mobility 
experiences, the authors concede that at their very beginning, the British colonies in the 
present day U.S. could have been considered classless societies. They argue, however, 
that during most of the colonial era and the nineteenth century, social structure in the 
present day U.S. resembled that of aristocratic Europe to a significant extent (Alesina and 
Glaeser 2004, 191-196). Second, they contend that the idea of the U.S. being a land of 
opportunity was a product of propaganda aimed at promoting immigration to a country 
eager for labor. This propaganda planted a seed that was reinforced by rhetoric from the 
political right since the time of the revolution (Alesina and Glaeser 2004, 198-199). 
Instead, they contend that the size of the country, rather than land availability per se, is 
important to explain diverging beliefs. They argue that the U.S.’s size hindered the labor 
movement’s ability to organize and strike and prevented the emergence of a strong 
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socialist party (Alesina and Glaeser 2004, 219-221). Finally, with regard to Protestant 
religious beliefs, the authors show that there is no relationship between Protestantism and 
the belief that income is the result of luck. Thus, they conclude that religious belief alone 
cannot account for diverging social beliefs across the Atlantic (Alesina and Glaeser 2004, 
196-197). 
Historical mobility and land availability, on the one hand, and religion, on the 
other, are also unsatisfactory explanations—and perhaps more clearly so—when it comes 
to differences between Argentina and Peru. First, if either of the two countries were to be 
regarded as a “land of opportunity” at some point in time it would be Argentina. Like the 
U.S., Argentina was endowed with vast, scarcely populated plains rich in arable land and 
pasture—the Pampas (Sokoloff and Engerman 2000). Due to a number of reasons, 
including the Spanish Crown’s restrictions on foreign trade and European immigration, 
and focus on precious metal extraction, this territory remained mostly unsettled during 
the colonial era. After independence, this changed dramatically as a series of military 
campaigns that ended in the 1880s successively expanded the country’s “frontier” and 
decimated the indigenous population. By the end of this so-called Conquest of the Desert, 
the Argentine state had expanded its control of the Pampas from the area immediately to 
the west and south of Buenos Aires towards the Andes and Patagonia (Perry 1980). 
What followed was a period of unprecedented economic progress and massive 
immigration from Europe, especially from Italy and Spain. Between the 1880s and 1920s, 
the Argentine economy grew significantly as beef, wool, and grain exports soared. By the 
1910s, the country became one of the wealthiest in the world, along with those of 
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Western Europe, the U.S., and other “settler economies” like Australia and Canada 
(Taylor 1992). At the same time, the Argentine government, acting at the behest of the 
local landed elite, promoted massive European immigration to provide much needed 
labor for the export complex. The successful efforts included contracting recruiting 
agents, paying ocean passages, and showcasing the country as one in which newcomers 
could easily acquire cheap land (Solberg 1982, 135). The combination of land abundance, 
scarce labor, and economic prosperity imprinted the idea of a land of opportunity and 
richness in the minds of immigrants and their descendents, who would eventually become 
the majority of the population (Llach and Gerchunoff 2004). 
In contrast to Argentina, the territory that is now present-day Peru was densely 
populated at the arrival of the Spaniards. Arable land was relatively scarce, but the area 
was rich in mineral resources. As the center of Spanish power in South America, Peru 
had a closed, pyramidal social structure. Working in the colonial administration or 
enjoying the rents produced by land or mines, Spaniards and creoles (Americans of 
Spanish-descent) lived quite comfortably. At the other end, and while de jure free, a large 
share of the indigenous population was de facto tied to the elites through semi-feudal 
relationships in large estates or subject to forced labor in mines (Cotler 1978, 21-65). 
This social structure remained for the most part unchanged after independence—except 
for the departure of the colonial administrators—and well into the twentieth century. In 
this context, social status and prestige remained tied to land and natural resource 
ownership rather than to industriousness (Burga y Flores Galindo 1979, 95-99). 
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Unlike Argentina, Peru did not experience sustained prosperity as it consolidated 
as an independent country. Its economic history at the time is one of boom and bust 
cycles spurred by the discovery of natural resources that were in high demand by the 
international market (Yepes 1972; Thorp and Bertram 1985). Guano, nitrate, and rubber 
were exploited intensively until supplies were exhausted, war cut off access to supplies, 
and foreign competitors prevailed, respectively. At the same time, relatively modern 
enclave economies controlled by the domestic elite or foreign capital developed around 
mining in the central highlands, and sugar and cotton growing in the northern and central 
coastal valleys. However, these enclaves were not enough to sustain major economic 
growth or large-scale modernization. The combination of labor surplus—and low 
wages—, land scarcity, and limited economic growth are likely to blame for the 
successive failures of government initiatives to promote European immigration from the 
mid-nineteenth century until the 1920s.46 
In sum, when it comes to historical mobility experiences and land availability, 
Argentina is more similar to the U.S. than Peru is. However, when it comes to social 
beliefs, Peru is more similar to the U.S. than Argentina is. It is also important to point out 
that available evidence suggests that current mobility levels in Argentina and Peru are 
comparable, and thus cannot account for diverging beliefs. When it comes to educational 
                                                
46 During this time, Peru only received substantial immigration inflows from another labor surplus country, 
China. These immigrants were brought to work as agricultural laborers in the coastal valleys. 
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mobility, for example, the two are among Latin America’s most mobile countries, along 
with Chile and Uruguay (Andersen 2001).47 
Second, with regard to religious beliefs, Argentina and Peru both have deep-
rooted Catholic traditions that can be traced back to colonial times. In Argentina, the 
influence of Catholicism in society survived the liberal reforms of the last decades of the 
nineteenth century and remained an important social and political force throughout the 
modernization period that preceded Perón’s rise to power (Plotkin 1994, 30-33). Mass 
immigration did not threaten its predominance because the vast majority of newcomers 
were Catholic (Halperín Donghi 1975, 769-770). In Peru, liberals also attempted to pass 
secularizing reforms, but the Catholic Church, backed by conservative elites, was able to 
forestall them until the first decades of the twentieth century (Klaiber 1996). 
Catholic traditions and the Catholic Church have remained strong after the major 
political and social changes that the two countries underwent throughout the twentieth 
century. Today about 80% of their respective populations declares to be Catholic,48 and 
the Church is one of the most trusted institutions in both countries, although it is more 
                                                
47 Comparable studies of social mobility in Argentina and Peru are scarce because of data availability. 
Andersen (2001, 7) argues that given that education is highly correlated with income one could reasonably 
expect income mobility trends to resemble those of educational mobility and also avoid the pitfalls 
associated with measuring income. Available comparative studies of income mobility include Peru, but, 
unfortunately, not Argentina. See Azevedo and Bouillon (2009) for a review of studies analyzing social 
mobility in Latin America. 
48 Argentina’s censuses have not asked questions about religion since the 1960s. According to the First 
Survey about Religious Beliefs and Attitudes in Argentina (CEIL/CONICET 2008), 76.5% of those older 
than 18 and that reside in urban areas are Catholic. In Peru, according to the 2007 census, 81.3% of those 
older than 12 are Catholic (INEI 2008, 138). 
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trusted in Peru.49 Beyond these similarities, there is one main difference in present day 
religious attitudes across the two countries: opinions about the Catholic Church are more 
polarized in Argentina than in Peru. However, this difference should not be seen as a 
potential cause of divergence in social beliefs. As will be argued in the next section, 
political events during the Peronist government of 1946-1955 are the likely cause of both 
religious polarization and redistributive frame dominance. In conclusion, the hypothesis 
that links diverging social beliefs to religious differences is unsatisfactory in the case of 
Argentina and Peru. 
A final alternative explanation to consider in the case of the two countries under 
study is related to the beliefs of the immigrants that arrived in Argentina at the turn of the 
twentieth century. Given that the vast majority of that country’s population is comprised 
of these immigrants’ descendents, it is possible that the current dominance of the 
redistributive frame is explained by the newcomers’ beliefs. On the one hand, Europeans 
might have brought with them views amenable to redistribution. On the other hand, 
immigrants might have developed them after arriving in Argentina and prior to the ascent 
of Perón. Available evidence on the character of immigrants and on their organizational 
and political experiences as they integrated into society suggests that these hypotheses are 
implausible. 
The “diffusion hypothesis” is unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. First, Italy 
and Spain, the sources of most of the population influx, were among the most traditional 
                                                
49 According to LAPOP, the average trust on the Catholic Church in Argentina in 2010 was 43.3 points (in 
a 100-point scale) and it was the second most trusted institution after the media (53.6) (LAPOP 2010a, 
131). In Peru, with 62.3 points, the Church was the most trusted institution in 2010 (LAPOP 2010b, 154). 
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countries in Europe at the time. Having barely industrialized, and thus with relatively 
small working classes, socialist ideas were far from being widespread in these countries. 
Second, most of the newcomers were illiterate, of rural origin, and, as previously 
mentioned, Catholic (Halperín Donghi 1975, 769-770). Moreover, they generally aspired 
to live as small capitalists in the cities or small landowners in the country, and to get rich 
rather quickly (Miguens 1983, 158; Solberg 1982, 150). These hopes and socioeconomic 
characteristics suggest that immigrants were in fact not fond of redistributive ideas. 
Finally, one could argue that, if anything, immigrants were probably bearers of self-
reliance beliefs as they were “by definition taking their destiny in their own hands” 
(Alesina and Glaeser 2004, 220). While immigration certainly brought some anarcho-
syndicalists and socialists to Argentina that would later become labor organizers, it would 
be a stretch to argue that the immigrant mass constituted some sort of socialist vanguard 
in light of the preceding arguments. 
Could immigrants have developed pro-redistributive views upon arrival? Consider 
first the case of those who settled in rural areas. Once in Argentina, those lured by 
promises of cheap land quickly realized that the local elite already owned most of the 
Pampas and had to become renters or sharecroppers (Germani 1978, 136-137; Solberg 
1978, 136-139). Immigrants were generally content with these arrangements, but the 
situation changed as crop prices started to fluctuate in the 1910s. Price drops sparked 
periods of social unrest, with rent strikes being the preferred mode of contention. Protest 
was usually short-lived, however; they waned as crop prices improved, and were aimed at 
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lowering rents and obtaining favorable contract conditions like longer terms and credits 
for farm improvements, rather than at expropriation (Solberg 1971).50 
Rural worker unions also developed during this period. Although their contention 
repertoire included violent strikes, these unions also sought moderate concessions, such 
as twelve-hour shifts, wage increases, and more favorable working conditions (Solberg 
1971, 41-43). It is also worth noting that most renters and braceros were not naturalized 
and thus could not participate in politics. This helps explain not only their limited success 
at having their demands met by the political system but also their strategy to focus on 
narrow claims in the first place—rather than on more ambitious efforts aimed at social 
change. Overall, while immigrants in rural areas faced difficulties that fuelled discontent 
and mobilization, it would be hard to make the case that their very specific, interest-
driven demands were manifestations of wider concerns about inequality or poverty. 
The same conclusion applies to the larger share of immigrants who settled in 
urban areas. During the first decades of the twentieth century, population influx was the 
main factor driving the expansion of the urban working class. This growth came along 
with the social problems inherent to rapid urbanization and nascent industrialization. 
Workers faced poor working and living conditions, and had no access to social services. 
In this context, workers channeled their discontent into unionization and protest. While 
anarcho-syndicalism was strong within the labor movement in the 1910s, socialism and 
later communism challenged this leadership. In the process, the three tendencies were 
                                                
50 Other issues of concern for renters were credit access, pest control, and input price reduction. Their most 
radical proposals entailed introducing a land tax to force the division and sell of large estates and passing 
homestead laws like the ones passed in the U.S. so that the settlers of frontier territories could become 
owners (Solberg 1971, 33-39). 
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weakened within the movement, although socialists finally managed to take control of the 
movement by the 1930s (Collier and Collier 2002, 155). Nevertheless, unions remained 
almost strictly concerned with labor issues until the Perón years (Germani 1978, 143; 
Halperín Donghi 1975, 771-773; Plotkin 2007, 31-32).51 Like in the case of their rural 
counterparts, the prevalence of non-naturalized immigrants in the urban worker unions is 
probably a contributing factor to this state of affairs. 
Immigrants also joined the ranks of the urban middle class. Some arrived with 
skills and abilities that allowed them to become professionals and clerical workers as well 
as small businessmen. Numerous others worked their way up from the working class 
(Solberg 1969, 216-218). Indeed, upward social mobility into the middle classes served 
as an escape valve that defused social unrest and deterred the development of a working-
class subculture (Germani 1978, 144-145). Aspiring to become or to consolidate their 
position as small capitalists, the main concern of these immigrants was avoiding falling 
(back) into the working class (Halperín Dongui 1975, 771). This is hardly the case of a 
middle class that is empathetic with the disadvantaged and amenable to redistributive 
rhetoric. 
In sum, it seems highly unlikely that immigrants brought with them socialist, 
redistributive beliefs to Argentina or that they spontaneously developed them in reaction 
to their experiences upon arrival. Instead, social unrest among immigrants, and the 
working and popular classes, more generally, should be viewed as antecedent conditions 
                                                
51 According to Ranis (1992, 18) workers “were more concerned with immediate personal economic gain 
and tended to express their social consciousness in an awareness of being “poor” rather than membership in 
a class.” He mentions that almost 90% of the 113 strikes that took place in 1942 aimed at obtaining salary 
improvements and readjustments. 
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to Perón’s rise to power in 1946. It is this controversial leader’s combination of anti-
oligarchic, populist rhetoric and pro-labor and pro-poor social policies that imprinted the 
redistributive frame in the minds of the majority of Argentina’s public. 
Argentina: From Peronism to Neoliberalism and Back Again 
This dissertation argues that beliefs in line with the redistributive frame become 
dominant wherever political actors using populist rhetoric to advance comprehensive 
welfare policies attain power and implement their platforms at critical political junctures. 
In Argentina, the period during which the popular and working classes were incorporated 
into politics constitutes the first juncture. Roughly lasting from the mid-1940s until 1955, 
this time was brought about by population growth and urbanization, as well as by the 
growth of the export complex and nascent industrialization. The combination of anti-
oligarchic, populist rhetoric and redistributive policies that characterized the Perón 
government (1946-1955) created the mass beliefs that would continue to shape the 
politics of redistribution in that country until the present day. 
Antecedents to the First Critical Juncture 
Before the irruption of the popular and working classes into politics, the Radical 
Civic Union (UCR) had posed the first challenge to a closed and elitist political system 
(Germani 1978, 142-143; Kirkpatrick 1971, 22-25). Representing the growing urban 
middle sectors, and featuring some discontented members of the elite among its most 
prominent members, the UCR was the first mass party in Argentine politics. Its demands 
for political inclusion and free and fair elections led to the passage of a universal suffrage 
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law in 1912, which made the vote secret and obligatory for all males. The UCR won the 
presidency in the ensuing 1916 elections, the first clean and truly competitive elections in 
the country’s history. The party would go on to govern for the next fourteen years, 
winning the 1922 and 1928 presidential elections, until being ousted by a military coup in 
1930. 
While the UCR challenged elite dominance of the political system, this opening 
was short of producing a fully democratic system. Given the stringent naturalization laws 
of the time, the bulk of immigrant popular and working classes remained disenfranchised. 
In terms of policy, the UCR did not represent a major departure from the liberal, minimal 
state paradigm that had guided policy-making since the previous century (Plotkin 1994, 
19). With the state’s failure to address the “social question”—that is, how to deal with the 
socio-economic consequences of development among the working and popular sectors 
(Collier and Collier 2002, 59)—during this period, the tensions produced by 
modernization in rural areas and especially in the growing cities continued to mount. This 
failure is at least in part the product of the disenfranchisement of the popular and working 
classes, as well as of the conservative elite’s ability to retain control of the legislature 
during these years. Overall, however, the state expanded during these years, becoming a 
source of employment for the middle class (Collier and Collier 2002, 141) and providing 
social protection for the most powerful labor sectors, such as railroad, public utility, and 
bank workers (Mesa-Lago 1978, 168). 
The hit of the Great Depression and the increased social turmoil of the time 
provided the backdrop for the 1930 military coup. The coup marked the beginning of a 
 163 
new political era, the Infamous Decade, that lasted until another military coup in 1943. 
Governments during these years promoted import substitution industrialization (ISI) as a 
response to the major international trade disruptions of the time, while remaining 
committed to preserving the interests of the traditional landed elites. Nascent 
industrialization, along with an internal migration process spurred by the economic 
downturn and the decline of the agricultural exports, contributed to rapid urbanization 
and boosted the growth of the working and popular classes. But the political 
incorporation of these classes was delayed during this period because of electoral fraud 
and the repression of opposition parties and labor. The period was also characterized by 
allegations of corruption, betrayal of national interests, and a continued disregard for the 
social question (Collier and Collier 2002, 154-155). 
During this era, the liberal, minimal state paradigm was severely undermined. The 
shift from export-led development into ISI was accompanied by a growth of nationalism 
among the most important political actors of the time. At the same time, several actors 
fearing revolutionary ideas started to view the state as the only institution capable of 
putting an end to the unrelenting social turmoil (Waisman 1987). While there was no 
consensus about the means to accomplish this, one view that started to develop was that 
the state should arbitrate labor disputes and enact policies to improve the well-being of 
the popular sectors (Plotkin 1994, 27-30). Among some, corporatist and fascist models 
were particularly appealing as a way to channel social mobilization (Collier and Collier 
2002, 331-332). These ideas were present to various degrees in the group of officers that 
conducted the 1943 coup, which included then Colonel Juan Domingo Perón. 
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By the time Perón made his entrance into politics, the popular and working 
classes were mobilized, but mostly estranged from partisan politics. The major parties 
and factions of the time had failed to incorporate these classes into their political projects, 
and stringent naturalization laws and electoral fraud had disenfranchised large sectors of 
the population. As mentioned earlier, the labor movement had remained mostly 
concerned with union issues and its leadership was divided into various factions. In 
addition, the employed population that had recently migrated to Buenos Aires and other 
large cities lacked a union tradition (Germani 1978, 187-188). In this context, vast sectors 
of the working and popular classes were likely devoid of political predispositions. The 
Perón years would have a lasting effect on this public’s political attitudes and beliefs. 
Redistributive Rhetoric and Policies during the Peronist Era 
During his years in government, first as Director of the Department of Labor 
(1943) and Secretary of Labor and Social Protection (1943-1945), and then as president 
(1946-1955), Perón sought to control organized labor and popular mobilization through a 
corporatist model. His platform had three main goals: economic independence, political 
sovereignty, and social justice. Later on he would develop justicialismo, a “third way” 
between capitalism and communism whose main aim was to advance the “happiness of 
the people” through progressive government policies and channel popular discontent with 
capitalism away from revolutionary tendencies (Ranis 1992, 23; Plotkin 1994, 47). 
Populist rhetoric was one of Perón’s most powerful tools in building popular 
support for his political project. He created a collective identity for the popular and 
working classes, whom he referred to as “the people” (el pueblo); he also used 
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descamisados (“those without shirts) and “the humble” to refer to the urban poor. This 
identity was based not only on self-affirmation but also, and perhaps more importantly, in 
opposition to an antagonistic group, “the oligarchy” (Germani 1968, 334-335). Perón 
blamed the “unjustified egoism” and the “stingy interests” of this “vendepatria” 
(“country-selling”) oligarchy for the social problems of the time and demanded that this 
group share its profits with the workers (Kirkpatrick 1971, 35-37; Plotkin 1994, 49; 
Plotkin 2007, 44). In this way, he shifted responsibility for poverty away from the poor 
and questioned the status of the wealthy, while building solidarity across the popular and 
working classes. 
Perón relied on mass rallies to communicate with his followers. These rallies 
drew large crowds and reached even more people through the media. In fact, the first 
public television broadcast in the history of Argentina was the 1951 celebration of the 
Day of Peronist Loyalty during which Perón and his wife Eva gave speeches at a 
crowded Plaza de Mayo (Varela 2007, 85).52 Eva Perón reinforced the populist message 
in her own public appearances and would go on to become a powerful Peronist symbol 
upon her premature death in 1952. His communication strategy also made use of town 
hall meetings (cabildos abiertos) and letter writing campaigns (Elena 2005). 
With regard to actual policies, Perón implemented a wide range of measures 
aimed at improving the living and working conditions for the lower classes, as well as at 
redistributing income to these sectors. As Director of the Department of Labor and 
                                                
52 The Loyalty Day was the yearly commemoration of the popular protest held on October 17, 1945 calling 
for Perón to be liberated from prison—he had been arrested a few days earlier by the conservative faction 
of the military government in fear of Perón’s growing control over the labor movement. That day, Perón 
addressed a large crowd that had assembled at the Plaza de Mayo. 
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Secretary of Labor and Social Protection, Perón enforced the eight-hour workday law, 
and introduced regulations regarding job-related accidents, overtime pay, and sanitary 
conditions at the workplace. He also passed the Law of Professional Associations, which 
officially recognized union’s representational rights and stipulated that only one union 
could represent workers in a given industry or sector (Ranis 1992, 19). Perón used this 
law as part of a larger strategy to control labor by rewarding collaborative factions and 
punishing dissenting voices within the movement (Collier and Collier 2002, 338-340). 
As president, Perón laid the foundations for a comprehensive social security 
system, expanding pension coverage to most of the labor force and introducing health 
coverage for some sectors (Mesa-Lago 1978, 168). Again, social policy was strategically 
used to consolidate control of the labor movement. Moreover, he increased wages, 
expanded workers’ benefits and union rights, such as collective bargaining and the right 
to strike, and started public housing and slum clearance projects. He also continued the 
price controls favorable to his urban base that had been introduced in 1944 (Kirkpatrick 
1971, 37-44), and imposed taxes on export sectors to fund these programs and foster 
industrialization (Collier and Collier 2002, 332-333). Overall, while redistributive in aim, 
Perón’s policies did not seek expropriation or a major change in the economic system. 
These policies achieved some of their intended effects, at least during the first 
years of Perón’s presidency. For example, the share of the national wealth going to 
workers increased from 38% in the early 1940s to 46% in 1948 (Turner 1983a, 4) and 
wages increased by 24% between 1946 and 1948 (Wynia 1983, 36). While there is still 
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much debate about the long-term effects of Peron’s measures,53 more important here is 
whether these policies left a positive imprint on the memory of large shares of the 
population. There is a scholarly consensus around the view that they in fact did (Collier 
and Collier 2002, 349-350). 
Thus, for example, Ranis (1992, 88) argues that workers continued to share “to 
one degree or another an inheritance of solid social benefits and protection dating from 
the Peronist era. Whether […] [workers] personally experienced the “golden days” under 
Perón or not, there remained a kind of class memory of the rights of labor.” In a similar 
vein, Gino Germani, one of Peronism’s most prominent critics, concedes that the benefits 
accrued by the popular classes during this period contributed to keep alive the memory of 
the regime and the figure of Perón beyond what would have normally happened 
(Germani 1978, 178-179). 
By the time Perón was ousted from power by the military, his combination of 
controversial anti-oligarchic, populist rhetoric and redistributive policies had significantly 
polarized Argentine politics and society. His repression of the opposition further 
contributed to the split and so did his overt confrontation with the Catholic Church in the 
last years of his second term—this last confrontation also helps explain why attitudes 
toward the Church remain polarized up until the present day.54 Peronists sought to 
preserve what they believed were “genuine social accomplishments of greater equality 
                                                
53 In a moderate assessment of Perón’s record, Turner (1983a, 4) recognizes the regime’s undeniable 
commitment to egalitarianism and redistribution, but argues that the policies enacted to reflect this 
commitment ultimately undermined economic growth prospects. In the long run, this hurt the living 
standards of the popular and working classes and reverted the improvements they experienced during the 
first years of Perón’s government. For another balanced assessments see Kirkpatrick (1971, 36-38, 43-44). 
54 On the relationship between the Church and Perón, as well as its aftermath, see Domini (1983). 
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and the political integration of urban workers and provincial poor,” while the opposition 
“denounced the man they deemed the tyrant and his accomplices who [they thought] had 
[…] ruined Argentina” (Epstein 1992, 9). 
Peronism divided the population mostly along class lines (Kirkpatrick 1971, 79-
115; Miguens 1983, 160-166). The popular and working classes were mostly Peronist and 
some sectors of the middle class were also sympathetic towards the movement. The 
opposing side was comprised of the upper and the upper-middle classes for the most part. 
With regards to societal actors, the party held tight control of labor while the most 
powerful faction within the military was anti-Peronist—as the 1955 coup and subsequent 
military veto to the party and its leader demonstrate. 
Ideologically, the Peronist camp included various tendencies. Under an umbrella 
of support for the leader and broad commitment to the basic principles of justicialismo, 
extreme leftist and rightist tendencies along with other orientations in between eventually 
coexisted in the movement. Likewise, the anti-Peronist block was divided among minor 
socialist and communist parties, the centrist UCR, and an economically liberal, but 
politically and socially conservative right. 
Evidence showing Argentines’ social beliefs and attitudes towards redistribution 
during the Perón era and its immediate aftermath is very limited. As mentioned in the 
introduction, public opinion data are only available starting in the 1960s and are 
relatively scarce. Before presenting and discussing available survey evidence, Figure 6.1 
presents the share of votes obtained by Peronism in national elections from 1946 until 
1973. This share is a reasonable estimate of the proportion of the voting population 
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holding views closer to the redistributive frame, especially in those contests in which the 
movement was allowed to fully participate in electoral contests. 
Figure 6.1 
Peronist Vote Share in National Elections, 
1946-1973 
 
Note: Figures for 1957, 1958, 1960 and 1963 include blank votes only; figures for 1962 
and 1965 include votes for neo-Peronist parties. Source: Figures for 1957-1965 elections 
taken from Kirkpatrick (1965, 64); all others taken from Ministerio del Interior (2008). 
Results from the 1946, 1951, and September 1973 presidential elections—those in 
which Perón was allowed to compete—show that Peronism enjoyed the support of a 
majority of the population. The movement fell just short of a majority in the March 1973 
election, the only other presidential contest in this period in which it was allowed to put 
forth a candidate of its own (although Perón was not allowed to run). Results from the 
1954 elections to fill the vacant vice-presidency show that the movement was still very 





































































While more modest, Peronism’s electoral fate in the second half of the 1950s and 
the following decade is still remarkable given the restrictions it faced at the time and 
considering that its leader remained in exile throughout these years.55 Indeed, depending 
on the given election year, the movement was either not allowed to compete (1957, 1958, 
1960, and 1963) or forced to compete through neo-Peronist parties that could not be 
named after one of the Peróns or invoke them in campaign literature (1962 and 1965) 
(Kirkpatrick 1971, 66-75). With the exception of the 1963 presidential contest, the option 
endorsed by Perón—be it casting blank votes, supporting another party, or casting votes 
for neo-Peronist parties—obtained a plurality in the restricted election years.56 
Moving on to survey evidence, a first indicator suggestive of redistributive frame 
dominance is the approval rate of the Peronist movement’s actions during its golden era. 
As argued earlier, a positive collective memory of the actions and policies during the 
Perón presidency is one of the factors that made this dominance possible. This indicator 
is available in a national survey carried out by Instituto IPSA in 1972: 56.7% of 
respondents approved of what Peronism had done for the country while only 20.6% 
disapproved of it—the remainder 22.7% did not know or refused to answer (Instituto 
                                                
55 Perón went into exile following the 1955 coup. He returned to Argentina in June 1973 following the 
Peronist victory in the March 1973 elections and subsequent call for a new electoral contest for September 
of that year in which Perón was allowed to run for the presidency. 
56 In the constituent assembly elections of 1957 and congressional elections of 1960, Peronists were 
instructed to vote blank. The proportion of blank votes was 24.9% in both contests. In the 1958 presidential 
election, they were directed to support Arturo Frondizi, the candidate of the Intransigent Radical Civic 
Union (UCRI), one of the two parties in which the original UCR split following the ban of Peronism. The 
popular vote for the UCRI increased from 21.7% in the 1957 election to 41.8%. Neo-Peronist parties 
obtained 31.9% and 29.9% in the 1962 and 1965 congressional elections, respectively. Following the 1962 
contest, the military forced President Frondizi to step down and his successor to annul the elections. In that 
contest, Peronists had also won 11 of 14 provincial governorships, including that of Buenos Aires province. 
The 1965 election was followed by a coup the following year. That military stayed in power until 1973. 
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IPSA 1972).57 This confirms that a majority of Argentines had a positive recollection of 
the Perón government almost twenty years after it had ended. 
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 present responses to survey items capturing Argentines’ views 
on distributive issues and selected public policies, respectively. As Table 6.1 shows, 
Argentines were displeased with the distributive status quo in 1965 and 1971. 
Overwhelming majorities of respondents thought that their fellow countrymen were 
getting less than their fair share of the good things in life and that wealth was distributed 
unjustly. 
It is worth noting that the respondents answering “less than fair share” were asked 
a follow-up question about whether or not basic social and economic reforms were 
needed to see that most people get their fare share. The bulk of respondents (86%) 
thought reforms were needed. This widespread perception of distributive injustice—and 








                                                
57 The specific wording of item is: “In general, do you approve or disapprove of what Peronism has done in 
the country between 45 [sic] and 55, that is when it was [in] government?” 
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Table 6.1 
Views about the Distribution of Wealth in Argentina, 
1965 and 1971 
 
Wording has been slightly modified to ease presentation. Source: USIA (1965); Turner (1971). 
a Ad hoc sample composed of 120 businessman, 199 urban blue-collar workers, 298 middle class 
adults, 100 rural workers, 100 landowners, and 73 retired military. 
Table 6.2 reveals that Argentines had very positive attitudes toward redistributive 
policies, even those involving expropriation, in 1961 and 1965. High levels of support for 
price controls and wage indexation also reveal pro-poor and pro-labor attitudes among 
the general public. If one is willing to assume that social beliefs and redistributive 
attitudes were linked back then as they have been since the 1990s, this evidence is 














Less than fair share 71.0
No answer 10.1
Very acceptably (or justly) 0.8
Quite acceptably (or justly) 7.5
Somewhat unequally (or unjustly) 14.8
Fairly unequally (or unjustly) 34.3
Very unequally (or unjustly) 38.3
DK/NA 4.3
Argentines are getting their fair 
share or less than their fair share 
of the good things in life?
Thinking in a general sense,         




Policy Attitudes in Argentina the 1960s 
 
Wording has been slightly modified to ease presentation. Sources: 1961 item is taken from USIA 
(1961); all others taken from Kirkpatrick (1971, 183). 
a Kirkpatrick (1971) only reports the proportion of respondents who would favor a given policy. 
Figures for other responses are simply the complements to the reported proportions and likely 
include “would not favor” as well as DK/NA responses. 
To sum up, the Peronist era fundamentally reshaped Argentine politics. Perón’s 
populist rhetoric and redistributive policies appealed to vast sectors of the population who 
had remained disenfranchised and awaiting incorporation. This included women, who 
were granted the right to vote in 1947 and voted for the first time in the 1951 election. By 
shifting responsibility for social maladies away from the poor and toward the wealthy and 
enacting concrete policies that addressed those issues, Perón imprinted beliefs in line 
with the redistributive frame among the public and linked them to support for 



















Would favor a candidate that believes wages 
should be raised to match increases in the cost 
of living
Would favor a candidate that favors reforming 
the tax system to provide for higher taxes on 
large incomes and business profits
Would favor a candidate that supports strong 
price controls on basic items that affect most 
people's cost of living
Would you favor or oppose land reform that 
would divide large agricultural properties and 
distribute the land among agricultural workers?
Would favor a candidate that believes in the 
expropriation of private lands for redistribution 
to landless farmers
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its leader and his concern for the social question. The coup against Perón and the 
subsequent proscription of Peronism, together with sluggish economic performance and 
political and social turmoil of the ensuing years, would contribute to consolidate a 
mythical image of Perón and of the social achievements during his presidency. 
The Rise and Fall of Neoliberalism and the Return of Peronism 
The 1970s and 1980s were a period of great uncertainty produced by political 
violence, defeat in war, and economic crises. These changes helped the UCR win the 
presidency in the transitional election of 1983, defeating a Peronist candidate for the first 
time. Later, continued economic underperformance, including a major crisis at the end of 
the 1980s, created an opening for the implementation of neoliberal reforms under a 
Peronist government. While a number of changes in Argentine attitudes suggest that the 
dominance of the redistributive frame weakened during the 1980s and 1990s, growing 
dissatisfaction with market reforms and the major economic crisis of 2001-2002, restored 
its dominance and placed the progressive wing of Peronism back in power in 2003. 
After 18 years of political polarization, with Perón in exile and vetoed by the 
military, the then aging leader returned to the country and successfully ran for the 
presidency in 1973. At the time, political violence was mounting and involved 
revolutionary outfits and reactionary paramilitary groups, both from within and outside 
Peronism, as well as the military. Perón’s decision to expel an extreme left-wing faction 
from the party upon his return and the government’s turn to repression after the leader’s 
death the following year further exacerbated violence. In this context, the military 
stepped into power once more after staging a coup against Isabel Perón in 1976. 
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The National Reorganization Process (1976-1983) would prove disastrous on 
many fronts: it ended political violence by committing massive human rights abuses 
against guerrilla members and left-wing militants and sympathizers; it was unable to 
spare the country from serious economic downturn in the midst of the Debt Crisis; and it 
led the country into an undeclared war with Britain over the Falkland Islands in an effort 
to bolster its popularity—a maneuver that backfired in the face of defeat. This last event 
ultimately forced military leaders to relinquish power and allow for a quick transition to 
democracy (Cavarozzi 1986; Turner 1983b, 237-241). 
By the time democracy was restored, Argentines’ beliefs and attitudes had shifted 
away from statist, corporatist, and redistributive stances. These changes were the 
consequence of the uncertainty produced by economic crisis and the failure of the 
corporatist model, but also of the major structural changes that had taken place since the 
1950s. The growth of the service sector and particularly that of self-employment 
undermined the structural bases of Peronist support and redistributive beliefs. For 
example, unionization levels, industrial employment shares, and social security coverage 
rates had significantly declined since the Perón era (Mora y Araujo 1991). 
A growing share of the population had adopted a middle-class culture, in which 
individuals’ roles as consumers rather than as workers or producers were more important 
in shaping their attitudes. Accordingly, a majority of the population supported utility 
privatization, economic deregulation, and international trade openness; disapproved of 
unions and labor leaders; and favored concentrating efforts in increasing production 
rather than on redistributing wealth (Mora y Araujo 1991, 60-82). Even among workers, 
 176 
support for privatization and openness to foreign investment ran high at the time (Ranis 
1992, 228). In the midst of continued economic troubles, this shift away from the 
attitudes and beliefs that had been dominant since the Perón era would continue 
throughout the 1980s and provide the opportunity for market reform implementation. 
A weakened and still divided Peronist movement and the shift in mass beliefs 
provided an opening for the UCR to defeat the Peronist movement’s party, the Justicialist 
Party (PJ), in the 1983 elections. After failed attempts at heterodox economic 
stabilization, the economy would slip into deep recession in 1988-1989 and 
hyperinflation in 1989-1990 (Weyland 2002, 81-91). In a context of growing discontent 
with the politicians and political parties, Carlos Saúl Menem, the governor of La Rioja 
province, would win the presidency in 1989 campaigning as an outsider within the PJ and 
making use of populist rhetoric (Weyland 2002, 100-103). 
The new government implemented radical market reforms. The measures 
included fixing the exchange rate, privatizing public firms, liberalizing markets and 
international trade, and lifting restrictions on foreign investment. The reform package 
also included a major overhaul of the pension system with the introduction of a private 
individual capitalization system to complement the existing public, pay-as-you-go 
scheme. These reforms were initially successful. Inflation dropped to single digits by 
1993 and the economy grew every year since 1991 until 1998 with the exception of 1995. 
Despite the recession, Menem was reelected in 1995 by a wide margin. 
Public enthusiasm for reforms, however, had started to steadily decline soon after 
the implementation of the 1991 Convertibility Plan (Weyland 2002, 126-127). This 
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frustration—which also eroded the president’s approval rate—was fueled by concerns 
about growing unemployment and anxiety over the reforms’ long-term social 
consequences. The public was particularly skeptical about neoliberal policies’ ability to 
produce inclusive growth and improve the distribution of wealth. It also became 
progressively less willing to sacrifice social benefits in exchange for economic stability. 
The evolution of the public’s views on these issues is shown in Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3. 
As shown in Figure 6.2, in 1991, those who believed that Argentina was en route 
to becoming a more equal country slightly outnumbered those who thought the opposite. 
Views started to become more pessimistic shortly afterwards, however. As early as 1995,  
those who thought the country was headed into a path of more inequality more than 
doubled those with a more optimistic outlook. Opinions seemed to stabilize by the middle 
of the decade, with more than 70% of Argentines believing the country would have 











Expectations about the Distribution of Wealth in Argentina, 
1991-1996 
 
Items ask respondents whether Argentina was en route to becoming “a country in which 
the rich will be richer and the poor will be poorer” (“Greater inequality”) or “a country in 
which the majority of the people will improve their living standards” (“Greater 
equality”). Figures for 10/1995 taken from a national survey; all others taken from 
surveys of Buenos Aires residents. Source: Estudio Graciela Römer y Asociados (1991; 
1993; 1995b; 1995c; 1996a; 1996b). 
Argentines’ views about social spending during the same period follow a similar 
pattern. As Figure 6.3 shows, in 1992, almost 50% of respondents were willing to 
sacrifice spending on social assistance in exchange for economic stability, while 38% 
thought that increasing spending on social assistance was necessary despite its potential 
detrimental effects on inflation and public finances. In 1994, the latter outnumbered the 
former by a slight margin. By 1996, increasing social spending was preferred to 
decreasing it by almost three to one. As distributive issues and unemployment became a 
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Figure 6.3 
Views about Social Spending in Argentina, 
1992-1996 
 
Items ask respondents whether it was best for the country to reduce social spending to 
control fiscal deficit and inflation or increase social spending even if deficit and inflation 
also increase. Figures for 1992 taken from a survey of residents of Greater Buenos Aires 
and other six cities; figures for 1994 taken from a national survey; all others taken from 
surveys of Greater Buenos Aires residents. Source: Estudio Graciela Römer y Asociados 
(1992; 1994; 1995a; 1996b). 
Together, this evidence is consistent with earlier claim about redistributive beliefs 
weakening in light of the structural and attitudinal changes documented by Mora y 
Araujo (1991) and the major crisis of the late 1980s. Indeed, the figures show that 
concerns about distributive justice and social spending were sidelined in the early 1990s. 
If earlier data were available, one would probably see that this was also the case—and 
perhaps more so—in the 1980s. This provided an opening for Menem to implement 
neoliberal reforms, but as soon as the public decided that his policies would be unable to 
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Toward the end of the 1990s public support for the president and the reforms was 
at its lowest, as unemployment levels continued to rise and the economy slipped into 
recession. Menem attempted a second re-election bid, but Congress refused to pass a law 
that would allow him to do so. With a PJ weakened by Menem’s reelection attempt, the 
alliance between the UCR and the Front for a Country in Solidarity (FREPASO) would 
go on to win the presidency in the 1999 election (Corrales 2002, 33-34). The new 
government was unable to stop the recession, and the economy hit rock bottom in 2001 
and 2002, when the GDP contracted by 4.41% and 10.89%, respectively. In the latter 
year the poverty rate reached a staggering 54.3% of the urban population, more than 
double the rate before the recession started. The president resigned in December of 2001, 
amidst a new round of generalized popular protest and rioting, this time channeling 
widespread discontent with the political system and rejection of neoliberal reforms. 
Congress appointed a caretaker president that served for only seven days and then 
a second one who served until 2003. Both appointees were Peronists. By the time growth 
resumed, the fixed exchange rate had been abandoned, the banking system was 
recovering from near ruin, and the country had defaulted on its debt. The two major 
contenders in the 2003 presidential election, ex-president Menem and Néstor Kirchner, 
the governor of Santa Cruz province, represented the two major opposing factions within 
Peronism; Menem represented the pro-market, center-right, and Kirchner represented the 
progressive, center-left (Sanchez 2005, 461-463). While Menem was the leading 
candidate in the first round by a narrow margin, he resigned from participating in the 
runoff to avoid suffering the catastrophic loss predicted by the polls. 
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Kirchner’s government followed the programmatic lines of orthodox Peronism to 
a significant extent. Among its most prominent measures were the nationalization of 
some privatized businesses, the return of relatively wide-ranging price controls, and the 
expansion of social spending. Politically, unions played a more prominent role and 
recovered some of the prominence they lost in the past two decades (Etchemendy and 
Collier 2007). Kirchner’s successor and wife, Cristina Fernández, has continued most of 
these policies. One of her major reforms has been the elimination of the mixed pension 
system established in the 1990s and a return to the single pay-as-you-go public system, 
which included confiscating funds held in private capitalization accounts and transferring 
them to the public treasury. 
Overall, after a period of great change in mass beliefs that created the opportunity 
for market reforms, the redistributive frame has returned and is quite strong in Argentina. 
As shown in the previous chapter, Argentines tend to believe that wealth accumulation is 
zero-sum, that hard work does not generally produce success, that poverty is caused by a 
society that treats individuals unfairly, and that the poor do not have a chance to escape 
poverty. Statist orientations have also made a comeback; Argentines demand greater 
involvement of the state in regulating the economy, owning businesses, providing social 
protection, and fighting unemployment (Mora y Araujo 2003). 
Peru: Elite-Controlled Incorporation and the Failure of Progressives 
This section traces the origins of mass social beliefs in Peru. It shows that beliefs 
in line with the redistributive frame failed to become dominant because no political actor 
was able to combine redistributive rhetoric and policies at a critical juncture. The 1930s 
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and 1940s, the years during which the urban popular and working classes were initially 
incorporated into politics, constitute the first juncture. APRA used populist rhetoric, but 
was unable to attain power. As a result, it did not implement its progressive platform and 
only a minor fraction of the public developed beliefs aligned with the redistributive 
frame. Peruvian politics during this period shows that rhetoric without accompanying 
policy shifts cannot produce substantial changes in mass beliefs. 
The country experienced a period of progressive transformations starting in 1968, 
when the military staged a coup against a reform-oriented government. At least during its 
first phase of power (until about 1975), the Revolutionary Government of the Armed 
Forces (GRFA) (1968-1980), embraced reformist rhetoric and enacted various policies 
that not only improved the well-being of the lower classes in the short term but also 
redistributed land and industrial property. Mass beliefs failed to tilt toward the 
redistributive frame at this time, however, because these developments took place during 
a time of normal politics in which the public was not receptive to the military 
government’s initiatives. Finally, the 1980s witnessed a new critical juncture caused by 
economic, political, and social factors. In a context of great uncertainty, the public’s 
reaction to an exclusionary system of social protection is what ultimately led to 
dominance of the self-reliance frame starting in the 1990s. 
Antecedents to the First Critical Juncture 
Like in Argentina, the incorporation period of the popular and working classes 
was preceded by a time of increasing challenge to the conservative order. In Peru, 
however, the challenge did not come from a new party representing excluded sectors of 
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the population. Instead, by courting the labor movement and the lower classes with 
reformist agendas, members of the elite distanced themselves from the dominant Civilista 
Party, which governed almost uncontested from 1899 until 1919. The first major split 
within the party occurred during Augusto Leguía Salcedo’s first government (1908-
1912), as a result of the passing of legislation protecting the indigenous population from 
forced labor and workers from job-related accidents. These changes to the policy status 
quo divided the Civilistas into a conservative faction comprising mostly landowners and 
a reformist faction of more modern capitalists, which respectively opposed and supported 
the president’s platform (Cotler 1978, 168-171). 
This split created the opportunity for a party outsider, Guillermo Billinghurst 
Angulo, to win the presidency in 1912 with direct support from the urban popular sectors. 
Despite being a member of the economic elite, Billinghurst pushed forward a reformist 
agenda that included employment programs, wage increases, housing project 
construction, and worker-friendly labor legislation. Because of opposition from the 
Civilista-dominated Congress, the president was ultimately able to pass only a fraction of 
his initiatives.58 This short-lived reformist period ended when the Civilistas secured a 
military intervention on their behalf in 1914 (Cotler 1978, 171-176). 
Politics as usual resumed until 1919, when ex-president Leguía returned to the 
country from exile and rallied the political actors and social groups excluded by the 
Civilistas to support him in the election of that year. Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, a 
                                                
58 Only dispositions regulating strikes and introducing state arbitrage of labor disputes were passed during 
this time. Billinghurst’s platform also included a call for major electoral reform, which included expanding 
the franchise to the lower classes—at the time only male, literate, taxpayers could vote. However, he only 
succeeded in getting Congress to grant the Supreme Court the power to oversee elections. 
 184 
student leader who later founded APRA, was among his supporters (Collier and Collier 
2002, 136-137; Cotler 1978, 177-183). Leguía won the election, but he was only able to 
assume the presidency after the military intervened to stop the Civilista attempt to 
disregard the election results. After approving a new constitution that reinforced the 
executive and expanded the scope of state power in 1920, he would win uncontested 
elections in 1924 and 1929, to be finally ousted by a military uprising in 1930. 
Politically, Leguía’s “Patria Nueva” stripped the traditional Civilista landed elite 
of most of its political power and replaced it with a modern, bourgeois elite allied with 
the military. While the president initially courted labor and the student movement, he 
soon turned to repression and alienated these actors from his coalition. He also failed to 
expand the suffrage to the lower classes; the new constitution did not eliminate the 
restriction of suffrage to literate male taxpayers. In terms of policy, legislation expanding 
industrial safety regulation and workmen’s compensation and establishing basic 
assistance for the poor was passed during these years (Mesa-Lago 1978, 115). Legislation 
protecting the rights of the indigenous was also approved, but other laws such as the one 
establishing conscription for road-building significantly burdened this population. In the 
end, Leguía’s cooptation project proved insufficient to address demands for political 
inclusion and the social question more generally, leading to the first critical juncture. 
APRA and the Critical Juncture in the 1930s-1940s 
The “Patria Nueva” provided a unique context for APRA to gain ascendance over 
the labor movement and build a wide coalition behind a reformist platform. Since his 
days as leader of the student protests of 1919 and throughout the early-1920s, Haya and 
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his collaborators cultivated a strong relationship with workers, especially among those in 
the sugar industry of the northern coast, the mining centers of the central highlands, and 
the textile factories of the capital (Klarén 1976; North 1975).59 Following his exile in 
1924, Haya founded the Popular Revolutionary Alliance for the Americas in Mexico 
City. The alliance’s original platform included five points: action against Yankee 
imperialism; political unity of Latin America; nationalization of land and industry; 
internationalization of the Panama Canal; and solidarity with all people and oppressed 
classes (Kantor 1966, 10-11). Distancing himself from Marxism, Haya intended the 
movement to have a multi-class base. He argued that its objectives were only attainable if 
all the working classes, the proletariat, the peasantry, the intellectuals, and the middle 
class, united against economic domination (Burga and Flores Galindo 1979, 186-188). 
While the Popular Revolutionary Alliance for the Americas aimed at having a 
strong presence throughout Latin America, only its Peruvian chapter, the Partido Aprista 
Peruano (APRA), would have a lasting life. APRA was officially founded in 1930 to 
allow Haya to run for the presidency in the elections that the provisional government had 
scheduled for the following year. That government also passed a new electoral law that 
expanded suffrage to all literate males, made voting obligatory, and established the secret 
ballot. In a context of democratic enthusiasm, APRA quickly developed into an important 
                                                
59 In the first year of the Patria Nueva, unions supported students’ demands for university reform and the 
latter sided with the former in calling for legislation enacting the eight-hour workday. Haya further 
strengthened this collaborative relationship by setting up a system of popular universities for workers along 
with other students who later became figures within Aprismo in 1921 (Klaiber 1975). The worker and 
student movements protested together again in opposition to the consecration of the country to the Heart of 
Jesus in 1923 and, as a result, Leguía toughened repression of both. Finally, the government arrested and 
deported Haya that year and closed the popular universities and exiled their leaders the following one. 
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mass party during the campaign, showcasing a strong apparatus built upon its relationship 
with labor, the student movement, and other social organizations (Collier and Collier 
2002, 150-151). Besides its labor and popular sector base, the party also gained a strong 
following among white-collar workers as well as small traders and entrepreneurs in urban 
areas (Graham 1992, 26-33). 
During the campaign, the party called for promoting economic independence and 
fighting against the oligarchic order as well as the semi-feudal system that organized 
society in the highlands. These goals would be accomplished by developing a strong state 
that would promote growth, own large-scale industry, and channel foreign capital to key 
sectors; by giving land ownership to those who worked it—the party adopted the “land 
and freedom” motto at this early stage; and by promoting cooperative and domestic 
private ownership of businesses (Burga y Flores Galindo 1979, 186-188). The party also 
called for the “economic emancipation of all working classes, striving to abolish, as 
allowed by the circumstances and gradually, the exploitation of men by men” (Cotler 
1978, 214). The qualifying clause in the quote reflects APRA’s early attempts to 
convince foreign capitalists and governments, the domestic elite, and the military 
establishment that the party was reformist rather than revolutionary. 
While efforts to assuage fears of revolutionary intentions were successful among 
the foreign actors, they were futile among the domestic ones. Fearful of APRA’s 
“revolutionary” platform, the military and the elite supported the conservative candidacy 
of Army Commander Luis Sánchez Cerro, the leader of the military uprising against 
Leguía. A large share of the non-unionized urban middle and lower classes also backed 
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the officer following a media campaign that portrayed APRA as communist, antipatriotic, 
and anticlerical (Cotler 1978, 244-246). As a result, Sánchez Cerro beat Haya by a wide 
margin, 51% versus 35% of the popular vote. 
Next, APRA contested the election results and opposed the new government. At 
the same time, several insurrection attempts took place, the most notable one being the 
Trujillo Revolution of 1932. That year the party was finally declared illegal. In 1933, an 
Aprista militant murdered the president, and the congress designated Army General 
Oscar Benavides to serve the remainder of Sánchez Cerro’s term. The new president 
would continue to repress APRA, and it was not allowed to participate in the 1936 
election. These were the first events in a long confrontation of the military and the 
economic elite against APRA and the popular sectors that would define Peruvian politics 
until 1968. 
In the years following 1933, two parallel processes took place. First, Benavides 
and his successor in the presidency, Manuel Prado, incrementally but substantially 
expanded the social security system, extending coverage to most blue-collar workers, 
including the self-employed with low wages (Mesa-Lago 1978, 116-117). This was 
complemented with substantial investment in housing projects, healthcare facilities, and 
“popular restaurants” (restaurantes populares) that served the growing urban working 
class, but excluded workers in rural areas and the indigenous peasantry (Drinot 2011). 
These policy initiatives reduced the space available for subsequent governments to 
introduce relatively uncontroversial pro-worker and pro-poor policies. 
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Second, APRA progressively moderated its discourse and platform. Perhaps the 
most significant gesture was Haya’s statement about wealth redistribution in his first 
public discourse after the party was temporarily legalized in 1945. He argued that the 
party “would not take wealth from those who had it, but would create it for those who did 
not have it” (Collier and Collier 2002, 321). In terms of policy, by the 1940s, the party 
had abandoned its anti-imperialistic and pro-expropriation stances. It continued to 
propose a state-led form of capitalism, but accepted the need for foreign capital and 
called for targeted nationalization of industries that would be accomplished by buying 
businesses from their owners and not by forced expropriation (Kantor 1966, 76-79). 
In the ensuing years, the party would continue shifting towards the center-right, 
embracing capitalism as the road to development, proposing moderate agrarian reform 
that left modern agricultural estates undisturbed, and containing mobilization and 
extremism within organized labor (Collier and Collier 2002, 477-478). Together, the two 
processes help explain why APRA was not able or willing to carry out substantial social 
reforms when it was part of various governing coalitions at different points between 1945 
and 1968. 
Given the lack of survey data during this first critical juncture and its immediate 
aftermath, APRA’s share of the vote is used to provide insight into how much of the 
voting population held views closer to the redistributive frame. Figure 6.4 presents this 
vote share information for the three presidential contests (1931, 1936, and 1945). In the 
1931 elections, Haya obtained about a third of the vote, suggesting that about this much 
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of the voting population supported his rhetoric and policy positions that were in line with 
the redistributive frame. 
Figure 6.4 
APRA’s Vote Share in Presidential Elections, 
1931-1945 
 
Source: Tuesta Soldevilla (1998a; 1998b; 1998c). 
In the 1936 elections, Luis Eguiguren Escudero, the candidate informally backed 
by a proscribed APRA, got 37% of the vote, again suggesting this much of the population 
held views in line with the redistributive frame. The overwhelming victory of the APRA-
backed candidate in 1945 was not reflective of a surge in APRA’s base within the 
electorate – nor should it be interpreted as indicative of the proportion of the population 
holding views in line with the redistributive frame. The increase in APRA’s vote share 
reflects the massive support for a broad political coalition as well as APRA’s own initial 
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APRA and the redistributive frame did not hold sway over a majority of the population at 
this time. 
What would have happened to mass beliefs had APRA had a chance to govern in 
the 1930s or early-1940s? Even though the party’s base was short of being a majority 
within the electorate, it seems highly likely that Haya would have won the presidency had 
there not been a military ban on the party. After all, according to the electoral rules of the 
time, a candidate could win the election with a plurality of at least a third of the valid 
popular vote. If that had been the case, the redistributive frame would have had a greater 
chance to become dominant for at least two reasons. 
First, APRA would have been able to implement a number of redistributive 
policies and use state resources to continue spreading its populist rhetoric. The economic 
recovery after the Great Depression and the export boom during World War II would 
have provided an Aprista administration with the resources needed to deliver on its 
promises, improve the well-being of the growing working class and urban popular 
sectors. In other words, APRA would have been able to implement the social policies set 
in place by Benavides and Prado, while presenting them as a triumph of the people over 
the oligarchy and imperialism. This would have likely produced a change in beliefs like 
the one that took place in Perón’s Argentina. 
Second, an APRA government would have probably made strides toward 
incorporating the large indigenous peasantry.60 While this group had organized localized 
                                                
60 There are no exact figures on the size of the indigenous peasantry at the time. The following figures 
provide some information about the potential size of the group that was excluded from the electorate, most 
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revolts prior to the critical juncture, as a whole, it remained unorganized and 
marginalized from politics. Moreover, it remained disenfranchised by a literacy 
requirement that would be eliminated only in the 1979 Constitution. Had APRA 
implemented its platform of sweeping land reform in the highlands and education 
targeted at the indigenous peasantry (Kantor 1966, 84-86), this population would have 
become an important social base for the party and the redistributive frame. 
The GRFA as a New Progressive Offensive 
The military officers leading the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces 
(GRFA) (1968-1980) believed that the social turmoil that had grown common in Peru at 
the time was the warning sign of growing social pressures that threatened the continuity 
of traditional social structures (Einaudi 1973, 73). Indeed, during the 1960s, the country 
experienced unprecedented peasant and worker mobilization and guerrilla activity. 
Convinced that political parties—especially APRA—would be unable to carry out the 
reforms needed to finally address the social and indigenous questions, this group of 
mostly middle-class officers took matters into their own hands. At least in its first phase 
that lasted until 1975, the military government sought to implement wide-ranging 
economic and social reforms and to institute a state corporatist system in which all social 
                                                
of which were peasants. According to the 1940 Census, 57,6% of the population 15 years and over was 
illiterate (INEI 2012b) and 64.6% lived in rural areas (INEI 2012c). Another interesting figure is the 
growth rate in the electorate between the 1963 general election, the last one before the GRFA, and the 
transitional election of 1980, when the illiterate were allowed to vote for the first time. The electorate grew 
by almost 212.5% (from 2,070,718 to 6,471,101 voters) (Tuesta Soldevilla 2001, 194, 218), while the 
general population only grew by 70.5% between the censuses of 1961 and 1981 (from 10,420,357 to 
17,762,231) (INEI 2012d). 
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classes would harmoniously work towards the national common good (Stepan 1978; 
Huber Stephens 1983). 
While the government sought to avoid class warfare, it nevertheless made 
extensive use of revolutionary, nationalistic, and populist elements in its rhetoric (Dore 
and Weeks 1976). For example, the manifesto issued the day of the coup in 1968 argued 
that “powerful domestic and international economic groups, in complicity with some 
unworthy Peruvians,” [referring to politicians] had continuously “frustrated the people’s 
hopes for basic structural reforms” and “preserved an unjust social and economic order 
which places the usufruct of the national wealth only within the reach of a privileged few, 
while the majorities suffer the consequences of a marginalization that is injurious to 
human dignity” (Revolutionary Junta 1968). The declaration called for “the people” (el 
pueblo) to join the Armed Forces in a fight for social justice and national development. 
Another example of this rhetoric is the now famous “peasant, the lord will no longer eat 
from your poverty!” proclaimed by Army General Juan Velasco Alvarado, the president 
appointed by the military junta, in his speech decreeing agrarian reform. 
Agrarian and industrial reforms were the military’s boldest initiatives. The former 
transferred ownership of traditional haciendas and modern agroindustrial complexes to 
peasant and rural worker cooperatives. The more innovative industrial reform involved a 
scheme requiring businesses to use a portion of their profits to increase their equity and 
transfer the new shares to workers. As an “industrial community,” workers participated in 
management and profit sharing, and would acquire up to 50% ownership of businesses, 
making labor and capital equal partners. The government also nationalized businesses, 
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created public monopolies in several strategic economic sectors and public services, 
increased wages, and controlled prices. 
Overall, the combination of populist rhetoric and pro-worker and pro-poor 
policies under the GRFA failed to produce redistributive frame dominance. While mass 
beliefs changed substantially during this period, bringing important sectors of the 
population closer to the left and to the redistributive frame, especially among labor and 
some sectors of the urban poor, the changes were not enough to produce redistributive 
frame dominance. For example, among Lima’s poor, traditional attitudes such as 
acceptance of social hierarchy and low horizontal solidarity weakened, but remained 
quite dominant in the mid-1980s (Stokes 1991; Stokes 1995). Among the peasantry, 
while agrarian reform undermined traditional clientelistic and paternalistic attitudes, 
peasant class-consciousness did not develop and communities remained relatively self-
centered and skeptical of the state (McClintock 1981, 259-286). These attitudes are not 
those one would expect of individuals that have embraced beliefs in line with the 
redistributive frame. 
Dietz (2000, 304-307) provides the only direct evidence about the evolution of 
social beliefs during the GRFA and its immediate aftermath. The author included a 
question about the causes of poverty (“What do you think is the main cause of 
poverty?”61) in surveys carried out in 1970 and 1982 in six Lima slums. Table 6.3 
presents the responses to these items. Responses blaming poverty on structural factors 
should not be interpreted as indicative of redistributive frame dominance because they are 
                                                
61 Translated by the author of this dissertation. 
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passive factual statements, rather than active attributions of blame. As argued by the 
author, “these responses would have to be severely distorted before they can be 
interpreted as conscious and radical criticisms of the Peruvian socioeconomic system” 
(Dietz 2000, 306). Most important here is to highlight the very few responses (2.6%) 
indicative of more radical or class-conscious orientations among poor limeños. 
Table 6.3 
Views about the Causes of Poverty among Lima’s Poor, 
1971 and 1982 
 
Source: Dietz (2000, 304-307). 
Overall, the experiences during the GRFA failed to produce redistributive frame 
dominance because they did not satisfy the expectations of the population. The policies 
carried out during these years did not produce lasting welfare improvements. While 
agrarian and industrial reforms had immediate positive effects on peasants and workers 
by transferring asset ownership and providing additional income, productivity losses and 
decapitalization soon became a problem. In addition, peasant and rural workers were also 
harmed by the government’s pro-urban price controls and import tariff policies. More 
generally, macroeconomic imbalances produced inflation and meager economic growth, 
1971 1982Options
Structural (lack of employment, lack of education, cost of living) 57.4% 55.5%
Other 2.5% 10.2%
Personal/fatalistic (lack of talent; laziness; bad luck) 13.7% 11.0%
Radical/class-concious (class differences, failed governments) 2.6% 5.2%
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forcing the government to cut social expenditures (Segura-Ubiergo 2007, 235-237). 
These cuts placed a particularly high toll on the urban lower classes. 
The reforms also had a number of unintended consequences that deterred peasants 
and workers from identifying with the military project. In agricultural cooperatives, 
government-appointed administrators became a source of discontent that created conflict 
similar to that between peasant and landlords and between rural workers and estate 
managers that preceded reforms. Agrarian reform also caused divisions within the 
peasant and rural worker movements as cooperatives had to compete with one another in 
an increasingly difficult economic environment (McClintock 1981). Contrary to 
reformers’ intentions, the industrial community reform led to a substantial increase in 
unionization rates and more frequent clashes between labor and capital. This context 
provided fertile grounds for radical currents within labor to develop (Huber Stephens 
1983). While this probably contributed to redistributive frame dominance among 
workers, greater polarization likely estranged the general population from radicalism. 
Finally, the military’s attempts to control social mobilization further estranged workers, 
peasants, and the urban poor.62 Fearing a state takeover—and dissatisfied with the 
                                                
62 Similar to Perón, the government offered incentives to collaborative unions while it punished defiant 
organizations with deactivation or restructuring (Stepan 1978, 74). At the same time, the government tried 
to create new peak labor and peasant organizations to replace existing autonomous federations. In addition, 
to control the growing population that settled in shantytowns on the outskirts of Lima and other major 
cities, the government created offices in charge of channeling citizens’ demands for property titles and 
public works. Finally, the GRFA created the National System for Social Mobilization (SINAMOS) to 
coordinate these initiatives as well as to serve as a vehicle to link the government with the populace and 
build support for the military’s project. McClintock (1981), Huber and Stephens (1983), and Dietz (1986) 
provide extensive overviews of the fate of peasant, labor, and urban poor mobilization during the GRFA, 
respectively. For a general overview of the military attempt at establishing a state corporatist system see 
Stepan (1978). 
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government’s inability to deliver—, social organizations further distanced themselves 
from the military. 
Beyond these immediate causes, what arguably explains the lack of redistributive 
frame dominance is that the GRFA’s efforts took place at the wrong time. This was a 
period of normal politics. By the late-1960s, the bulk of the population was already 
politically engaged. Much of the working, peasant, and urban popular sectors had 
allegiances with political parties and movements like APRA, the reform-oriented Popular 
Action Party (AP), and a growing political left. The military’s radical policies and 
attempts to control social mobilization created further polarization and provided 
opportunities for the opposition, both from the left and right, to thrive and unite in a 
struggle for democracy. In such a highly polarized context where the redistributive frame 
was not dominant, the working and popular sectors were divided in their political 
allegiances, and the public had high expectations of reforms (of any kind) due to years of 
postponement, the military’s policies were bound to disappoint the bulk of the 
population. Thus, the GRFA’s efforts had little chance of leaving a lasting impression on 
mass beliefs.  
Furthermore, the military was arguably pushed down a path of radical, polarizing 
reforms because of the constraints established by previous governments’ policies. 
Sweeping agrarian reform was somehow unavoidable given the failure of the moderate 
attempt during the prior AP government (1963-1968). It is possible that the GRFA’s 
route of controversial industrial reform could have been avoided had other alternatives to 
benefit urban workers been available. But by the 1960s, social protection had been 
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extended to almost all sectors and the only reform that the military could implement in 
this area was unification of the various sub-system—a reform that was met with 
significant worker resistance (Segura-Ubiergo 1997, 232; Mesa-Lago 1978: 120-124). In 
sum, had the GRFA experiment taken place at an earlier stage of the country’s political 
development, it probably would have had a greater chance to produce realigning change 
in mass beliefs toward the redistributive frame. 
The 1980s Critical Juncture and the Ascent of Neoliberalism 
Growing disenchantment with reforms, the sluggish economy, and the lack of 
democracy would lead to major social protest in 1977 and ultimately force the military to 
negotiate an orderly transition to democracy. A constituent assembly that had been freely 
elected in 1978 passed a new constitution the following year, and transitional elections 
took place in 1980. This was the first election in which all adults were allowed to vote.  
The decade of 1980s was characterized by great uncertainty produced by 
economic crises and political violence. During the first half of the decade, the 
government’s adjustment program failed to stop inflation and economic 
underperformance, and an abnormally strong El Niño current contributed to a major 
recession in 1983. At the same time, political violence between state forces and the 
Maoist Shining Path (SL) guerrillas reached critical levels in the highlands.  
APRA finally won the presidency in 1985. Led by its young candidate, Alan 
García Pérez, the campaign signaled the party’s return to some of its original nationalistic 
and populist stances. The APRA government implemented a heterodox economic 
program that included wage increases, price freezes, tax cuts, and government spending 
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expansion. These initiatives initially resulted in significant growth and moderate 
inflation, but the boom was short-lived. Spiraling inflation reached hyperinflation levels, 
and the economy went into a deep recession in 1988-1990. At the same time, political 
violence continued to grow, with SL increasingly turning to sabotage and terrorist 
activities to make its presence felt in Lima and other major cities. 
Despite this context, the decade was characterized by a rather stable party system 
with a strong leftist coalition, the United Left (IU), APRA in the center, and AP and the 
Popular Christian Party (PPC) to the right. The left was particularly strong during these 
years, achieving important electoral victories at the local level, including the mayoralty of 
Lima and the populous districts on the outskirts of the city. On average, each political 
current had the support of roughly a third of the electorate. Relative political stability, 
along with very visible labor and popular mobilization, masked a major transformation 
that was taking place within the public. 
The internal migration process that started in the 1950s had transformed Peru 
from a mostly rural into a predominantly urban country by the 1980s. This new urban 
population overwhelmed existing social structures and led to a surge in the informal 
economy and to the development of an alternative migrant culture in the cities (De Soto 
1987; Matos Mar 1986). Tied to traditional social organizations that were increasingly 
less representative of the lower classes, political parties were unable to incorporate the 
demands of the new urban population into their projects. The major economic crisis at the 
end of the decade contributed to this process by pushing even more people into the 
informal economy and increasing overall discontent with political parties, social 
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organizations, and the political system as a whole. Together, these changes led to the 
demise of the party system and the rise of political outsiders (Cameron 1994; Tanaka 
1998). 
Similar to Menem in Argentina, the eventual winner of the 1990 elections, 
Alberto Fujimori Fujimori, campaigned with a vague policy platform and a strong 
message against the political establishment. He promised to control inflation and restore 
growth with gradual adjustment. However, once elected to office, Fujimori implemented 
sweeping neoliberal reforms that tamed inflation and brought about economic growth. 
These accomplishments brought the president great popular support and provided him 
with political capital needed to close the congress in 1992. Under international pressure, 
the president called elections for a constituent assembly that took place later that year. 
The assembly drafted a constitution that consolidated market reforms and allowed the 
president to run for a second term. 
The new constitution was approved by a referendum in 1993 and Fujimori was 
reelected in 1995. To assure these victories, Fujimori’s government made extensive use 
of clientelistic social spending (Graham and Kane 1998; Schady 2000). At the same time 
that the pension system was being privatized and other work-related social benefits 
reduced, poverty relief expenditures as well as health and education spending saw 
substantial increases (Segura-Ubiergo 2007, 247-256). Also critical in explaining support 
for Fujimori’s regime was the capture of the most important leaders of SL and the near 
defeat of the guerilla organization (Kelly 2003; see Weyland 2000 for a different 
assessment). 
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A confluence of factors played a role in consolidating self-reliance beliefs among 
the public during the 1990s. The collapse of the social structures, general dissatisfaction 
with the state, and dissatisfaction with the political and social establishments—who were 
blamed for the general debacle of the 1980s—not only contained the growth of 
radicalism within the lower classes, but also convinced vast sectors of the population that 
the state was not going to provide a solution to their problems. This expectation was 
fulfilled by the state retrenchment policies implemented in the 1990s. Moreover, the 
increased access to social services that the lower classes experienced during Fujimori’s 
government was not framed as an achievement en route to greater social equality or 
justice. Instead, they were used to promote Fujimori’s popularity and demonstrate his 
efficiency while his rhetoric reminded the public of the perils of big government and the 
ineptitude of the political establishment. 
As shown in the previous chapter, beliefs in line with the self-reliance frame have 
been dominant in Peru since Fujimori came to power in the 1990s. Figure 6.5 provides 
additional evidence to this effect. The figure shows that a majority of Peruvians has 
consistently thought that increasing production and productivity is more important for the 
country than improving the distribution of wealth. The majority was quite sizable in the 
first half of the 1990s, when economic reforms were being implemented and Fujimori’s 
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Despite shrinking over time, this majority proved to be resilient through tough 
economic times like the recession of 1998 and the stagnation of the early 2000s. It has 
also proven resilient through major political developments like the fall of Fujimori, the 
revelation of widespread corruption during his government, and the anti-neoliberal threat 
of presidential hopeful Ollanta Humala Tasso in the 2006 elections. While Humala was 
elected president in 2011, this was a product of his moderation during the campaign 
rather than of a change in the mass beliefs and attitudes. Thus fa during his presidency, 
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In sum, the dominance of the self-reliance frame established after the 1980s 
critical juncture should be attributed to the public’s realization that the state would be 
unable to provide a solution to the social question. This is especially true among the new 
urban population comprised of migrants that left the countryside in search of opportunity 
and social inclusion. Barring a major economic crisis or a critical political development, 
this dominance should remain strong. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that a critical juncture framework is useful in 
understanding changes in mass beliefs and attitudes regarding inequality within 
Argentina and Peru. These mass beliefs are stable or change only incrementally during 
times of normal politics, but are highly malleable at certain points in time. Major political 
developments, like the expansion of the franchise and the advent of mass politics, as well 
as economic, political, or social crises, make the public particularly receptive to new 
ideas. Gradual structural change also plays a role in bringing about changes in mass 
beliefs but only in combination with major events. Most importantly, the chapter has 
shown that the choices of political actors at these critical junctures largely shape mass 
beliefs. Indeed, only the confluence of populist rhetoric and successful redistributive 
policies at such times can produce redistributive frame dominance. 
In Argentina, redistributive frame dominance developed because a political actor 
was able to implement relatively successful equity-enhancing policies while using 
populist rhetoric early in the country’s experience with mass politics. The crises of the 
1970s and 1980s, as well as the major structural changes that took place since the Perón 
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era undermined the dominance of the redistributive frame. However, the economic 
underperformance of the 1990s and ultimate major crisis of 2001-2002 reversed this 
trajectory and brought the progressive wing of Peronism back to power. This resulted in 
the consolidation of redistributive frame dominance. In Peru, in contrast, APRA was not 
able to produce redistributive frame dominance because it was prevented from governing 
by the military throughout the first critical juncture. Later, the GRFA failed because it 
attempted radical change at a time of normal politics, when the public was not receptive 
to its initiatives and discourse. Realizing that the state could not provide a solution to the 
social question, the public embraced self-reliance beliefs after the 1980s critical juncture. 
Finally, the dominance of this frame became consolidated as a product of President 





This dissertation has analyzed existing theories of redistributive attitudes based on 
interests and group identity in Argentina and Peru. It has also developed and examined a 
belief-based account of support for redistribution. In contrast to extant accounts 
emphasizing individuals’ position with regard to structural cleavages, this theory focuses 
on social beliefs, cognitions about the causes of poverty and inequality that inform 
judgments about the fairness of the distributive status quo and the moral worthiness of 
helping those in need. This study is one of the first attempts at systematically assessing 
these three types of explanations in developing democracies. 
The preceding analyses have shown that interest-based and group identity-based 
accounts are not very useful in explaining variation in redistributive attitudes in 
Argentina and Peru. Of all the considerations suggested by these theories, only income 
consistently shapes attitudes as expected. In an examination of patterns in the effects and 
non-effects of the other considerations, it was argued that context plays a key role in the 
extent to which they are salient. By doing so, this dissertation has moved scholarship in 
the direction of generating a general theory of support for redistribution. Such a theory 
will need to specify the factors that make particular structural cleavages more or less 
salient in informing support to be able to account for variation in contexts as different as 
those found in advanced industrial and developing democracies. 
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As argued in Chapter 4, cleavages arising from employment status, class status, 
and occupation sectors are not very relevant in the developing world because of greater 
economic volatility and structural complexity. Together, these factors make it challenging 
for individuals to become cognizant of their constantly changing economic interests. The 
relative weakness of social and political organizations that promote these types of 
interests makes this even more difficult. Limited and targeted coverage of social 
protection systems further contributes to this state of affairs and also leads to the 
fragmentation of groups that could potentially become strong constituencies supporting 
specific social policies. 
Ethnic cleavages are not very relevant either. This finding is not surprising in the 
case of relatively homogenous Argentina, but it is surprising in ethnically diverse Peru. 
Despite having higher levels of fragmentation than the U.S., group identification and 
prejudice are not powerful predictors of redistributive attitudes in Peru. Limited social 
protection coverage as well as weak ethnic-based organizations again play a role in 
explaining this result. In addition, extensive mestizaje helps explain this finding, as it has 
produced porous ethnic lines and very fluid ethnic identities. 
Overall, social beliefs shape redistributive attitudes as expected. Within each 
country, individuals whose views are closer to the redistributive frame are more 
supportive of redistribution. Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, social beliefs can 
account for some of the divergence in support across the two countries. Indeed, while 
Argentines tend to hold beliefs about the nature of wealth accumulation, about the causes 
of poverty, and about equality of opportunities and social mobility that are closer to the 
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redistributive frame, Peruvians’ views on these issues are more aligned with the self-
reliance frame. As documented in Chapter 5, if social beliefs were more similar across 
the two countries, the divergence in levels of support for redistribution would be less 
pronounced. 
Finally, the dissertation explored the origins of inequality frame dominance. It 
proposes a critical juncture framework to understand the evolution of mass social beliefs. 
Chapter 6 demonstrated how the redistributive frame can become dominant when, at 
critical junctures, progressive political actors are able to implement comprehensive social 
policies while relying on populist, egalitarian, or class warfare rhetoric to justify their 
policy choices. This was the case in Argentina where mass incorporation coincided with 
the rise of populist president, Juan Perón. The chapter also showed how the redistributive 
frame failed to become dominant in Peru where this combination of factors never 
occurred during a critical juncture. Eventually, in the wake of Fujimori’s government and 
neoliberal reforms, the self-reliance frame’s dominance was consolidated. 
In sum, this dissertation has developed a belief-based explanation of support for 
redistribution that helps explain variation within and across the developing countries of 
Argentina and Peru. It has also assessed existing explanations based on interests and 
group identity and developed insights about how economic, policy, and social factors 
mediate the effects of the considerations emphasized by these theories. Finally, it has 
provided a politico-historical account for understanding the origins of social beliefs in 
Argentina and Peru. The remainder of this chapter discusses the theoretical and 
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substantive implications of these findings as well as new research questions that emerge 
from the study. 
Theoretical and Substantive Implications 
To date, public opinion scholars have been mostly concerned with examining the 
extent to which redistributive attitudes reflect individual-level considerations such as 
interests, ethnic identity, values, and personality traits. Accordingly, their research has 
mostly centered on analyzing within-country variation. Cross-national differences in 
attitudes, which are arguably as or more important given that they can account for 
disparate political developments, have received much less attention. Furthermore, most 
scholarship concerned with this cross-national variation tends to assume that attitudes are 
shaped by constructs such as culture or institutions, and thus focus on studying these 
constructs, losing sight of attitudes and individuals (Wildavsky 1987). 
As a result, public opinion scholarship has identified a plethora of considerations 
that explain individual-level variation in policy attitudes, but most often examines them 
in isolation without any consistent efforts at theoretical synthesis. As a consequence, 
scholars know that a lot of considerations can shape a given attitude, but know very little 
about why certain considerations matter in some contexts, but not in others, or about what 
explains their relative importance. Even less is known about the role that these 
considerations play in explaining cross-national variation in opinion. In turn, studies 
analyzing opinion at the aggregate-level have identified various system-level factors 
explaining variation, but do not specify the causal mechanisms through which these 
factors shape individuals’ opinions. 
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This dissertation moves public opinion scholarship forward by addressing these 
weaknesses. First, rather than attempting to demonstrate the importance of a single 
consideration to the detriment of others, this study has sought to integrate a relatively 
novel explanation with existing accounts that are theoretically sound. This was achieved 
by identifying the contextual factors that mediate the salience of specific considerations. 
Second, by considering contextual differences across countries as well as compositional 
and salience differences that originate at the individual level, the dissertation has 
provided a framework to examine the individual-level foundations of cross-national 
variation in attitudes. In this way, this study constitutes a step toward the type of general 
theorizing that is currently lacking in comparative public opinion scholarship. It is worth 
noting that other recent research has moved in this direction by using multi-level 
modeling to examine increasingly available cross-national survey data. The empirical 
strategy employed in this dissertation provides a framework to conduct a similarly 
rigorous analysis whenever data limitations preclude multi-level statistical analysis or 
when a case-oriented approach is preferred. 
This study also has important implications for existing theories of welfare state 
development. These theories focus on structural explanations that assume that public 
policies are a reflection of the dominant economic interests in society. According to 
power resource theory (Huber and Stephens 2001; Korpi 1983; Stephens 1979), generous 
welfare states develop wherever labor enjoys significant political strength and is capable 
of building stable left-wing government coalitions. In Varieties of Capitalism scholarship 
(Iversen 2005; Iversen and Soskice 2001; Mares 2003; Mares 2005), generous welfare 
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states develop wherever coalitions of employers and employees in sectors that want to 
socialize the costs of market risks are strengthened by patterns of specialization in the 
global economy. Earlier theories focusing on the social disruptions brought about by 
industrialization and economic growth also assume welfare states to be automatic 
responses to the emergence of new vulnerable populations (Wilensky 1975). 
This dissertation has two interrelated implications for these theories. First, the 
study shows that social beliefs are an important consideration shaping attitudes about 
redistribution. Social beliefs did not play a central role in the initial implementation of 
welfare states in Argentina and Peru where mass inequality frames first developed after 
the political incorporation of the working and popular classes and as a consequence of the 
social policies that were implemented at this time. Social beliefs could, however, be 
central in explaining policy outcomes wherever the advent of mass politics preceded 
welfare state formation or expansion.  
One could argue, for example, that the dominance of the self-reliance frame in the 
U.S. might have constrained the options available to politicians and policy-makers in the 
aftermath of the Great Depression, leading them to implement temporary workfare 
programs. Even in current times, social beliefs can pose important constrains on policy-
makers trying to enact reforms in response to financial pressures. Theories of welfare 
state development should be overhauled to consider the role played by social beliefs not 
only during initial policy implementation, but also during consolidation and reform 
periods. 
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Second, according to existing theories, policy outcomes reflect the preferences of 
dominant social groups. This is likely accurate in advanced industrial democracies, where 
the state has been historically weak vis-à-vis societal actors. However, as the analysis of 
the Argentine experience during the Perón era shows, welfare state development can 
follow a substantially distinct path in which individual political actors that capture an 
autonomous state are central. Theories should be revised to incorporate this alternative 
state-centered path of welfare state development. A move in this direction should be 
particularly useful to understanding the welfare states of developing countries, where the 
state has often been a powerful, relatively autonomous actor, often enabling particular 
leaders to advance their platforms without major societal opposition. 
Finally, this dissertation sheds light on the role of public opinion in policy-making 
and democratic politics, more generally. According to established theoretical 
frameworks, citizen preferences and policy positions are the fundamental inputs to the 
political system. Political elites respond to constituent demands or so the story goes. 
Various studies have indeed shown that policies are responsive to public opinion in 
various policy domains (e.g., Page and Shapiro 1983; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 
1995; Brooks and Manza 2006). In these models, citizens’ positions are taken as a given 
and thus remain under-theorized. This dissertation’s theory about the origins of social 
beliefs and redistributive attitudes offers a number of insights about the process by which 
preferences and policy positions are formed and how they subsequently constrain 
subsequent policy developments. Thus this study follows Pierson’s (1993; 1996) 
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suggestions to consider public opinion as both a consequence of and a cause of welfare 
state development and public policies, more generally. 
This account sheds light on how public opinion develops when an issue first 
enters the public sphere—e.g., when the modern welfare state was first introduced—or 
when large sectors of the population are first allowed to engage in debates about a given 
issue—e.g., when the working and popular classes were first incorporated into politics. 
Relatively devoid of predispositions, at this stage, the public is relatively receptive to 
political elite cues and messages transmitted not only via rhetoric but also via the 
implementation of public policies. While elite actions are fundamental to explain the 
public opinion patterns that first emerge on a given issue, their role later becomes 
reactive or constrained by the opinions of the public. Indeed, as politics on a given issue 
become normalized, public opinion becomes quite resistant to elite attempts at 
influencing it, effectively constraining the range of policies that can be enacted or the 
reforms that can be attempted. 
During periods of normal politics, we should observe high levels of 
correspondence between policies and the public’s positions on a given issue. This normal 
politics stage is also the time during which current dominant theories of public opinion 
formation are more informative. Indeed, memory-based theories that focus on political 
elite messages or the role of the media are relatively accurate in explaining the 
incremental change in attitudes observed at this stage (e.g., Zaller 1992; Iyengar and 
Kinder 1989). Theories that focus on gradual transformation due to generational or cohort 
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effects and socialization are similarly informative (e.g., Cutler and Kaufman 1975; 
Mannheim 1952; Searing, Wright and Rabinowitz 1976). 
However, these theories and insights cannot explain the radical changes in public 
opinion that create opportunities for similarly radical institutional reforms. In contrast, 
the politico-historical theory of the origins of mass beliefs can account for these 
developments. As argued in this dissertation, crises make the public open to new ideas, 
providing political elites with leeway to implement major policy overhauls. This 
argument is in line with other research that highlights the role of crises in triggering 
public demand for institutional change (Weyland 2002; Weyland 2008). 
It is important to mention that crises can only make the public open to policy 
reforms, but cannot guarantee that reforms will be accepted in the long-term. This 
ultimately depends on reforms’ capacity to improve the well-being of the public. As 
shown by the case of Argentina in the 1990s, hyperinflation and a deep recession made 
the citizenry open to neoliberal reforms. However, the public started to question reforms 
as soon as unemployment and the regressive distributional effects of reforms became a 
source of concern. And the new major economic crisis of the early-2000s completed the 
swing back to redistributive social beliefs and policy positions that had characterized 
Argentine public opinion before the 1980s. 
This way of understanding the role of public opinion in the social policy-making 
process has important substantive implications. First, it suggests that politicians and 
policy-makers should be particularly attentive to public opinion and social beliefs during 
times of normal politics. During these times, they will face particularly high barriers to 
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reform the policy status quo in directions that go against the dominant inequality frame. 
In contrast, incremental change that moves the policy status quo in the other direction—
i.e., closer to the dominant frame—should be relatively easy to enact.  
Recent developments in Argentina and Peru illustrate this point. In the 2000s, 
conditional cash transfer programs were introduced in both countries. In Argentina, 
programs were introduced in 2002 as a response to the massive increase in poverty 
brought about by the 2001-2002 economic crisis. In line with what one would expect 
given the dominance of redistributive beliefs, these programs were criticized because 
they were targeted rather than universal, because they involved a workfare component, 
and because of their inability to create conditions for beneficiaries to overcome their 
economic troubles in the short term (see, for example, Campos, Faur, and Pautassi 2007; 
CELS 2003). In other words, these programs were criticized as being not progressive 
enough. Since then, these programs have been overhauled to make access more universal 
and promote human capital accumulation by replacing workfare components with 
conditions related to children’s education and healthcare. Public opinion has not been an 
obstacle to these reforms. While a 2007 national survey shows that Argentines were 
quick to point out the limitations of cash transfer programs, it also shows that only a 
minority of respondents (28%) was willing to eliminate programs without replacing them 
(Cruces and Rovner 2008, 64-66). 
In Peru, conditional cash transfers were timidly introduced in 2005 and mostly in 
response to prompts from international organizations such as the World Bank and the 
Inter-American Development Bank. A survey of Lima inhabitants carried out in March of 
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2005 reveals that a sizable majority (61%) of those who had heard about the initiative 
opposed it because “creating employment rather than giving away money” was a better 
alternative (Ipsos Apoyo Opinión y Mercado 2009b). Furthermore, the survey also shows 
that 86% of respondents thought that this program would create incentives for the poor to 
become complacent with their situation (Ipsos Apoyo Opinión y Mercado 2009c). Given 
this opposition, the program has been expanded incrementally in the subsequent years 
despite its success at alleviating extreme poverty. More recently, the current 
government’s initiative to introduce universal, non-contributory pensions for the elderly 
was met with skepticism by the public. To assuage the fears of critics, it was finally 
implemented as a pilot, means-tested program targeting the extreme poor. 
This framework for understanding the relationship between public opinion and 
public policy also suggests that opportunities to introduce major reforms are a scarce 
commodity for politicians and policy-makers. After initial implementation and once mass 
politics has fully developed, the immediate aftermaths of economic crises—when 
uncertainty undermines individuals’ predispositions—are likely the only periods during 
which major reforms can be enacted. The ultimate survival of drastic reforms 
implemented during these periods hinges, at least in part, on the generation of wide-
ranging support among the public. The major pension system reforms introduced in the 
aftermath of the hyperinflationary crises underwent by both countries in 1989-1990 and 
the subsequent policy changes are illustrative cases of these points. 
In Argentina, a mixed system was introduced to replace the public pay-as-you-go 
system in 1993. This system consisted of having workers continue to contribute to the 
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public system, which guaranteed a minimum pension upon retirement, and to a private 
individual capitalization system for additional benefits. After the return of the progressive 
wing of Peronism to power, all funds in the private system were nationalized, and the 
single, state-run, pay-as-you-go system was reinstated in 2008. In a context of 
widespread disenchantment with neoliberal reforms, substantial policy reversal took 
place without any major public upheaval.  
Similar reforms were implemented in Peru during the same period of economic 
crisis, but, in contrast to Argentina, these reforms have enjoyed relatively high and broad 
public support. In Peru, the reforms involved a new pension system in which individuals 
were given the option of choosing between a private individual capitalization system and 
the existing public pay-as-you-go system upon entering the labor force. The system has 
only been modified slightly since its implementation. Complete policy reversal as in the 
case of Argentina is unthinkable, as it would likely be confronted with great opposition 
from the public. 
Finally, this dissertation offers somewhat grim predictions about the prospects of 
developing welfare state policies that are more progressive in Argentina and Peru as well 
as in other similar countries. Chapter 3 showed that while redistributive and universal in 
aim, welfare state spending in Argentina is neutral at best. While the citizenry as a whole 
would in principle support equity-enhancing reforms in these policies, organized labor 
would oppose them given that it is the social actor that has mostly benefited from the 
current state of affairs. Barring the occurrence of another major crisis, and given the 
importance of this actor in Argentine politics, equity-enhancing reforms should be very 
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difficult to enact. In this context, improvements could only arise from creating new 
programs or expanding coverage of existing ones among relatively worse-off individuals, 
a development that is unlikely given the financial constraints faced by governments in 
developing countries. 
In Peru, major policy changes in the direction of equity are perhaps even more 
improbable, as aspiring reformers would have to convince public opinion of their 
convenience. In this case, expanding the coverage of existing programs would also be 
difficult and creating new ones would only be possible if proposed programs involved 
means testing and targeting. Despite the fact that this type of program is highly 
progressive, a move in this direction would take Peru farther away from the possibility of 
being able to implement a universal welfare state. 
Avenues for Future Research 
Existing studies suggest that social beliefs can account for variation in 
redistributive attitudes not only within the U.S. and Europe, but also across the two 
contexts (e.g. Alesina and Angeletos 2005; Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Benabou and 
Tirole 2006). This dissertation has provided evidence indicating that this is also the case 
in Argentina and Peru. Moreover, and unlike in the case of advanced industrial 
democracies, it has shown that, other than income, considerations suggested by theories 
based on interests and group identity do not shape support for redistribution in these two 
countries. The dissertation also developed an account of the origins of inequality frames. 
The natural next step to follow would be to explore whether these findings are 
generalizable to other countries in Latin America and the developing world. The 
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discussion in Chapter 4 suggests that the elements that make interest less salient in 
Argentina and Peru should also be present in other developing countries. Considerations 
suggested by theories based on group identity should be salient in countries were 
ethnicity has been an important social or political cleavage. Finally, social beliefs should 
inform support for redistribution regardless of context. Besides exploring whether these 
findings hold in other countries, future research should also examine the extent to which 
the politico-historical framework developed to understand the origins of mass social 
beliefs can be generalized to other policy domains. 
This dissertation suggests at least three additional avenues for future research. The 
first one stems from the limitations of the items used to measure redistributive attitudes in 
this study. As discussed in Chapter 3, because of vagueness in the items’ wording, some 
respondents might have answered them having a general idea of redistribution in mind, 
while others might have expresses attitudes toward specific policies. These specific 
policies could themselves vary from very general social policies like education and 
healthcare to more targeted programs such as old-age pensions and unemployment 
benefits. Future research could shed light on the role that the various factors explored 
here play in shaping redistributive attitudes as the level of abstractness of attitude objects 
varies from specific policies to the more abstract construct of redistribution. 
A particularly interesting hypothesis worth exploring is whether material interests 
become more relevant as attitude objects become more specific. For example, one would 
expect retirees, students, and welfare payment recipients to be particularly concerned 
about pensions, education, and cash transfer programs, respectively. In contrast, more 
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abstract considerations like social beliefs should play a bigger role in informing more 
abstract opinions about inequality or redistributive policies as a whole. Inquiring about 
the policies that individuals have in mind when answering general questions about 
reducing inequality could provide additional insights about the role of social beliefs. For 
instance, two individuals might express similar levels of support for redistribution. 
Suppose one proposes general, opportunities-enhancing social policies while the other 
one suggests a measure involving expropriation. Social beliefs could help explain these 
preferences among potential policy solutions to address inequality. 
The second avenue for further research is related to this dissertation’s finding that 
the salience of individual-level factors in informing support for redistribution varies 
within countries over time.63 For example, the analysis in Chapter 4 revealed that being 
self-employed or a student was associated with lower support for redistribution in Wave 
4 of the WVS, but not in the other two waves in Argentina. In Chapter 5, the evidence 
indicated that believing that hard work does not always lead to success was associated 
with higher levels of support in Wave 3, but with lower levels of support in Wave 5 in 
both countries under study. 
The discussion hypothesized that these and other instances of effect heterogeneity 
were the result of changing political circumstances related to the enactment of neoliberal 
                                                
63 To the best of the author’s knowledge, this dissertation is the first study to document this type of effect 
heterogeneity. Existing studies of redistributive attitudes generally analyze a single cross section of surveys 
(e.g., Corneo and Grüner 2002; Cusack et al. 2006; Iversen 2005; Rehm 2005) or pool all available data 
and thus are not designed to document heterogeneity (e.g., Alesina and Giuliano 2009). Some studies 
analyze heterogeneity in the effects of class status across countries (Guillaud 2008; Isaksson and Lindskog 
2007; Kumlin and Svallfors 2007), but none allows for the possibility of within-country across-time effect 
heterogeneity. 
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reforms in the 1990s. This is a plausible explanation for heterogeneity as observed in 
Argentina and Peru, but it remains to be seen if this explanation can withstand systematic 
assessment. This will only be possible as more data become available. Additional data 
will also make it possible to determine whether this heterogeneity is substantively 
important or simply unimportant, minor deviations from otherwise well-established 
patterns. While comparative surveys that include developing countries are becoming 
more and more commonplace, they are still relatively scarce. Given this limitation, future 
research on this front should probably begin by exploring effect heterogeneity in the 
context of advanced industrial democracies where there is more opportunity to examine 
this over an extended period of time. 
Finally, this study has documented that substantial differences in levels of support 
for redistribution persist across the two countries under study even after controlling for 
individual-level factors. In other words, Argentines are less supportive of redistribution 
than Peruvians regardless of their individual characteristics. Given the research design of 
this study, it is not possible to draw definitive conclusions about the sources of these 
population-wide differences. Thus, this is a topic that future research should address—not 
only in the case of differences between Argentina and Peru, but also more general cross-
national differences that cannot be explained by individual-level differences. 
It would be particularly interesting to explore whether inequality frames could 
account for population-wide differences by having a direct effect on aggregate levels of 
support. As shown in Chapter 5, individuals who hold the redistributive frame are more 
supportive of redistribution than those who hold the self-reliance frame. That chapter also 
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showed that the former frame is more widespread among Argentines than among 
Peruvians. Accounting for these individual-level differences helps explain the divergence 
in redistributive attitudes across the two countries, but only partially. Could the relative 
dominance of the redistributive frame lead to an across the board increase in support? 
Conversely, could the relative dominance of the self-reliance frame lead to an across the 
board decrease in support? This could be the case if inequality frames constrained the 
levels of redistribution that all or a large majority of individuals within a given country 
deem acceptable.  
Future research could explore the mechanisms through which this effect on 
aggregate support might occur. One avenue worth exploring is how dominant inequality 
frames are transmitted through political socialization involving the family, educational 
systems, and mass media. It would also be interesting to explore how dominant frames 
affect the nature of political competition, especially through the structure of political 
party systems, and how this in turn shapes aggregate support. 
In conclusion, while this dissertation has made several contributions, it also opens 
the door to future research on many fronts. Future research should further test the 
arguments made here in other contexts. It should also explore the generalizability of the 
findings in policy domains beyond redistribution. Finally, it should explore what else—
other than compositional and salience differences in social beliefs—can help explain the 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Income Brackets and Nominal Marginal Tax Rates 
in Argentina and Peru 
 
Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers (2011). 
a Exchange rates: 0.2686 US$ per Argentinean Peso (Argentine Central Bank, 




Income Bracket            
(US$)a
Marginal Tax Rate      
(%)
0 - 2,386 9
2,386 - 4,772 14
4,772 - 7,158 19
7,158 - 14,316 23
1,4316 - 2,1475 27
21,475 - 28,633 31
28,633 and up 35
0 - 9,197 0
9,197 - 44,672 15
4,672 - 80,146 21
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Models of Support for Redistribution in Argentina 
(RESPONSIBILITY Item) 
 
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. * prob<0.10; ** prob<0.05; ***<prob<0.01. 
Controls not included in waves four and five as they were used to predict—and thus are highly correlated 




-0.0353 -0.0321 -0.0150 0.0040 -0.0145 0.0036
(0.0455) (0.0456) (0.0692) (0.0709) (0.0769) (0.0835)
0.0772 0.0999 0.1109 0.1648 -0.0237 -0.0247
(0.4370) (0.4365) (0.5665) (0.5663) (0.3676) (0.3687)
0.3627 0.5705 0.3979 0.5129 0.6717 0.5284
(0.3710) (0.4035) (0.3184) (0.3518) (0.4595) (0.5012)
0.1436 0.3462 -0.2142 -0.1053 -0.0361 -0.1813
(0.3087) (0.3411) (0.2715) (0.3090) (0.3414) (0.3953)
0.2758 0.5045 0.3643 0.4901 0.0850 -0.0425
(0.4228) (0.4555) (0.2981) (0.3383) (0.3582) (0.4123)
0.1250 0.2918 -0.5054 -0.4064 0.3716 0.2188
(0.4629) (0.4816) (0.3450) (0.3727) (0.4364) (0.4800)
-0.7417 ** -0.5507 0.5676 ** 0.6916 ** -0.4043 -0.5391







0.0635 * 0.0618 *
(0.0368) (0.0367)








5.4283 *** 5.2161 *** 6.6237 *** 6.4175 *** 6.1624 *** 6.2146 ***
(0.8922) (0.9127) (0.3994) (0.4563) (0.4719) (0.5525)
N 861 861 1238 1238 969 969













Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5








Models of Support for Redistribution in Peru 
(RESPONSIBILITY Item) 
 
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. * prob<0.10; ** prob<0.05; ***<prob<0.01. 
Occupational category variable not included because item was not available in Wave 5. 
 
-0.1038 * -0.1070 * 0.0360 0.0279 -0.0036
(0.0561) (0.0567) (0.0496) (0.0499) (0.0575)
0.0638 0.1300 -0.3459 -0.3611 -0.1541
(0.2731) (0.2772) (0.4201) (0.4162) (0.3522)
0.3469 0.0360 -0.2937 -0.4353 0.7489
(0.4670) (0.5870) (0.3026) (0.3927) (0.4635)
-0.3487 -0.6705 -0.0964 -0.2150 -0.1713
(0.3159) (0.4827) (0.2562) (0.3615) (0.2609)
0.1139 -0.2383 -0.1331 -0.2130 -0.1573
(0.6229) (0.7341) (0.5043) (0.5737) (0.5955)
-0.2347 -0.5025 0.6294 ** 0.4731 -0.3331
(0.3808) (0.5123) (0.3052) (0.3892) (0.3579)
-0.0811 -0.4182 0.0463 -0.0749 -0.2857





-0.0965 -0.0506 -0.2805 -0.3290 * -0.0754
(0.2288) (0.2335) (0.1928) (0.1944) (0.1981)
0.1025 * 0.1115 ** 0.0197 0.0114 -0.0344
(0.0542) (0.0544) (0.0480) (0.0484) (0.0365)
-0.0012 * -0.0013 * -0.0004 -0.0003 0.0004
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0004)
-0.4350 -0.5292 -0.3780 -0.3857 -0.1138
(0.4397) (0.4400) (0.4445) (0.4448) (0.3240)
-0.6893 -0.7185 * -0.4333 -0.4623 -0.3537
(0.4284) (0.4292) (0.4401) (0.4409) (0.3270)
-1.2594 ** -1.2250 ** -0.5482 -0.7423 -0.2729
(0.4958) (0.5095) (0.4786) (0.4912) (0.4059)
4.6698 *** 4.8148 *** 5.5145 *** 5.8940 *** 6.1525 ***
(1.1105) (1.1449) (0.9979) (1.0462) (0.8246)
N 960 950 1472 1470 1321













Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Models of Support for Redistribution in Argentina, 
Including Ethnic Identification and Prejudice 
(RESPONSIBILITY Item) 
 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * prob<0.10; **<prob<0.05; ***prob<0.01. 
a Interactions between minority identification and the two types of prejudice not included because 
intersections contained less than 30 respondents. 
b Item used to construct ethnic identification dummy was only available in Wave 5. 
c Dummy indicating prejudice toward racial outgroups not included in Wave 5 because category 
contained less than 30 respondents. 
-0.0360 -0.0353 0.3267 0.3245 -0.0759
(0.0455) (0.0455) (0.2204) (0.2195) (0.2585)
0.0777 0.0782 0.1426 0.1492 -0.0459
(0.4380) (0.4374) (0.5762) (0.5824) (0.3781)
0.3712 0.3644 0.3580 0.3613 0.6076
(0.3714) (0.3713) (0.3207) (0.3191) (0.4681)
0.1420 0.1439 -0.2334 -0.2113 -0.0908
(0.3085) (0.3088) (0.2742) (0.2750) (0.3522)
0.2699 0.2738 -0.0314 -0.0083 -0.0190
(0.4220) (0.4239) (0.3786) (0.3794) (0.4911)
0.1208 0.1242 -0.5433 -0.5297 0.2574
(0.4635) (0.4637) (0.3895) (0.3902) (0.4781)
-0.7460 ** -0.7427 ** 0.4361 0.4407 -0.3066







0.1058 0.1052 0.2955 0.2741 -0.1145
(0.2276) (0.2275) (0.2241) (0.2235) (0.2606)
0.0633 * 0.0634 * 0.0012 0.0016 -0.0348
(0.0368) (0.0369) (0.0322) (0.0322) (0.0388)
-0.0008 ** -0.0008 ** 0.0002 0.0001 0.0004
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004)
-0.4736 -0.4704 -0.8623 ** -0.8671 ** 0.7496
(0.3875) (0.3885) (0.4219) (0.4203) (0.5505)
-0.6207 -0.6131 -1.0120 -1.0307 0.4387
(0.4162) (0.4174) (0.7350) (0.7327) (0.8891)
-0.6310 -0.6233 -2.7016 ** -2.7308 ** 1.0536
(0.5269) (0.5277) (1.2500) (1.2467) (1.4587)
5.4448 *** 5.4312 *** 5.4241 *** 5.4696 *** 6.6436 ***
(0.8938) (0.8945) (1.1020) (1.0982) (1.2908)
N 861 861 1238 1238 947



















Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
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Table A1.9 
Models of Support for Redistribution in Peru, 
Including Ethnic Identification and Prejudice 
(RESPONSIBILITY Item) 
 
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. * prob<0.10; ** prob<0.05; *** 
prob<0.01. Models include a constant and the usual controls. Coefficients not reported 
to economize space, but consistent with those in Table A1.6. 
a Interactions between Afro-descendent and other minority identifications and 
prejudice not included because intersections contained less than 30 respondents. 
b Mestizos, indigenous, and Afro-descendents are classified into a single category in 
Wave 4 due to item limitations. 
c Other minority identification not included in Wave 5 because category contained less 
than 30 respondents; these respondents are included in the base category. 
d Interaction between indigenous identification and prejudice not included in Wave 3 
because intersection contained less than 30 respondents. 






















1.2059 * 0.7794 -0.4175
(0.6166) (0.6455) (1.2981)



















Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
N 953 1459 1249
R-squared 0.0314 0.0133 0.0241
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Table A1.10 
Models of Support for Redistribution in Argentina and Peru, 
Including Ethnic Identification and Prejudice 
(WELL-BEING Item) 
 
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. * prob<0.10; ** prob<0.05; *** prob<0.01. Models 
include a constant and the usual controls; coefficients are not reported to economize space, but are 
consistent with those in Table A1.7. 
a Other minority identification dummy not included because category contained less than 30 respondents 
for all country-years. These respondents are included in the base category. 
b Item used to construct union membership dummy was only available in 2008 surveys. 
c Item used to construct economic prospects dummies was only available in 2010 surveys. 
d Afro-descendent respondents dummy not included for Argentina models because category contained less 
than 30 respondents. These respondents are included in indigenous category. 
-0.0233 0.0341 -0.0117 -0.0188
(0.0179) (0.0294) (0.0254) (0.0247)
-0.6237 -0.0951 0.3425 * 0.6582 ***
(0.4521) (0.1880) (0.1874) (0.1981)
0.5103 0.6602 *** 0.0060 0.0950
(0.3799) (0.1602) (0.2472) (0.1781)
-0.1831 -0.1775 0.0248 -0.0412
(0.1299) (0.1321) (0.1243) (0.1184)
-0.4663 ** -0.3613 -0.3404 -0.0316
(0.2316) (0.2975) (0.2880) (0.2644)
-0.1617 -0.4320 * 0.0155 0.0610
(0.1599) (0.2217) (0.1914) (0.1853)
-0.4641 *** 0.0766 0.0207 0.0879
(0.1599) (0.2009) (0.1508) (0.1438)
-0.0621 0.0422
(0.1569) (0.1373)




0.0669 -0.4421 *** 0.1141 0.2290 *
(0.1019) (0.1263) (0.1357) (0.1315)
0.1594 0.6327 0.1929 0.3811




















Independent              
Variablesa
ARGENTINA PERU
2008 2010 2008 2010




























N 962 905 1235 1113





Models of Support for Redistribution in Argentina, 
Including Beliefs about Wealth, Economic Outcomes, and Poverty 
(RESPONSIBILITY Item) 
 





































4.9819 *** 5.0996 *** 4.9794 ***
(0.9287) (0.8979) (1.0170)
N 835 854 717


























































Model 4 Model 5
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Table A1.12 
Models of Support for Redistribution in Peru, 
Including Beliefs about Wealth, Economic Outcomes, and Poverty 
(RESPONSIBILITY Item) 
 
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. * prob<0.10; ** prob<0.05; *** prob<0.01. 


























0.0983 * 0.0982 * 0.1070 *
(0.0563) (0.0544) (0.0575)




-0.7530 * -0.7036 -0.8929 *
(0.4521) (0.4367) (0.4702)
-1.3174 ** -1.2926 ** -1.5169 ***
(0.5168) (0.5053) (0.5389)
4.6317 *** 4.9150 *** 4.5057 ***
(1.1716) (1.1231) (1.2030)
N 921 951 855


























































Model 4 Model 5
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Appendix 2 
Imputation of Income Variable for Argentina 
in Wave 4 and Wave 5 of the World Values Survey 
The first step of the imputation process involved estimating the parameters of the 
following income equation using ordinary least squares with data from Wave 3 of the 
World Values Survey: 
INCOMEi = !0 + !1FEMALEi + !2AGEi + !3AGE*AGEi 
 + !4PRIMARY SCHOOLi + !5SECONDARY SCHOOLi 
 + !7COLLEGEi + ei 
where INCOMEi is the individuals’ income; FEMALEi is a dichotomous variable 
indicating whether the individual is male or female; AGEi is the individual’s age; 
PRIMARY SCHOOLi, SECONDARY SCHOOLi, and COLLEGEi are dichotomous 
variables that indicate the individual’s level of educational attainment; and ei is a random 
error term. Table A2 below presents the estimates for this income equation. 
The income variable was imputed in Wave 4 and Wave 5 by calculating the 
predicted values of individuals’ income based on the estimated coefficients from the 
income equation and adding a random noise to this predicted value. The random noise 






Results of Estimation of Income Equation 
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